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Abstract
In recent years, neoclassical economic literature has undergone a fundamental change of
emphasis, from orthodox neoclassical to neoinstitutional theory. World Bank research
and high-level policy departments have reflected this change by shifting from
development as ‘structural adjustment’ to development as ‘governance’. I engage the
case of the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project (CCPDP) to argue that the
neoclassical economic shift is a spectacle or exhibit, irrelevant in important ways to
exploitation “on the ground.” Contrary to neoclassical economics and World Bank
development rationales, the CCPDP is a hyper-documented project with a hyperrestricted scope, typical of commodity exploitation in Central Africa and elsewhere. I
use the case of key commodity exploitation over the last 600 years in Nigeria to show
parallels with the CCPDP. First, I show the use of exhibits, spectacular violence and
quotidian control in exploitation of Nigeria from slave trade with dynastic canoe houses
through petroleum production at the time of nominal independence. Second, Watts’
examination of petroleum exploitation through the lens of the oil complex and the petrostate provides detailed analysis of the “ungovernable governmentality” that characterizes
such exploitation in Nigeria and in the larger “oil complex.” Thirdly, I examine writing
on CSR as well as evidence that political instability can be a competitive advantage. This
undercuts the important neoclassical economic development notion that business simply
ii

“does business” while government and civil society are responsible for human welfare.
In my conclusion I offer provisional areas where the project points to further research.
These include the importance of interdisciplinary regional focus on the Chad basin and
the Gulf of Guinea, including the value of business literature; ways of effectively
examining social movement pressure and corporate response; and the implications of
designing a project around governmentality and relational power for studies of
hegemony, power and development.

iii

Acknowledgements
Thank you first to the members of my dissertation committee, including Sarah Hamilton
and George DeMartino, for their patience and advice that made completion of this project
possible.

Thank you to committee member Rebecca Hardin for providing critical

assistance in particular with analysis of Central Africa, corporations, and politics of
culture. I am also grateful to John Heilbrunn for recommendations regarding inclusion of
the Extractive Industries Review, and for reflections on the character of the World Bank.
I could never have reached this point without commitment from current and former
faculty and staff of the Korbel School of International Studies and especially Angelique
Haugerud’s important direction on how to effectively embark on a theoretically-rich,
engaged, multidisciplinary journey into politics and culture of development; Peter Van
Arsdale’s passion for personal involvement in international development; and John
McCamant’s passion for political and ethical engagement. Thank you to my siblings old
and new for long-term, unconditional support and the example of their lives. Thank you
to Doug, Eric, Karen and Karl in particular for critical comments relating to previous
drafts of this project. Thank you to the Archdiocese of Los Angeles and Diocese of
Kumbo, Nforgwei John, Bigi George Nfor, Robert Tanto, the Tanlaka family, Ma Ya, the
late Abel Bongmba and all of my friends and associates in Cameroon who helped bring
some first-hand clarity to realities underlying “development.” Finally, I want to thank
my immediate family for their support and in particular my two children for motivating
me with their love of writing, reading and exploring. This project is dedicated to my
mom for demonstrating the value of questioning “common sense.”

As always,

responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation in this document rests with me.

iv

Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv
Chapter 1 Introduction: The Spectacle of Neoclassical Economics .................................. 1
Chapter 2 Theoretical Survey: Critical Economics, Hegemony and Govermentality ...... 18
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2

Institutional economics, rationality and power............................................................. 19
Economic questioning of neoclassical economics........................................................ 21
Neoclassical economics as mystification: Gramscian hegemony and the
“domination/resistance” debate.................................................................................... 32
Neoclassical economics as spectacle: Foucault, governmentality and the “microphysics
of power” ..................................................................................................................... 42
Foucauldian discourse and the ‘local’ ................................................................................... 43
Governmentality .................................................................................................................... 48

Chapter 3 From Neoliberal to Neoinstitutional Approaches ............................................ 52
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Reasons for institutions: information costs underlie transaction costs ......................... 54
Transaction cost economics .......................................................................................... 57
Evolutionary neoinstitutional economics ..................................................................... 59
Neoinstitutional economics and development .............................................................. 66
Social interregnum: ‘new institutional economic sociology’ ....................................... 73

Chapter 4 From ‘Structural Adjustment’ to ‘Governance’ ............................................... 76
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

Alleviating ‘crisis’ through rapid economic growth: from ‘embedded liberalism’ to
orthodox neoliberalism ................................................................................................ 79
Moderating neoliberalism: Institutions and ‘sustainable growth’ ................................ 84
Comprehensive development and Poverty Reduction Strategy.................................... 99
International business and ‘development as governance’ .......................................... 105

Chapter 5 The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project .................................. 111
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5

Petroleum industry and neoclassical economic development .................................... 114
The World Bank and extractive industry reform ........................................................ 117
Chad: A poor country with little or no comparative advantage.................................. 122
Project Design: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project ............................ 126
The project on the ground: inserting all actors and removing “political correctness” 134

Chapter 6 Force and consent: The petro-state and the oil complex ................................ 147
6.1
6.2
6.3

Poverty, spectacle and creation of locality ................................................................. 155
The oil complex and global petroleum production ..................................................... 167
CSR and ‘management’ of political instability .......................................................... 172

v

Chapter 7 Conclusions: Neoclassical economics as spectacle ........................................ 178
7.1
7.2
7.3

Regional research of exploitation in the Chad basin .................................................. 189
Corporate engagements and social movement pressure ............................................. 191
Engaging multimodal power ...................................................................................... 194

References ....................................................................................................................... 196
Appendix 1 – HDI 1975-2005 ........................................................................................ 218
Appendix 2 – Abbreviations ........................................................................................... 220

vi

Chapter 1 Introduction: The Spectacle of Neoclassical Economics
an exhibited 'people' became more real and authentic
than the lands and peoples themselves. (Apter 2005,
89)

In recent years, neoclassical economic literature has fundamentally shifted from
neoliberal (orthodox neoclassical) to neoinstitutional approaches for describing economic
activity in ‘developing areas’.1 In particular, the idea of allocative efficiency (resource
control based on technology, resulting in a single equilibrium distribution of resources)
has been replaced by the idea of adaptive efficiency, whereby institutions interact with
material resources to determine efficiency, institutional fixity sustains ineffective as well
as effective economic interactions, and therefore economic development depends on
institutional change. Instead of economic development being only a function of efficient
resource allocation (comparative advantage) given costless information, neoinstitutional
economists have argued that information is not costless. Rather, information constraints
allow for opportunism and resource fixity.

Powerful actors create, maintain and

incrementally alter institutions in order to decrease the possibility of opportunism by
controlling the incentives and limiting the range of choices that individuals can make.
These institutions can be sustainable even if they do not support effective economic
development.

1

‘Developing areas’ is a problematic concept to the extent that it presupposes the liberal definition of
development held by democratization theorists as well as followers of neoclassical economics theory.

1

This theoretical shift has gradually affected research and high-level policy
perspectives within the World Bank2 as the largest organization for neoclassical
economic development. Originally formed to assist European countries devastated by
World War II, the World Bank moved from the early 1960s through the 1970s into global
development initiatives based on state-centered economic approaches. The World Bank
promoted poverty alleviation through support for large state-led projects for rapid
industrialization (Rostow’s “non-communist manifesto”).3 Beginning in the late 1970s,
however, the Bank gradually moved to strictly market-based development policy
rationales, eventually encapsulating the ingredients for poverty alleviation and therefore
development in the policy framework of “structural adjustment.” In the Bank’s view at
that time, economic growth could only occur if governments removed themselves almost
completely from levers of economic production, only retaining marginal economic roles
for distribution. This approach to poverty alleviation is complementary to orthodox
neoclassical economic theory. Beginning in the early 1990s, the World Bank moved
decisively from development based on ‘structural adjustment’ to development based on
‘governance’.4 Picciotto (1995, 6-8) argues that this shift was necessitated primarily by
increased information flow brought about by new globalizing technologies that more
sharply highlighted government failure, and by increased fiscal restraints and pressures.
This shift in World Bank approach mirrors very closely, within the purview of the World
Bank’s stated motto (“working for a world free of poverty”) and with added social
network approaches influenced in particular by Granovetter (1985), the shift within
2

I limit myself in this project to the World Bank’s notion of the “World Bank,” which “refers only to the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development
Association (IDA).” This leaves out organizations such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
3
Briefly, Rostow (1960) argues that societies go through particular stages, beginning with traditional
societies, in the process of economic development. These stages include gaining preconditions for take-off,
taking off, the drive to maturity, and finally mass consumption. Rostow’s theory concentrates on
manufacturing and has a strong role for states in creating conditions for economic development.
4
As I allude to in many areas of this project (especially from perspectives of economic theory, World Bank
research and high-level policy, and business), governance clearly changes meaning depending on context.

2

neoclassical economic theory to neoinstitutional economics.

Governance parallels

assumptions of neoinstitutional economists, and many such as North5 figure prominently
in the rationales published by research and high-level policy departments of the Bank.
In addition to forming the basis for policy at multiple levels in governments and
multilateral economic organizations, neoclassical economic theory and development
rationales inform deeply held assumptions within academic institutions especially about
how goods get produced and distributed; who people are in ‘developing areas’; and
whether, where and how people should concentrate time and resources for progressive
transformation.

I seek to show in this project that these deeply held assumptions

underlying the shift from neoliberal to neoinstitutional economic theory and the related
shift from ‘structural adjustment’ to ‘governance’ are in important ways irrelevant to onthe-ground exploitation in rural areas of less-industrialized countries. However,
sustaining neoclassical economists’ broad assumptions about the ‘real world’ have
provided critical support for sustaining on-the-ground exploitation. How is this? Where
does neoclassical economics exercise power?

Briefly, the strength of neoclassical

economics lies in presenting an aura of apolitical objectivity to those whose training and
experience leave them amenable to such arguments. As Miller (1998a, 196) comments:
[The force of economic abstraction] takes the shape of academics, paid for by states and
international organizations and given the freedom to rise above context in speculative
modelling. While Marx had to tease out the abstract logic of capitalism, today the greater
abstraction of academic economics is quite transparent and constantly confirmed by its
practitioners. Social scientists may not think of academics as particularly powerful; but
then they are not economists.

Peet (2007, 17) similarly writes of the power of experts and ‘expert sense’:
. . . in modernity hegemony is produced as dominant theoretical imaginaries in disciplines
claiming power by presuming to the status of science. Putting this slightly differently,
hegemony means controlling what is taken to be ‘rational’.

5

See, for example, World Bank (1995) Bureaucrats in Business.
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Dismissing such power is unwise and indeed paradoxically increases the power of
neoclassical economics vis-à-vis those who reject it at face value. As Edward Said
(1994, 24) argued in Orientalism: “The fabric of as thick a discourse as Orientalism has
survived and functioned in Western society because of its richness.” Orientalism is a
broader project than neoclassical economics, in that it posits the East (Orient) as a
negative of the West (Occident); that is, as empty of the good that the West possesses and
has developed. As Mbembe (2001, 4) argues in regard to Africa, “More than any other
region, Africa. . . stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and
circular discourse about, the facts of ‘absence,’ ‘lack,’ and ‘non-being,’ of identity and
difference, of negativeness – in short, of nothingness.” The discourse of neoclassical
economics is the currently predominant lens through which scholars and high-level
policymakers in the largest development organizations articulate the fullness of the West
and the lack of developing areas such as most of Africa.
As critically important as such examination is, my project is not about exploring
the power of neoclassical economics in sustaining these images of “lack,” nothingness,
and so on. Rather, I seek simply to buttress arguments that neoclassical economics
operates at the level of justification and not as a driver of on-the-ground exploitation. I
do so through a case study approach, examining petroleum production as an instance of
commodity exploitation in Central Africa.
narrative/counternarrative method.

My approach might be called a

I begin by bathing in the narrative that is

neoinstitutional economics as it relates to development, and the associated narrative that
is the World Bank shift from structural adjustment to governance. After building these
representational structures, I examine through World Bank research and high-level policy
documents the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project (CCPDP). According to
Bank officials, Chad was a country with a comparative advantage (export agriculture)
that could not support its people. Therefore, petroleum production represented a last4

ditch effort to help Chad. The Bank argued6 furthermore that its new (and yet proven,
perhaps by long gestation in other periods of World Bank development?) concentration
on governance gave it the credibility and tools to help Chad to avoid the “resource curse”
whereby countries that produce petroleum are characterized by corruption and
authoritarian regimes.

Therefore, the CCPDP was a model project for the new

concentration on governance that the World Bank argued was necessitated by
globalization as well as the rapid realization that simply removing state constraints on the
market was not enough.
When the social welfare aspects of the project quickly failed, current and past
Bank officials as well as neoinstitutional economists had ready answers, though for the
former the answers do not fit so easily into the neoclassical framework. As World Bank
officials such as Calderisi and Collier (also to a certain extent evolutionary
neoinstitutional economists such as North), recount below, the problems lay in African
culture.

For neoinstitutional economists such as Williamson, the failure simply

demonstrated that Chad was a country with political liberalization below the threshold
necessary to support economic development.

For such countries as Chad with this

condition, humanitarian aid becomes the only option.
I begin my counternarrative with the observation that, while the social welfare
portion of the CCPDP crumbled rapidly, the petroleum structure was completed ahead of
schedule. Indeed, as the recent unrest in the Chadian capital demonstrates, petroleum
production has been largely immune from political instability. Furthermore, the CCPDP
possessed a hyper-documented rationale and plan.

This hyper-documented plan,

especially after the collapse of the social welfare programs, masked the hyper-restricted
scope of the project. That is, the project only covered construction of the pipeline and the

6

http://go.worldbank.org/2Q72D32120. Updated 21 April 2000. Accessed 22 January 2009.
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Doba oil field while there is ample evidence that the pipeline is meant to serve the wider
Chad basin region in the medium term. This counter-narrative supports three key sets of
analyses that place the CCPDP in the long term context of commodity exploitation,
brutality and justification rather than in the sanitized technical narrative of neoclassical
economics. First, the CCPDP mirrors commodity exploitation in neighboring Nigeria
during the last six hundred years, as Apter, Okonta and Douglas, and Rowell detail from
the period of earliest slave trade through the genesis of petroleum production.
Commodity production has been buttressed in Nigeria by mundane control of the
Nigerian population through co-optation and sometimes creation of hierarchical
“traditional” rulers, and when necessary the application of spectacularly brutal force. It
has been justified/mystified in Britain and elsewhere (these other places falling under
what Mantz (2008) calls in a different context7 areas of “consumerist analyses”) by at
turns representing people in Nigeria as possessing “commercial facility” and being
infantile “savages.” Further, as Apter (2005, 151) describes below, the new economic
order of colonial exploitation in Nigeria was pursued “in the language of fair trade and
rational contract.” Watts helps to bring the story up to date with representation of
petroleum production through the “oil complex,” whereby petroleum production is not
inherently characterized by a ‘resource curse’ “(as though copper might liberate
parliamentary democracy?)” but rather one must look at “oil capitalism” and “the context
of a politics that predates oil” (Watts 2005b, 53). This politics has created contradictions
of centralization at the same time that state legitimacy is undermined, where a minority
becomes fabulously wealthy at the expense of the rest of the populace.

Watt’s

presentation is bolstered by the final piece, exploring CSR as well as Frynas’ argument
that political instability can bring benefits for ‘first mover’ petroleum corporations such
7

Mantz writes this as part of a critical analysis of what he refers, incorrectly as I argue later, to Foucauldian
approaches to globalization that concentrate on flexible consumption at the expense of marginal productive
areas. Mantz’s argument supports multiple parts of my argument below.

6

as Shell. This undermines those portions of the neoclassical economic development
narrative that portrays corporations as organizations which simply “do business” and only
hesitatingly get involved in politics.
The organizational framework behind my argument rests in significant part on
Allen’s notions of power as arrangements of resources that are mobilized in myriad ways
to produce effects that are then recognized as power. Allen (2003, 2-3) critiques writing
on power in two major ways. First, “. . . in the rush to see power as something which
turns up more or less everywhere. . . we have lost sight of the particularities of power,
the diverse and specific modalities of power that make a difference to how we are put in
our place, how we experience power.” Secondly, “. . . we have lost the sense in which
power is inherently spatial and conversely, spatiality is imbued with power. . . the likes
of domination, authority and seduction have not been thought through in terms of how
they are exercised. . . ”
Two lessons from Allen’s work are particularly important for this project. First,
power is neither a “thing” nor a “flow.” Allen describes power thus:
. . . [while] power is not some ‘thing’ or attribute that can be possessed, I do not believe
either that it can flow; it is only ever mediated as a relational effect of social interaction
(8). . .

Allen suggests (97) that it is best to:
[think] about power as just so many arrangements, each comprising any number of
resources – ideas, expertise, knowledges, contacts, finance and so forth – which are
mobilized to produce a succession of mediating effects in space and time which play
across one another.

Narrating power, then, requires engagement with social interactions that produce effects
recognized as power. It is not enough to say, for example, that neoclassical economics
has power without narrating the social interactions through which resources are
mobilized in arrangements the effects of which are then considered power. Indeed, it is

7

through examination of these interactions that the power of neoclassical economics is
revealed as justification/mystification removed from direct exploitation.
Secondly, power does not exist apart from mobilization of resources:
if power has a presence at all, it has it through the interplay of forces established in place.
People are placed by power, but not as the result of some massed force transmitted intact
by some central administration from up the road or even from the other side of the globe.
The arrangements of power we find ourselves exercised by may well arise from ideas and
events hatched elsewhere, but that, as I understand it, is merely another way of saying
that the presence of power is more or less mediated in space and time (2003, 11).8
power comes in different guises, the effects of which owe much to their diverse
geographies of proximity and reach (183).

By concentrating on placement and modalities of power, Allen provides conceptual
openings for the diverse ways that exploitation of key global resources has concentrated
in the Niger Delta through generations and in the Chad basin more recently. Neoclassical
economics forms one of many modalities through which power has been exercised.
Certainly it is one of the most powerful modalities of ideational power, but it is only one
among many. Therefore, it is important that neoclassical economics be understood in the
context of the ability to place people. The fact that there is a disconnect between the
logic of neoclassical economics and the actual processes of resource exploitation greatly
restricts the ability of neoclassical economics to ‘place’ people directly impacted by such
resource exploitation. However, this is not the purpose of neoclassical economics. A
corollary of my argument is that neoclassical economics places primarily those who are
distant from the direct exercise of power to extract resources. Simplistically, because
extended examination is beyond the scope of this project, neoclassical economics
exercises power through the seduction of elegance, the authority associated with technical
presentation, and indirectly though the coercion of states legitimized through elite
willingness to submit to the strictures of neoclassical economics (structural adjustment
followed by deeply intrusive governance training).
8

See also Latour (1990).
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Much critical literature about neoclassical economics, power, hegemony and
development has already been written, and there is much to admire, take account of, and
use. I begin, therefore, by looking at other approaches to neoclassical economics and
development, outlining briefly what I feel they bring to the table that is of particular
interest to my project, and how my approach complements, supplements or perhaps
confronts the existing literature.
economics.

I look first at economic critiques of neoclassical

Often, these approaches argue for more state-based and/or inter-

governmental solutions that moderate neoclassical economics with policies and other
measures to impede the worst excesses of market economics while retaining the core
state-market divide.

Other post-structural economic approaches look at neoclassical

economics as simply a discourse whose institutional forms can be undermined by
alternative forms of imagination. Still others argue for the importance of economic
policy considerations (as against post-structural economic doubts about efficacy of policy
study) but develop sophisticated normative rejoinders to neoclassical economic discourse
and associated policy prescriptions. Economic approaches are important for undermining
neoclassical economics, but must be buttressed by extra-economic approaches. In order
to cover these approaches, I take Carrier and Miller’s (1998) anthropologically based
argument for neoclassical economics as “grand narrative” as a means to move further into
anthropological and other literature prefiguring or helping to support in various ways my
argument that neoclassical economics is irrelevant in important ways for on-the-ground
commodity exploitation. Especially important disciplinary literature includes arguments
by Edelman and Haugerud (2004, 52) among others that it is imperative that
anthropology “‘clearly identify its inescapable interlocutors within the West itself’”
(quote from Trouillot 2003, 137).

In addition to literature on engagement with

development organizations and not only discourses, my argument benefits from two
broad strands of scholarship on neoclassical economics and power. The first I label
9

“neoclassical economics as mystification,” which relies on Gramscian hegemony in
particular.

Supplementing, but often confronting, Gramscian notions are works

presenting neoclassical economics “as spectacle.”

Within this category are more

Foucauldian-inspired work on techniques of rule, the “conduct of conduct,” or
microphysics of power.
I begin the narrative piece of this project by building up the theoretical structure
that is neoinstitutional economics in contexts of economic theory and World Bank
research rationales. Because they operate from ‘objective’ assumptions, neoclassical
economists tolerate very little ambiguity of norms or strategy. Neoliberal economists in
particular argue that governments should distribute wealth only to the poorest and most
marginal victims of economic development. Neoinstitutional economics represents an
important shift attempting to incorporate institutional variables to allow for multiple
equilibria while at the same time retaining core neoclassical economic assumptions of
relatively autonomous individuals and centrality of the price function. This brand of
neoclassical economics had its advent with Coase’s (1937) “The nature of the firm,” but
only achieved orthodoxy within the last two decades, brought on arguably by the
increased communication density brought by global communication and transportation
developments, and therefore greater knowledge of less-industrialized areas by people
with interest in human welfare.
Beginning in the late 1980s, the World Bank research and high-level policy
departments began to switch discernibly from neoliberal “structural adjustment” to
neoinstitutional “governance” forms of economic development. The most enthusiastic
driver of this shift was World Bank President Wolfensohn, selected as president in 1995.
In 1997, he laid out his plan for a Comprehesive Development Framework based in large
part on neoinstitutional economics with a “poverty reduction” filter.
10

Briefly, his

argument was that structural adjustment failed largely because privatization took place in
systems where ineffective economic structures were held in place by counterproductive
but stable institutions. Simply removing government interference, the argument went,
cannot lead to effective economic systems without the appropriate government rules and
social orientations spread throughout the economy.

Thus, the Comprehensive

Development Framework wedded structural adjustment (privatization, removing currency
controls and trade barriers, and decrease in the size of government) with promotion of
governance.

Governance includes accountability, transparency and rooting out of

corruption. In addition the new program involved decentralization of responsibility so
that all levels of society would “take ownership”9 of economic restructuring. Even more
broadly, the Framework involved encouragement of individualism and entrepreneurship
in order to promote effective economic development at all levels of society. This change
in research approach then translated into new policy frameworks, replacing Structural
Adjustment Facilities built by IMF and World Bank technocrats with Poverty Reduction
Strategies where individual governments were required to claim authorship and
“ownership.”
The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development (CCPDP) Framework was
presented as a paradigmatic case of governance applied to a difficult economic
development case. The World Bank sought to ‘save’ Chad by underwriting (morally
more than financially) construction of an oilfield in Doba and a pipeline to carry the
petroleum through Cameroon to the coast, located at Kribi. Chad is one of the poorest
countries in the world, and has been beset for decades by political instability and
corruption.

The petroleum industry, furthermore, is problematic according to

neoclassical economists and others because of “Dutch disease,” whereby supply and
9

As covered later in the project, “ownership” is a contested concept. Does ownership mean control over
“what development looks like” or simply the requirement that all levels of society must take responsibility
for implementing “governance” if the country is to be considered in compliance?

11

demand conditions associated with petroleum production remove productive resources
from goods that have more sustainable comparative advantage such as agriculture. If
revenues are not sterilized (by, for example, keeping them in offshore accounts)
petroleum can hurt the economy in the long term by destroying the sustainable
comparative advantage, particularly when the economic distortions are combined with
the “resource curse,” whereby petroleum as a high-value capital-intensive good arguably
leads to corrupt and authoritarian governing systems.
The World Bank argued that the CCPDP could be a last chance opportunity for
Chad to gain the resources necessary to provide for its people. It implicitly followed a
matrix constructed by Williamson, one of the premier scholars of neoinstitutional
economics (the “transaction cost” as opposed to the “evolutionary economics” branch of
neoinstitutional economics). He argues (2000a, 13) that economies can be placed in a
matrix according to whether a country has achieved economic development (market
liberalization), political development (democratization), or some combination of the two.
Because the Chadian government had made moves toward economic and political
liberalization, undertaking privatization and holding elections, the Bank placed the
country at the beginning of the project as having below threshold economic development
but with signs that its political development was above the threshold of capability to
sustain an effective economy. According to Williamson’s matrix, therefore, Chadian
elites could adopt the appropriate policies if effectively persuaded.10
The Bank designed the CCPDP in the context of controversy regarding petroleum
production. In particular, at the same time as the CCPDP, social movement pressure led
the Bank to undertake an Extractive Industries Review that concluded the World Bank
should cease support for petroleum industry development. The Bank rejected this advice.

10

See also Haggard (1995) for this argument.
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However, the CCPDP contained extensive documentation of measures within the
project’s scope to enable local participation, environmental protection and revenue
management. Nevertheless, the project encountered problems almost immediately as
social movement pressure became quite strong.

Indeed, the project was probably

signed11 only due to the strong personal relationship between the president of the World
Bank (James Wolfensohn) and the head of ExxonMobil (Lee Raymond), and the
distraction afforded by a more controversial, and unrelated, transmigration project in
China that involved Tibet. Scarcely after the signatures were dry, controversy erupted
anew when the Chadian president used part of the signing bonus to buy weapons. As
Chad has descended further into civil conflict and indicators of human welfare have
worsened, World Bank figures such as Calderisi (2006) and Collier (2008) have placed
most of the blame on corrupt African governments and “anti-entrepreneurial” (according
to their definitions) African culture. After the project failed to accomplish its social
welfare objectives (World Bank participation ending quietly in September 2008), this
seemed to prove for neoinstitutional economic theory and sympathetic development
researchers that Chad instead has below threshold political and economic institutions and
therefore can only be helped by humanitarian aid in line with Williamson’s argument.
Calderisi (2006) seems to uphold this opinion by including Chad as a good example of
“the trouble with Africa.”
I argue instead that the CCPDP is hyper-documented in its rationale but also
hyper-restricted in scope. That is, the project concentrates on construction of the oil
pipeline and development of the Doba oilfield, and generates volumes of documentation
(19-30 volumes for environmental impact alone) related to this project. However, there
is clear evidence that the production side of the project (the portion that was completed
ahead of schedule) is designed with a more regional scope in mind, with petroleum
11

As Calderisi (2006, 189) details, in a passage quoted below.
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extraction and shipment extending beyond not only the Doba oilfield in Chad but into the
broader Chad Basin region. This initiative belies the idea that the CCPDP represents a
new way of development. Rather, the “planned demolition” nature of the project (the
social development aspects of the project began self-destructing from the beginning),
especially combined with the World Bank’s argument that the project design and
implementation were satisfactory, suggests that the CCPDP is part of broader strategies
for extending hegemony over petroleum exploitation in what is the “next gulf” covering
Central Africa, while World Bank and neoclassical rationales are an appropriate example
of what Rose terms the “birth-to-presence of a form of being which pre-exists” (Rose
1999, 177) and yet that must be brought into presence through the work of experts.
Commodity exploitation has taken place in a similar manner through many generations
and across commodity types, as seen in Nigeria. Nigeria has experienced phases of
commodity exploitation from slave trade with coastal canoe houses, through palm oil
exploitation first through middlemen and then through direct colonial control, and finally
petroleum production in late colonial and early postcolonial societies.

Throughout

colonial and postcolonial history, hegemonic actors have built up the Niger Delta as a
spectacle of stagnant tradition and essentialized communities, at the same time as they
have used varying combinations of force and consent to gain and maintain control over
commodity exploitation. The following is a matrix showing the broad outlines of the
historical narrative that I cover below. It breaks down “governing phases” according to
the primary Nigerian actors identified by historians, and the primary key global
commodity transacted during the period:
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Primary Commodity

Primary Nigerian Actors

Governing phase

Slave trade

Dynastic canoe houses

Pre-colonial

Palm oil production

Nigerian middlemen

Pre-colonial

Palm oil production

“Traditional” hierarchies

Colonial

Petroleum production

“Traditional” hierarchies

Late colonial

Petroleum production

Unstable regimes

Post-colonial

I continue by sharpening concentration on petroleum production, and broadening
petroleum structures and actors to include governments, multinational corporations and
oil communities that make up what Watts refers to as the “oil complex and the petrostate.”

Watts mobilizes notions both of relational projection of power (especially

spectacle combined with coercion) and governmentality (relations between people and
things, techniques of mapping and organization) to look at capitalist forms underlying
petroleum production in the Niger Delta. In the case of the Niger Delta, Watts looks at
three critical “governable spaces” (Rose 1999, 31ff) underlying this exploitation. The
space of chieftainship addresses forms of local control created and maintained by
postcolonial government and multinational corporations.

The space of indigeneity

addresses shifting and unstable notions of identity mobilized to gain power in the context
of the oil complex. The space of nationalism addresses the character of Nigeria as a
coercive but unstable “geographic expression.”
Though the two counternarratives above demonstrate the intimate relations
between business, state and other key actors, it is still important to look directly at
problems associated with business self-identification. Business literature approaches
commodity exploitation and surrounding social issues with the implicit assumption that
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business, government and social organization are separate. In particular, businesses have
adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) to deal with damage to their brand image
as a result of such events as Shell Petroleum’s connection to the hanging of the Ogoni
nine in Nigeria. The World Bank and neoclassical economists disparage CSR because
they argue that business should simply concentrate on adding value to economies and
spreading entrepreneurship. Business literature looks at CSR not as a set of practices
inherent to business, but rather as a way of attempting to contain brand damage as a result
of events that governments and civil society organizations are by rights responsible for.
For example, Fombrun and Rindova (2000) discuss the effects that Shell felt on its
reputation after “vitriolic attacks” (the authors seem to assume that the attacks are
unjustified) on Shell by organizations such as the Body Shop when Sani Abacha hung the
Ogoni nine; and after Greenpeace publicized Shell’s plans to sink the Brent Spar platform
in the North Sea. Frynas and Watts take the compelling evidence of business/government
connections and argue that CSR is in fact an attempt to relieve pressure caused by the
violence and instability that business and governments institute as part of commodity
exploitation. Frynas takes this further with a well-researched argument that corporations
like Shell have actually benefited from the competitive advantage that they received from
political instability because they were the first mover corporation. This bolsters the
argument that business cannot hide behind neoclassical economics or depoliticized
discourse pervading business literature, and should instead be held responsible for
damage to human welfare occasioned by exploitation.
I conclude by summarizing key points and briefly noting major lessons that flow
from my argument.

First among these lessons is that regional focus on petroleum

production in the Chad basin and the wider Gulf of Guinea is critical. This includes
systematic, multidisciplinary study of the Chad basin similar to work that this project
covers regarding petroleum exploitation in Nigeria; examinations of relationships among
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various distinct areas (onshore emphasis in Nigeria and the Chad basin, related to
offshore production in Angola); and concentration on how corporations exploit petroleum
on a regional as well as state-by-state basis. Secondly, this project shows the importance
of looking at corporate (and to a lesser extent World Bank) responses to social movement
pressure. I provisionally suggest an approach divided broadly into responses that involve
more or less organizational change and those that involve only changes in perception. I
end with summarization of lessons for understanding power exercise as multimodal
(Allen 2003, 196) with neoclassical economics acting as a spectacle or exhibit while
exercise of power in places where direct exploitation takes place involves both
spectacular and quotidian fixing of people in place through, in the case of petroleum and
other key commodity exploitation covered in this project, what Watts (2007b, 108) refers
to as governmentality characterized by what “looks like ungovernability.”
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Survey:
Critical Economics, Hegemony and Govermentality
In forming the argument of this project, I travel through a broad array of theoretical and
epistemological perspectives, ranging from those closely related to neoinstitutional
economics to cultural anthropological and geographical literature that shares little except
the subject matter of commodity exploitation. In this chapter, I provide a broad overview
of the literature in order to locate my approach in relation to associated pursuits. I begin
with what Leys (1996, 82) terms “rational choice-based work on institutions,” which,
except that Leys adds Akerlof and does not include Veblen and “old institutional
economics,” also encompass the work in Harriss et al.’s (1995) The New Institutional
Economics and Third World Development.

I follow with critical literature within

economics of neoclassical economics. The relevant literature here ranges from neo- or
post-Keynesian state-based marginal critiques to post-structuralist literature that rejects
neoclassical economic discourse if not the power of neoclassical economics. The most
useful literature from that point moves into cultural anthropology and geography,
recognizing the power of neoclassical economics but bringing in a steadily increasing
range of epistemological approaches. I end with two competing and yet complementary
views on power and development.

First, Gramscian approaches look at

awareness/consciousness and power, and present neoclassical economics generally as
mystification. Secondly, more Foucauldian approaches look at the “microphysics” of
power, and present neoclassical economics generally as spectacle.
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2.1

Institutional economics, rationality and power

Two strands relating to neoinstitutional economics should be noted, though they are
outside the scope of my project. First, Bates “new political economy” is often related to
neoinstitutional economics. Indeed, Leys (1996) argues that North more appropriately
belongs with Bates rather than other neoinstitutional economists. Leys (1996, 82-83)
examines Bates’ rational choice political economy approach as well in a much more
trenchant critique of neoinstitutional economics. Leys (p. 82) divides what he refers to as
“rational choice-based work on institutions” into three sections. The first strand is “new
institutional economics” which follows on Bardhan’s categorization as well as roughly
following my breakdown in the next chapter. However, Leys separates North from
Bardhan’s (1989) CDAWN school (Coase, Demsetz, Alchian, Williamson and North),
and comments that “North, in contrast, is a historian concerned to make explanations in
economic history compatible with explanations in contemporary economics, i.e. to bring
them within the conceptual framework of neo-classical theory.” The third strand is
Bates’ “new political economy,” whereby Bates argues that his rational choice
perspective differs from neoinstitutional economics because he takes a political economy
view and not simply an economic view. In Harriss et al. (1995), Bates (1997) critiques
neoinstitutional economics for failing to acknowledge the political nature of institutional
imposition; that is, for being “apolitical.”
Leys argues that North really belongs with Bates in practice. “[B]ecause he
[North] wants to explain long-term as well as short-term change, and at the national and
even the global level, he too has to confront the problem that politics poses” (1996, 84).
This is an important point that is demonstrated as well by Nee and Ingram (2001) in the
context of “new institutional economic sociology,” and Dunning (1997d) in the context
of business. North’s analysis, though he argues that it still retains the price mechanism at
its core, has easily been removed from economics into other social sciences in a way that
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transaction cost economics cannot be removed. However, I believe that North cleaves so
closely to individuals, incentives, choice and price as the drivers of institutional
maintenance and change “in the last instance” that his rationale if not his evidence places
him squarely within neoinstitutional economics. More importantly, as I detail below,
World Bank research and high-level policy documents use North (and not so much Bates)
because North still bases his rationale on the maximizing individual of neoclassical
economics more than political science or even political economy. For this reason as well,
my project is about North and Williamson as neoinstitutional economists rather than the
“rational choice politics” of Bates and “new political economy.” I should mention,
however, that Leys’ separation of North and Bates out from other rational choice
perspectives to look at their influence on political science is quite valid and valuable for
his purposes. As I note in the final chapter, Leys’ (1996, 102) concluding remarks about
what ulterior motives the blandness of neoclassical economics might have are also quite
applicable to my conclusions.
Secondly, it is important to note the differences between “old” and “new”
institutional economics, in particular the value of comparing how they approach issues of
development. Also in Harriss et al., Stein (1997) argues that such development issues as
structural adjustment are in important ways more effectively addressed by “old
institutional economics” originating in the late 19th and early 20th century, connected in
particular with Veblen. Both old and new institutionalist economists concentrate on
“determinants of change over time” (Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis 1995, 5). However, the
basic disagreements that Stein highlights have to do with the nature of these
determinants.

In particular, neoinstitutional economists emphasize their fealty to

neoclassical economics by retaining individual agency as the basic driver of economic
interaction. Therefore, institutional change is based on individuals seeking to maximize
their utility given the structure of incentives that they encounter.
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Stein and other

adherents to “old institutional economics” (p. 110) argue that institutions are best
examined using Veblen’s (1919, 239) characterization of institutions as less instrumental
than “settled habits of thought common to the generality of man.” Parto (2003, 7)
distinguishes the two traditions in the following manner:
North's individual-centred approach is in sharp contrast to Veblen's communitarian
perspective and his focus on how institutions determine the manner in which a
community provisions for its members in terms of food, shelter, and welfare.
Institutionalism in the Veblenian tradition downplays the importance of “the individual”
as a unit of analysis in favour of “the institution.” This is because institutions fill a key
conceptual gap by connecting “the microeconomic world of individual action, of habit
and choice, with the macroeconomic sphere of seemingly detached and impersonal
structures.” Actor-structure connections signifying mutual interaction and
interdependence may thus be established (Hodgson 1999, 144).

The major differences, then, come down to differences about whether it is more useful to
attain the rigor brought by neoinstitutional economics or to acknowledge that economic
institutions are more embedded in habits and orientations of trust and loyalty than laws,
prices and opportunism. I am interested in subjecting to case study interrogation the
rationale of rigor behind the shift from orthodox neoclassical to neoinstitutional
economic theory, and so I do not explore further the very interesting and important
comparison of “old” and “new” institutional economics.

2.2

Economic questioning of neoclassical economics

Many have criticized neoclassical economics and some have questioned its connection
with reality. It is important to both recognize the value of these critiques as well as point
out how I see my approach as supplementing, and sometimes questioning, these
perspectives. I – and scholars I reference such as Frynas and Watts – engage political
economy work to buttress particular policy arguments. Frynas (1998), for example, uses
the evidence laid out by political economist Ahmad Khan (1994) regarding petroleum
production in Nigeria to argue that Shell actually benefited from political instability.
Chang and Grabel (2004; see also Edelman and Haugerud 2004, 8) offer a trenchant
critique along with alternatives to neoliberal/neoclassical economic development. They
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(p. 11) share my doubt about how much neoclassical economics has been changed by
recent reformulations:
There are reasons to be encouraged by efforts to rethink development policy by key
architects of the original Washington Consensus policies. However, the spin on this new
work inaccurately claims that the architects of the Washington Consensus have now ‘seen
the light’, and have genuinely moved to a new way of thinking that transcends their
previous policy prescriptions. This, in fact, is not at all the case. . . Indeed, the new
thinking reaffirms and even extends its neoliberal character in several important policy
domains. . .

Chang and Grabel seek to undermine neoliberal discourses that argue (as Thatcher
infamously commented) “there is no alternative.” They respond that indeed there are
alternatives that are currently in the economic policy tool kit, being presently enacted, or
enacted in the past. They concentrate on alternatives (trade, property, capital flows,
domestic financial regulation and macroeconomic policy) that involve stronger states
and/or interstate coordination, solutions that “can promote rapid economic development
that is equitable, stable and sustainable” (Chang and Grabel 2004, 1). Craig and Porter
(2006) advocate similar kinds of solutions, except that their focus is on World Bank
development projects rather than the more general economic development policy
structures emphasized by Chang and Grabel.
These projects are critical to weakening the stranglehold that neoclassical
economics has on discussions of development. However, neoclassical economics is as
much about creating a spectacle as about long-term policy constructed to match reality.
In saying this, I seem to slant toward post-structural economists such as Gibson-Graham
who concentrate on undermining neoclassical economics as a discourse or form of
knowledge, rather than ‘working around the edges’ by changing particular policies within
the corporate capitalist framework. In The End of Capitalism (as we knew it), GibsonGraham emphasize the power of discourse when they seek (1996, 5) to engage in “the
critical project of undermining prevalent practices of capitalist representation, and the
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more arduous project of generating a discourse of economic difference. . .”

Their

declared purpose is to “help create the discursive conditions under which socialist or
other noncapitalist construction becomes a ‘realistic’ present activity rather than a
ludicrous or utopian future goal” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 263). Their premise is that
social transformation has been hamstrung in large part because of peoples’ inability to
imagine ‘capitalism’ as anything but a homogenous totalizing framework of reality.
Therefore, when people are given tools to imagine capitalism as fragmented and weak,
then they are emboldened to make the everyday changes that can undermine the system.
Gibson-Graham (2003b, 49) argue that:
Perhaps a global regime is consolidating itself not so much through institutional
initiatives but through subjects who experience themselves as increasingly subsumed to a
global order—enter here the world economic system, known also as the market, or
neoliberalism, or capitalism.

Gibson-Graham respond by calling for an “ethics of the local” whereby people break
through these representational constraints through the power of scholar activism in
“creating or ‘performing’ the worlds we inhabit”:
Not only are academics becoming more involved in so-called scholar activism but they
are increasingly conscious of the role of their work in creating or ‘performing’ the worlds
we inhabit. This vision of the performativity of knowledge, its implication in what it
purports to describe, its productive power of ‘making’, has placed new responsibility on
the shoulders of scholars - to recognize their constitutive role in the worlds that exist, and
their power to bring new worlds into being. Not single-handedly, of course, but alongside
other world-makers, both inside and outside the academy (Gibson-Graham 2008, 614). . .
We cannot ignore the power of past discourses and their materialization in durable
technologies, infrastructures and behaviors. Nor can we sidestep our responsibility to
those both within and beyond our place who have suffered for our relative well-being.
But we can choose to create new discourses and counter-technologies of economy and
construct strategic forms of interplace solidarity, bringing to the fore ways to make other
worlds possible (ibid., 623).
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Gibson-Graham seem to unduly downplay the very large amount of ‘scholar-activism’ in
the 1960s and other eras including the present era,12 perhaps because such scholaractivism did not concentrate on developing alternative performances of the economic.
However, their objective is to present a project whereby the starting point is reframing
discourse, knowledge and imagination that spurs alternative action.13
DeMartino (1997; 2000; 2003) offers effective counters within critical political
economy to both Gibson-Graham’s undue focus on discourse, and the tendency of more
policy-oriented economic approaches (including heterodox approaches) to concentrate on
alternative forms of “welfarism” rather than questioning the normative bases of
welfarism itself. “It is imperative today that heterodox political economists emphasize
that the alternative policy regimes they advocate are not more faithful to welfarism than
is neoliberalism, but that they seek fidelity to other, more worthy normative principles”
(DeMartino 2003). He (2004, 369) hopes by his book’s argument to:
inaugurate a discussion about the value and even ethical imperative of egalitarianism, and
about what kinds of policy interventions can realize the objective of genuine, global
equality. . . At present the greatest obstacle to progress lies not in the power of
multinational corporations or hypermilitarized barbaric states or the International
Monetary Fund, but in our failure to conjure up visions of how the world might be
otherwise.

Though he emphasizes the need for alternative visions, DeMartino (2004, 370)
strongly defends the need for engagement with policy, even among post-structuralists, as
seen by his response to Graham’s (2004) critique of his recent book Global Economy,
Global Justice:
The idea that policy prescription is forbidden by virtue of a recognition of the
overdetermination of social life or related epistemological considerations cannot bear up
under close scrutiny. We (all of us) necessarily set, follow and/or transgress policy (with
12

See, for example, Price’s (2004) study of political anthropologists, McCarthyist persecution and the Cold
War. Those scholars whose careers were ruined by their advocacy would certainly protest this notion of
the “recency” of scholar-activism.
13
This is somewhat similar to Freire’s (1993) Pedagogy of Oppression and subsequent Pedagogy of Hope
(1994), whereby oppressed people are shown ways to reflect on the world with ‘good sense’, to
complement acting on the world. See, for example, the critical review in Jackson (2000).
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a small “p”) every moment of our lives – in our personal relationships and households,
our communities, and in the larger aggregations of which we are a part. Poststructuralist
sensibilities can inform the kinds of policy we embrace, perhaps, and they surely inform
the kinds of claims we make for policy, but they cannot be taken to place the policy
domain off limits.

Demartino’s deeper concentration on economic norms and their policy
implications provides important avenues for reconstituting economic thought and action.
However, changing policies and stated norms risks insignificance if not combined with
deep examination of spaces and places where exploitation is taking place. Carrier and
Miller (1998) provide additional prompting in this direction with their edited volume
Virtualism: A New Political Economy. Though they are anthropologists by training, they
argue emphatically in their introduction and conclusion that economic abstractions have
very great power in shaping modern societies, including commercial activities. This is
similar to Gibson-Graham’s discourse-intensive arguments, except that Carrier and Miller
concentrate on economic logic (abstraction) rather than presenting economics as
performative. By extension, they look at the line from economic abstraction to decisionmaking and then to global economic structures. They are not averse to ‘grand narrative’
and indeed Miller devotes a section (1998a, 188-190) to a “defense of grand narrative. . .
it is not that the economic model of the market represents capitalism, but that capitalism
is being instructed to transform itself into a better representation of that model” (Miller
1998a, 196).
Carrier and Miller build their argument upon Polanyi’s (1944) notions of “‘disembedding’: that is, removal of economic activities from the social and other
relationships in which they had occurred, and carrying them out in a context in which the
only important relationships are those defined by the economic activity itself” (Carrier
and Miller 1998, 2). They argue that neoclassical economics has major if not paramount
influence over social transformation today, through abstraction and then seeking to
realize that abstraction ‘on the ground’:
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Abstraction at this formal, conceptual level leads at least some people to adopt an
abstract-economic world-view. Here, the world is seen in terms of the concepts and
models of economic abstraction, which are taken to be the fundamental reality that
underlies and shapes the world. Those who adopt this view of the world can be said to
perceive a virtual reality, seemingly real but dependent upon the conceptual apparatus
and outlook that generate it. . .
What distinguishes the economic abstraction of the latter part of the twentieth century. . .
is not just that it is a way of seeing the world that tends to generate among its adherents a
virtual reality. . . Rather [it] is the combination of its institutional power and its tendency
to slip into virtualism. This is the conscious attempt to make the real world conform to
the virtual image. . . (ibid., 8).

Important for my argument, Carrier and Miller argue that capitalism follows the
instructions of the neoclassical economic model, given its institutional power. I question
the breadth of this connection in my study, arguing that in critical ways on-the-ground
exploitation disregards the neoclassical economic model. Of particular importance are
the questions of who adopts the “abstract-economic world-view,” and does such adoption
reach a critical enough mass to drive “actually existing capitalism”? While they come to
different conclusions than I, Carrier and Miller structure their volume in the same way
that I structure my project. First, they discuss what they call “conceptual abstraction,”
which covers the formation of virtual reality by neoclassical economic theorists. They
address conceptual abstraction, or neoclassical economic theory, in greater historical
detail than I do in this project, and use this background to argue that neoclassical
economics forms primarily what they call a “virtual reality.” My project only covers the
shift from neoliberal (orthodox neoclassical) to neoinstitutional economics, and only
covers that portion relevant to development.

However, I agree that neoclassical

economic discourse forms what they refer to as a virtual reality.
Secondly, Carrier and Miller discuss “practical abstraction” as the most direct
form of virtualism, whereby neoclassical economic organizations such as the IMF seek to
incarnate neoclassical economics on the world.

Miller addresses structural adjustment

programs detailed by McMichael (1998) in the volume:
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Structural adjustment provides a particularly clear case of the dominance of economic
theory over politics, and indeed . . . over actually existing capitalism . . . Structural
adjustment programmes . . . show that what may seem to be just an academic concern
with discourse can have vast consequences in the world. . . (Miller 1998a, 198-99).
Just as the problem with structural adjustment is not that it is based on academic theory
but that it has become practice, so the problem with the neo-classical consumer is the
effects that the model has on the possibilities of consumer practice. In some kind of
global card trick, an abstract, virtual consumer steals the authority that had been
accumulated for workers in their other role as consumers (Miller 1998a, 200).

I tend to agree with this portion of Carrier and Miller’s argument as well, because
multilateral development agencies certainly have power over economic ideas,
government policies, and environments in which firms operate. However, as above, I
question the dominance of neoclassical economic theory over “actually existing
capitalism,” and at any rate believe that this claim of dominance is undermined somewhat
in the third section of their volume.
Their third section is of most interest for my project because they seek (Carrier
1998, 16) to “[move] back from a virtualism driven by economic views of the world to
one driven by more practical and inarticulate forces: those that arise from the activities of
the firms that operate in and shape competitive capitalism”:
It may not be proper to call this ‘virtualism’, for it lacks the guiding vision and
intentionality that the term connotates. The practical results, however, may not be all that
different. This practical virtualism is appropriate, however, for a collection concerned
with economic abstraction. It is so because it makes visible the ways that neo-classical
economics is a bourgeois economics, a vision of the world that attains a significant part
of its force by making appear natural the ascendant commercial practices of powerful
capitalist firms in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

The notion that neoclassical economics is a “bourgeois economics [that makes large
corporate capitalism] appear natural” describes my basic argument quite well, and also
fits rather tenuously into their larger argument that neoclassical economics drives
commercial activity rather than primarily making it appear natural. Thrift’s work on the
“reflexive capitalism” of business is particularly applicable to my project because it deals
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with firms, and Thrift argues that firms operate according to a different logic from
neoclassical economics. This point is also taken up by Carrier in the introduction:
. . . firms, transnational and otherwise, are governed by a logic that is not only less formal
and articulate than the logic of neo-classical economics, but also is shaped by the
embedded practicalities of business life: the practicalities of things like calculation and
record-keeping, the management seminar and a reflexive management orientation. In
short, [Thrift] argues that there may well be a virtualising capitalism, but that it is
grounded on practical capitalism (Carrier 1998, 17).

Thrift expands the explanation thus:
No one can deny that political economy and economics have been important in the world,
but I am not at all sure how important they have been in business. They are important as
discursive elements of states, justifying action in producing arenas that the state enacts as
‘economic’. On the whole, however, I think that capitalist firms play to different drums
(1998, 163).

The question raised by Thrift seems to be how much influence state justification of action
has to commodity exploitation in such places as Central Africa. Miller (1998a, 196)
attempts to more directly relate the practical abstraction, or practical virtualism, that
Thrift details to the dominance of neoclassical economics:
As Thrift notes in his chapter, economics is not the 'theory' of working capitalism, which
has had to remain thoroughly engaged and performative, while economics has not. So,
while capitalism as a process by which firms seek to increase capital through
manufacture and trade has become increasingly contextualized, complex and often
contradictory (Miller 1997), another force has arisen that has become increasingly
abstract. . .
While capitalism engages with the world and is thus subject to the transformations of
context, economics remains disengaged...This is because economics has the authority to
transform the world into its own image. Where the existing world does not conform to
the academic model, the onus is not on changing the model, testing it against the world,
but on changing the world, testing us against the model.

One might take Miller’s comments (“economics has the authority to transform the world
in its own image”) as ironic, a kind of tongue-in-cheek over-valorization of the economic
mandate, except that economic abstraction has great force as a tool of legitimization
especially since it is backed up by state coercion. In this sense, I agree with Carrier and
Miller about the power of neoclassical economics to lend authority to actions. However, I
question the dependence of capitalism relative to economics. Carrier and Miller clearly
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respect the relational nature of power, in recognizing the value of including Thrift’s study
in their volume.

However, by attempting to argue that business is despite itself

compelled to follow the force of neoclassical economics, embodied in virtualism – they
come close to implying that social relations do not matter as much as the disembodied
(and/or dis-embodying) force of neoclassical economics as its “power” flows through
multilateral economic agencies and drives multinational corporations. This is also a
rather different argument from their contention that abstraction spreads through adoption
by particular academics.

While capitalism must adjust to context, I believe, the

disengagement of economics as “authority discourse” is necessary though not sufficient
for exercising power in the area of resource exploitation.

I argue that significant

evidence exists in literature on the Niger Delta and Chad basin for arguing that corporate
capitalism drives exploitation in producing areas while neoclassical economics primarily
provides the “discursive elements of states, justifying action in producing arenas that the
state enacts as ‘economic’” (Thrift 1998, 163). Economics operates at the level of
justificatory or mystificatory discourse, and such discourses of legitimization and
justification certainly carry power, beyond simply colonizing minds.
Edelman and Haugerud (2004, 18-20) seem to offer a similar argument on its face
as Carrier and Miller, when they argue that anthropological literature has recently
neglected to engage political economy literature as anthropologists concentrated
discussion of development and globalization on ‘local’ agency:
We would argue, following Graeber, that the concern with “choice” and microphenomena, as well as the determination to reject grand narratives, distracts “attention
away from the current attempt to impose the largest and most totalizing framework in
world history – the market – on just about everything” (Graeber 2002, 1224; quoted in
Edelman and Haugerud 2004, 18). . .
To make development theory useful and interesting again, it must, as Leys [(1996)
argues], explore ways to subordinate markets to the social goals of the communities that
markets serve. Expanding the practical ambitions of development theory in turn means
revisiting and re-invigorating the agenda of classical political economy.
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Anthropologists’ rejection of grand narratives, however, unwittingly accedes to the
constriction of contemporary intellectual debate, and points to an urgent need, as Miller
(1998a, 188) puts it, to “clarify connections between features of our world that too often
seem like isolated fragments whose simultaneous existence is no more than fortuitous”. . .
Among his targets is the outsized influence of a particular paradigm within the discipline
of economics, and the power of academic modelers to define economic policy through
widely imposed programs such as the World Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s
structural adjustment reforms for developing nations during the 1980s and 1990s.

Likewise, Stone et al. (2000, 2) note in the introduction to their Commodities and
Globalization:
Scholars such as Polier and Roseberry (1989, 254) caution against both world-systems
theorists’ view of the capitalist system as determinant, and postmodernists’ rejection of
such determinism and systemic relationships altogether. Contributors to this volume vary
in their emphases on determinism versus historical contingency, but all recognize
important structural or historical connections across time and space.

In a significant departure from Carrier and Miller, however, Edelman, Haugerud and
Stone et al. rigorously explore not so much a disembodied ‘fixing’ or ‘flowing’ power
(e.g. neoclassical economics drives business in spite of itself) but rather the exercise of
power in many different ways and in quite different locations from cash crop farming into
the halls of business and the World Bank. My project falls within this paradigm of
anthropology, though I perhaps discount the power of neoclassical economics as ‘grand
narrative’ more than many who “recognize important structural or historical connections
across time and space.” Edelman and Haugerud call for a broader and more complex
agenda, to examine and present literature that best represents the need for “vigorous and
imaginative new approaches to anthropology’s role in the public sphere” (Edelman and
Haugerud 2004, 52). Anthropologists are well suited for this because they “are trained to
capture empirical complexity, particularity and uncertainty. . .” (Edelman and Haugerud
2004, 46):
The discipline also “needs to clearly identify its inescapable interlocutors within the West
itself” – whether cultural critics, rational choice theorists, historians, or World Bank or
NGO officials (quote from Trouillot 2003, 137). This move is crucial, Trouiilot argues,
because identifying the interlocutors’ premises allows us to identify the stakes, the public
issues to which anthropological knowledge is profoundly relevant, instead of choosing
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scholarly comforts over risk and thus masking the wider public significance of the
discipline’s findings and debates (Edelman and Haugerud 2004, 52).

This concentration on “the West” points to another very important distinction among
types of cultural investigation regarding development and globalization, a distinction
very relevant to articulating the role of neoclassical economics if not as direct driver of
exploitation. Perhaps a better way of distinguishing “the West” from “the Rest” that
replaces the geographical distinction with an economic role is to separate consuming and
producing areas. Consuming areas include “middle-class” areas in the United States,
Europe and other global areas where people are managed primarily as consumers. The
producing areas include Africa, most of Latin America, India, China and areas of Eastern
Europe as well as any global areas (e.g. migrant labor on citrus farms in the United
States) where people are managed primarily as producers. These distinctions should not
be made more precise than the realities they represent. However, they are certainly an
effect of corporate capitalist imagination and other exercises of power. Mantz (2008, 41)
makes the distinction in the context of scholarship, in a study of coltan production in
eastern Congo:
. . . humanistic analyses of economy have turned their attention toward Simmel (1978)
and away from Marx (1976), and in doing so dwell on consumerist analyses of shopping,
product design, and style (e.g. Appadurai 1986; Fine and Leopold 1993; for excellent
analysis of these theoretical currents see Graeber 2001, 31–33; Graeber 2004, 71–72;
Miller 1998b). While such studies are admittedly useful for asserting the complexities of
Western economic culture (and by no means do I intend to diminish their significance),
the more general intellectual turn toward introspection and reflexivity has all too often
diverted attention away from the economic activities of those on the productive margins
of the global economy, and the accompanying processes that in fact provide the material
foundations [from which] any deriving of meaning from any consumer products by
ordinary Western subjects can emerge [sic]. . .
In contradistinction to the more Foucaultian [sic] analyses14 of power that have
dominated recent discussion about the meanings of commodities exclusively in their
consumptive domains, an analysis of coltan's role in the global market serves as an abject
reminder of the necropolitical (Mbembe 2003) manner in which epochally significant
14

I question the use of the term “Foucauldian” to refer only to the consumerist strands of commodity
exploitation in anthropology. As I discuss below, application of Foucault’s work can be divided into the
more discursive strands and the strands emphasizing micro-physics of control which are physical
constraints justified by a technical “authority.”
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global trade has typically thrived. This kind of approach can be traced to Sidney Mintz
(1985), who examined the connection between production and consumption through a
particular object (sugar), showing how tastes, ideas, sentiments and material processes
(such as class and state formation) in Europe were rooted in productive processes
elsewhere, namely in the Caribbean where slave labour regimes were largely responsible
for this modern capitalist expansion.

Neoclassical economics as a tool of persuasion, seduction or authority operates primarily
on people in the “consuming areas.” As Thrift suggests, Shell, the World Bank and
others – members of what Reich (1991) rhetorically refers to as “Who is Them?”15 –
bridge the consumption and production areas using very different resources, and different
logics, from neoclassical economists.

I argue that neoclassical economics serves

primarily to legitimize existing corporate capitalist relations and the activities of all who
work to inculcate and maintain these relations, by rendering these relations “common
sense,” technical and amenable to expert intervention.

At the same time as such

justification/mystification takes place in primarily consuming areas, business and other
key hegemonic actors employ very different resources in producing margins to fix people
in place. These actions include not only direct coercion but other forms of instability as
well as mobilization of essentialized identities.

2.3 Neoclassical economics as mystification: Gramscian hegemony
and the “domination/resistance” debate16
If neoclassical economics is irrelevant to exploitation in important ways, what is its role?
Though this project does not address in detail the question of the role of neoclassical
economics, the project argument is better understood if the theoretical approach to
neoclassical economics as justification/mystification is better apprehended. First, as the
introduction indicates neoclassical economics is certainly pervasive in development
narratives, beyond the economic narratives. Certainly the billions of dollars fed into the
World Bank, World Trade Organization and IMF are bearing some kind of fruit.

15
16

See also Tomlinson’s (1999) discussion of trans-cultural actors.
This section derives in large part from my Master’s thesis. Please see Jackson (2000).
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Structural adjustment programs have led directly to cuts in social services such as
education and health care. They have led to weakened social welfare (if retaining and
often enhancing the coercive capacity) aspects of state systems as social service
administration is decentralized and NGOs are increasingly tapped as service providers. I
heartily agree, and do not seek to unwisely discount the power of neoclassical economics
in those areas where it can be mobilized.

However, it is critical that neoclassical

economics be seen in the proper light, regarding how the notion of power relates to
neoclassical economics. As Allen argues in Lost Geographies of Power, power does not
‘itself’ move as a package or a flow but rather is a relational effect of social interaction.
Neoclassical economics has no power except as mediated through people’s behavior and
resources mobilized as a result. I argue that juxtaposing the history of exploitation in the
Niger Delta and Watts’ more recently articulated “oil complex” with the rise and fall of
the social welfare improvement aspects of the CCPDP demonstrates the disjuncture
between the discourse of neoclassical economics and the actual processes through which
power to exploit petroleum resources is exercised.

Furthermore, and perhaps most

controversially and importantly, the logic of neoclassical economics does not drive this
exploitation.

Rather, it acts not only as justification17 but more importantly a

mystification, an exhibit, and a spectacle exercised in concert with other mobilizations of
power (e.g. control of governments, construction of ethnic or other ‘communities’,
mobilization of religious fervor for missionary or other interventionist aims) that
corporate entities have used for hundreds of years to gain and maintain access to
productive resources.
17

Schmitz (1995, 64) references Mosley (1991, 20) in narrating the transition of World Bank policymakers
from nation-state relations to removal of state sovereignty over economic affairs:
As more of their lending became policy-based, subject to stringent economic ‘conditionality’ based
on the above [neoliberal] prescriptions, deliverance would come from roving teams of international
economic experts with ‘a justification for a much more active intervention in the local politics of
developing countries.’
See also Ferguson (1994).
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Many have presented neoclassical economics and development as divorced from
exploitative realities. These grow out of two major theoretical streams. The first, which I
cover in this section on “neoclassical economics as mystification,” flows from Hegel and
Marx as synthesized in particular by Gramsci. The second, covered in the following
section, flows from Foucault and has to do with the “microphysics of power” (Foucault
1977, 139). Gramsci mixes Marx with Hegelian thinking to form the notion of cultural
hegemony. As Sivaramakrishnan (2005, 348) describes: “Hegemony theory originated in
the Hegelian formulation of the dialectical relationship between the consciousness of the
master and the consciousness of the oppressed, with the former independent and the latter
dependent (Hegel 1977).” Marx (1963, 61; see also Scott 1985, 315), for his part,
distinguishes between “ruling ideas” and the “ruling material force of society”:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the
ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. . . The
individuals composing the ruling class possess, among other things, consciousness, and
therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and
compass of an epoch, [they], among other things, rule also as thinkers, as producers of
ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the idea of their age: thus their ideas
are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

These notions seem to share similarities with my project in that both divide material and
discursive realities into distinct spheres. Italian Antonio Gramsci provides an enduring
contribution to literature on “ruling ideas” by going beyond economically or politically
reductionist notions of domination and positing that system maintenance as well as
transformation depend not only on economic and political structures but cultural,
educational, and religious structures and processes as well (Cox 1996; Lears 1985, 568,
572, 574, 577). Of particular importance is Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” and its
relation to the coercive Weberian state structure. Lears notes Gramsci’s attempt to define
cultural hegemony thus:
[Cultural hegemony is] the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental
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group;18 this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence)
which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of
production (Gramsci 1971, 12; Lears 1985, 568).

This definition is the first of a two-part description of hegemony, in which the above
describes the role of “civil society.” The second part describes the role of “political
society,” or the state, as the apparatus with “legitimate” right to the use of force within its
boundaries against those who refuse to actively or passively consent.19 As Lears (1985,
568) indicates, “consent and force nearly always coexist; though one or the other
predominates.”20
Gramsci concentrates on a dichotomy not only between force and consent but also
between consciousness and practice.

Regarding consciousness, Lears suggests the

following: “As Gramsci understood, the hegemonic culture depends not on the
brainwashing of ‘the masses’ but on the tendency of public discourse to make some
forms of experience readily available to consciousness while ignoring or suppressing
others” (Lears 1985, 577). People are therefore not so much manipulated into adopting
ideologies supporting inequality and exploitation as they are persuaded of the
“legitimacy” of such ideologies, and prevented from considering alternatives (ibid., 574).
Indeed, Gramsci’s concentration is not so much on the class struggle as such but on
reasons for the lack of more pronounced class struggles in capitalist societies, and the
18

Gramsci’s code for dominant “class”, which he used to avoid censorship. See Gramsci 1971, 5n1.
Although Gramsci does not explicitly indicate this, it seems clear that he is alluding to Weber’s (1958,
78) conception of the state as the entity that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a
territory. See also Chilcote (1994, 98).
20
One might therefore look at hegemony, as does McCamant (1998, 8), as the next step beyond military
conquest in forming more effective and sustainable systems of domination. Although there must almost
always be an implicit threat of force behind hegemonic domination, ideological domination removes many
situations where such force would need to be exercised. Given that the balance between force and
“consent” is very precarious, governments usually must resort to indirect, hidden, deceptive activities not
only to maintain ideological domination but also to effectively utilize force when force is perceived as
necessary. For example, the FBI resorted to divide-and-rule, surveillance, and other tactics against the
Black Panthers and the American Indian Movement in the United States. See Churchill and Vander Wall
(1988). Cox (1996, 127) describes Gramsci’s (1971, 169-170) borrowing of the image of a centaur from
Machiavelli (1977, 49-50) as a way to indicate the relationship between consent and coercion. “To the
extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent
but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases.”

19
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example of a successful "vanguard" revolution in relatively non-capitalist Russia. He
suggests that much of the reason can be found in the cultural sphere, at a relatively great
distance from the means of production (Lears 1985, 572; see also Cox 1996, described
above).
According to Lears:
Gramsci’s vision of society involves not a mechanical model of base and superstructure
but a complex interaction of relatively autonomous spheres (public and private; political,
cultural and economic) within a totality of attitudes and practices. . . The [economic] base
does not determine specific forms of consciousness, but it does determine what forms of
consciousness are possible (Lears 1985, 571).

Gramsci’s vision of society indicates plausible reasons why ruling classes are able
to maintain control without resorting to coercion as often as would generally be expected.
The power of hegemony includes “cultural as well as economic and political power—the
power to help define the boundaries of common-sense ‘reality’ either by ignoring views
outside those boundaries or by labeling deviant opinions ‘tasteless’ or ‘irresponsible’’
(ibid., 572).
Subsequent scholars have applied such notions of “naturalization” and
“objectivity” to “democratization” initiatives; U.S. foreign policy (Robinson 1996); and,
of particular importance to the present project, ideological projects of the World Bank to
co-opt concepts of resistance groups in order to reorient discourses of environment,
participation, and equity so that they might fit within its dominant practices (Schmitz
1995). Moore suggests that post-World War II development discourses can be seen as
hegemonic constructions whereby “a dominant social class organizes its rule so it seems
‘natural’ to its subjects . . . [This] is by no means easy. . . It takes on . . . as many strands
of oppositional discourse as it can co-opt” (Moore 1995, 1 and note 3). Such works
portray ideological hegemony not only as control of the boundaries of consciousness,
what language is used to describe social phenomena, but also attempts by dominant
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institutions to appropriate whatever oppositional language seems to be most potent at any
given time, and either redirect its power to serve dominant interests or remove the power
of these words entirely. Note the importance of ideology in controlling discourse and
practice as well as the existence of opportunities for significant levels of contestation,
where competing ideologies vie for broad social influence.
Although control over ideological apparatuses may contribute to more effective
and stable patterns of inequality and domination, Gramsci and others indicate that there
are also spaces for resistance, although the precise nature of these spaces is contested,
particularly regarding divides between discourse and practice, or ideology and
experience. Indeed, there are many accounts of subordinated groups “counter-coopting”
dominant discourses in order to make their demands known. Lears suggests, inferring
from Bakhtin and Holquist (1981, 269-315) and with some ambivalence about the
devaluation of discourse,21 that “even the most successful hegemonic culture creates a
situation where the dominant mode of discourse. . . becomes a field of contention where
many-sided struggles over meaning are constantly fought out” (Lears 1985, 591); see also
(Cox 1996, 130ff). Lavie and Swedenburg (1996, 9) argue thus:
Hybrid products are. . . results of a long history of confrontations between unequal
cultures and forces, in which the stronger culture struggles to control, remake, or
eliminate the subordinate partner. But even in the case of extremely unbalanced
encounters, subordinates have frequently managed to divert the cultural elements they
were forced to adopt and have rearranged them for their own sly purposes within a new
ensemble—as in the case of the Native American Kashaya Pomo of California, who took
on the trappings of an austere Victorian Christianity in order to protect themselves from
decimation (see also Sarris 1996).

21

“One is entitled to some skepticism. All the talk about ‘struggle’ suggests a mock-heroic picture of the
‘strong’ writer or artist vanquishing, against all odds, external influences. . . Skepticism deepens when one
wonders whether the struggle over meaning might abate if language itself were diffused, increasingly
deprived of its capacity to evoke precise (albeit subjective) meanings. Henri Lefebvre [1984], Jean
Baudrillard [1976], and William Leiss [1976; Leiss and Kline 1978] have all commented on ‘the floating
stock of meaningless signifiers’ that seems to increase under the aegis of consumer culture, as advertisers
and the mass media assemble and reassemble clusters of symbolic attributes designed to sell commodities”
(Lears 1985, 591-92).
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Scott uses such reasoning as the above to argue against the need for a “revolutionary
consciousness.” Rather, many revolutionary movements such as those in France and
Russia have grown out of discourses not of revolution but reform (Scott 1985, 318).
Thus, such groups at least initially locate their demands from within dominant discourses
rather than from without.

Sorel (1941), paraphrased in Cox (1996, 131), cautions,

however, that "reform" could be used by dominant groups to inhibit true social
transformation. "For Sorel, social myth, a powerful form of collective subjectivity,
would obstruct reformist tendencies. These might otherwise attract workers away from
revolutionary syndicalism into incrementalist trade unionism or reformist party
politics."22
One of the recently more controversial aspects of Gramsci’s framework has to do
with the division between discursive and practical consciousness, and in particular
Gramsci’s contention that while people may possess a transformative practical
consciousness, they may be hamstrung by the presence at the same time of “uncritically
absorbed” discursive consciousness:
[The ordinary person has] two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory
consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with
all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one,
superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically
absorbed. [This verbal conception] holds together a specific social group, it influences
moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerfully
enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not
permit of any action (Feierman 1990, 31-32; Gramsci 1971, 326-327, 333; see also Lears
1985, 569).

Invoking literature regarding development discourse, one might say that the lived reality
is dehistoricized and depoliticized, therefore rendering it seemingly unchangeable (Moore
1995).

22

See also Escobar (1995b) on alternatives to conventional political institutions.
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Scott (1985, 318) critiques Gramsci’s notion of “contradictory consciousness” by
suggesting that Gramsci has it backwards at best when he argues that people can be
resistant in practice while not being able to coherently locate their lived experiences in a
“critical historical consciousness,” to use Giroux’s (1981, 46) description. First, there is
significant empirical evidence that subordinate classes have been able to “penetrate and
demystify the prevailing ideology.”

Secondly, suggesting that subordinated classes

conflate what is inevitable with what is just reveals a mistaken understanding of the
“hidden transcripts” that such classes must employ in the face of the “compulsion of
economic relations” as well as threats of coercion. Another weakness that therefore
surfaces in Gramsci’s notions of hegemony as a combination of consent and coercion
(see Cox 1996, 127; Lears 1985, 568) is a failure to effectively describe the character of
coercion vis-à-vis consent. Scott suggests that “consent” is only possible by holding out
the threat of violent reactions to opposition. People know this, and therefore act publicly
as if they are in agreement while privately engaging in resistance.

Thirdly, the

requirement of hegemony that it represents idealizations of reality contains within itself
contradictions that enable subordinate classes to resist dominant classes on their own
terms (see also Lears 1985, 591).23 Fourth, historical analysis of revolutionary
movements such as those in Russia or France nearly always reveals non-revolutionary
demands or representations of what Lenin referred to as “trade union consciousness”
(Scott 1985, 318, 340-343). Finally, breaking norms and values is usually the work of
the bearers of a new mode of production rather than the subordinate classes who “are
often seen as backward looking, inasmuch as they are defending their own interpretation
of an earlier dominant ideology against new and painful arrangements imposed by elites
and/or the state” (ibid., 318).

23

We may look at corporate social responsibility as offering such possibility.

39

Feierman24 invokes recent anthropological literature regarding relationships
between discourse and practice to argue that Gramscian theories of hegemony suffer from
some of the same weaknesses found in anthropological studies that gathered data
primarily through interviews and other methods of engaging in discursive interactions
with subjects. He quotes Bourdieu thus, “Anthropologists learn about exotic society
through indigenous discourse, even though practice is the authentic basis of social
organization” (Bourdieu 1977, 1; quoted in Feierman 1990, 27). Feierman criticizes
theorists of practice such as Bourdieu and Ortner (1984), for ignoring discourse in large
measure and therefore finding it difficult to account for change as well as analyzing links
between consciousness and power (Feierman 1990, 28). He suggests instead that in order
to present a true picture of discourse and practice in maintaining or transforming
ideologies and actions one must examine how “socially central ideas” (ibid., 27) evolve
through struggles among intellectuals at all levels of society. How are discourses not
only created but also appropriated for different ends by people at different levels of
society?25 He suggests that it is necessary to conceive of discourse and practice relating
to one another in diverse and complex ways:
The valuable contribution [of Gramsci’s notions of contradictory consciousness] is the
recognition that practical consciousness and discursive consciousness can coexist in a
state of contradiction. It is clear, however, that no regular relationship exists that ties
practical consciousness to rebellion or discursive consciousness to consent. . . There is
no limit to the way contradictions can appear—contradictions between dissenting
discourse and consenting practice, or the reverse, in addition to contradictions within
practice and within discourse (ibid., 32).

Feierman’s notions of complex, dynamic relations between discourse and practice, as
well as focus on individuals as mediators between discourse and practice, lead him
ultimately to reject the necessity of any type of centralized control of ideology and
centralized intellectual power (ibid., 19).
24
25

See my discussion of textual analysis below.
See Fisher (1997) and Forbes (1996).
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Both Feierman and Scott suggest from their critique of Gramsci’s notions of
dissenting practice and consensual ideology that peasants and other subordinated groups
can comprehend that they have been subjected to unjust political, economic, and social
structures. However, given the resources available to them, they are only able to engage
in “everyday forms” of resistance.

As Scott suggests, “Short of actual rebellion,

powerless groups have, I argue, a self-interest in conspiring to reinforce hegemonic
appearances” (Scott 1990, xii). Similarly, powerful groups also have an interest in
upholding appearances of hegemony, in that it allows them to more effectively maintain
order. Without the means to deal with consequences of speaking the “hidden transcript. .
. directly and publicly in the teeth of power,” (ibid., xiii) people are better off getting
what they can and biding their time.
According to Feierman, the Shambaai peasants among whom he lived have not
been able to take power under colonial or postcolonial regimes because “the forces of
government and of employers are too powerful for members of a vulnerable class to resist
directly.” Instead, it is useful to speak of differences between onstage and offstage
discourse, akin to Scott’s public and private transcripts. Scott (1990, 91) suggests for his
part that:
[in cases where open revolt is coercively prevented] it is. . . more accurate to consider
subordinate classes less constrained at the level of thought and ideology, since they can in
secluded settings [i.e. through private transcripts] speak with comparative safety, and
more constrained at the level of political action and struggle, where the daily exercise of
power sharply limits the options available to them.

However, Feierman’s above statements that “there is no limit to the way contradictions
can appear [between practical and discursive consciousness]” (Feierman 1990, 32)
indicate that he is uncomfortable positing either Gramsci’s or Scott’s characterization of
relationships between ideology and practice. Feierman further articulates his discomfort
thus:
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the separation between action offstage and action onstage, discourse offstage and
discourse onstage, is a valuable one. [However] the distinction between discourse
offstage and discourse onstage is very different from the distinction. . . between
discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. To describe consciousness as
practical is to say that knowledge is tacit and that the actor is incapable of formulating it
discursively. To say that discourse cannot be seen onstage leaves open the question of
whether the action emerges as practice without discursive penetration, or whether the
action emerges from discourse which is merely unseen, publicly invisible (ibid., 42).

Lears (1985, 573) expresses some distaste for those who are willing to disparage
the capacities of elites for rationality, but who are reluctant to describe subordinate
groups in the same way. In a different manner from Scott especially but also Feierman,
he suggests that Gramsci’s conception of hegemony is compatible with “the recent
emphasis on distinct and vigorous working-class cultures”:
To clarify that flexibility, one might imagine hegemonic cultures placed anywhere on a
continuum from “closed” to “open.” In the closed version, subordinate groups lack the
language necessary even to conceive concerted resistance; in the open version, the
capability for resistance flourishes and may lead to the creation of counterhegemonic
alternatives. The place of a culture on the continuum depends on specific circumstances
at a particular historical moment (Lears 1985, 573-574).

2.4 Neoclassical economics as spectacle: Foucault,
governmentality and the “microphysics of power”26
Though there is much beneficial to be said about Gramsci’s contributions to hegemony,
the domination/resistance split is only somewhat useful and certainly too dualistic. Li
(2007, 25), in arguing that Foucauldian engagements including Rose (1999) tend to be
“anemic” regarding politics, usefully combines Gramscian dominance/resistance with
Foucauldian mundane practices:
The value of the Gramscian approach, for my purposes, is the focus on how and why
particular, situated subjects mobilize to contest their oppression. This was not a question
elaborated by Foucault. Conversely, Foucault has the edge on explicit theorization of
how power shapes the conditions in which lives are lived... Foucault shared the concern
to examine how power is lived but approached it differently [from Gramsci]. Gramsci
understood consent to be linked to consciousness. Foucault understood subjects to be
formed by practices of which they might be unaware, and to which their consent is
26

See Sivaramakrishnan (2005, 349), for example of the use of “microphysics of power” in relation to
Foucault.
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neither given nor withheld. Further, Foucault highlighted the ways in which power
enables as much as it constrains or coerces. It works through practices that are, for the
most part, mundane and routine. Thus the binary that is compatible with a Gramscian
analytic – people either consent to the exercise of power or they resist it – was not useful
to Foucault. I do not find it necessary to choose between Gramsci and Foucault on this
point. Some practices render power visible; they trigger conscious reactions adequately
described in terms such as resistance, accommodation, or consent. Other modes of power
are more diffuse, as are people's responses to them. John Allen (2003, 196) put this point
eloquently when he observed that power "often makes its presence felt through a variety
of modes playing across one another. The erosion of choice, the closure of possibilities,
the manipulation of outcomes, the threat of force, the assent of authority or the inviting
gestures of a seductive presence, and the combinations thereof.”

Allen completes this passage by stating, “A simple domination/resistance
framework in this respect trivializes the feeling for what power is when it is brushed up
against.” Much of this “power that one brushes up against” has been theorized with
reference to Foucault. However, Foucault has been approached in at least two different
ways with regard to the issue of neoclassical economics as spectacle. I covered the first,
what I call the discourse approach, briefly in discussion of Gibson-Graham above. I
revisit it here because it has been a major force recently among those critical of
development according to the neoclassical economic model.

The second approach,

governmentality or the “conduct of conduct,” underlies much of my counternarrative
below including that which references Apter, Watts and Li. It underpins the everyday
forms of control in producing margins, forms which make it less necessary to engage in
spectacular and brutal violence to maintain control.

2.4.1

Foucauldian discourse and the ‘local’

The Foucaldian discourse approach is helpful in this project because it provides a critical
context for looking at the terms that the World Bank uses to portray development as
governance: participation, empowerment, accountability, transparency. These terms, like
the neoclassical economic theory that still forms the necessary core of development, are
substantively disconnected in important ways from realities of exploitation. Scholars
such as Escobar (1995a; 1995b; 1997), others who contributed to Rahnema and
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Bawtree’s (1997) Post-Development Reader and Sachs’s (1992a) Development
Dictionary, and Ferguson (1994) posited—albeit with more concentration on failure than
success—that modern states and notions of development have specific characteristics that
have contributed to development disasters of a certain sort with similar outcomes (for
Ferguson, the extension of state influence where it had previously been largely absent)
and even to the utter poverty of development as a progressive discourse (Escobar,
Rahnema, and Sachs).27 Escobar undertook a similar project regarding development in
the 1990s. Like Gibson-Graham above, Escobar joins other post-development or poststructural scholars in emphasizing discourse as the space of domination and advocating
for concentration of social transformation in the generative local. Escobar’s other work
argues for emphasis on the value of “new social movements”28 as spaces for political
action outside conventional state and civil society structures such as political parties and
trade unions. He suggests that:
whether [action of such groups] leads to significant transformations in the prevailing
regime remains to be seen . . . However, the grassroots initiatives of social movements. . .
constitute an analytical and political terrain in which the weakening of development and
the displacement of certain categories of modernity. . . can be defined and explored
(Escobar 1995b, 210).

Although his approach is self-described as poststructuralist and discursive—“in the sense
that it stems from the recognition of the importance of the dynamics of discourse and
power to any study of culture” (Escobar 1995a,vii)—Escobar describes development
thus:
Instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s,
the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: massive
underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression (ibid., 4;
emphases added).

27

The following is a revised version of my Master’s thesis discussion (Jackson 2000, 56) of difference and
locality in the context of Freire’s critical literacy.
28
See Escobar (1992; 1995), Alvarez and Escobar (1992), Alvarez et al. (1998) and Touraine (1981).
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Sachs (1992a, 4) suggests — demonstrating sympathy with notions of ideological
hegemony — that “the mental space in which people dream and act is largely occupied
today by Western imagery,” and that the essays in his edited volume intend to “expose
some of the unconscious structures that set boundaries on the thinking of our epoch.”
Words such as “development” (Esteva 1992); “environment” (Sachs 1992b);
“participation” (Rahnema 1992a); and “planning” (Escobar 1992) have been used to
justify management and intervention on behalf of modernization. These articles as well
as one by Rahnema on poverty (Rahnema 1992b) seem to suggest that resistance must
come from more decentralized, grassroots sources so as to respect and protect
“vernacular” or “local” knowledges and ways of being.
The writing by post-structuralists of domination in discursive terms, and the
consequent concentration on a resurgent local as the space for true social change, forms
part of my argument in the conclusion that my approach to neoclassical economics and
development has significant implications for study of and engagement with social
movements and contentious politics. However, there has been significant criticism of
post-structuralist literature, criticism that I largely agree with in questioning the inherent
capacity of resistance to be found in the ‘difference that locality makes’, and the
reductive Gramscian location of domination in the “mental space in which people dream
and act.” In a review of the books by Ferguson, Escobar, and Sachs, Agrawal (1996)
suggests that they are flawed in their (e.g. Ferguson) tendency to offer critique without
alternatives, or to offer alternatives such as greater attention to the local that threaten to
replace one grand theme with another, and their tautological arguments. Agrawal (1996,
476) offers two useful pieces of advice for the above authors:
Instead of avowing an explicit commitment to post-structuralism and calling for a
repudiation of ‘development,’ it might be far more fruitful to examine the ways in which
attempts by the state to foster development are often used as instruments of legitimation
and extension of political control, yet also often engender resistance and protest. It was
Foucault, after all, who pointed to the positive as well as the negative aspects of power.
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A second productive move might be to accept the impossibility of questioning all
metanarratives and instead to rethink how development can be profitably contested from
within as well as from outside.

Gupta and Ferguson also argue (1997, 46) that movements for social
transformation cannot fall back on pre-existing structures of identification in battling
such forces as corporate globalization:
For the proponents of ‘cultural critique,’ difference is taken as a starting point, not as an
end product. Given a world of “different societies,” they ask, how can we use experience
in one to comment on another? But if we question a pregiven world of separate and
discrete “peoples and cultures” and instead see a set of difference-producing relations, we
turn from a project of juxtaposing pre-existing differences to one of exploring the
construction of differences in historical process.

In a similar manner, Ebert (1991, 295-296) critiques ‘ludic postmodernism’, and
argues that instead:
difference, as I argue resistance postmodernism rewrites it, is always difference in
relation, that is, difference within a system of power and the social struggle it engenders. .
. This concern with the economy of relations of difference within historically specific
totalities is the key issue of transformative politics—and its main difference from ludic
politics—for transformative politics sees its task as intervening in the power relations
organizing difference in order to end the oppression and exploitation grounded on them.
If totalities are structures of differences, and thus multiple, unstable, and changeable
arenas of contradictions and social struggle, then they are open to contestation and
transformation (emphasis in original).

Agrawal, Gupta and Ferguson emphasize the optimistic potential inherent in relations of
power, as well as the structures and relations of power through which “difference”
operates. “If totalities are structures of differences, and thus multiple, unstable, and
changeable arenas of contradictions and social struggle, then they are open to
contestation and transformation.”

However, ‘totalities’ are also structures with

materiality.
Watts emphasizes the materiality of totalities, as against the “performative
knowledges” common to post-structuralist thought. He does so in three particularly
emphatic instances. First, he (1999, 91) critiques post-development
discourses on alternatives and their imaginaries. . . Identity politics is championed by
Escobar, for example, because it represents part of an alternative reservoir of knowledge
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and because such ideas stand against the ‘axiomatics of capitalism’. But there is surely
nothing necessarily anti-capitalist or particularly progressive about cultural identity: calls
to localism can produce Hindu fascism as easily as Andean Indian co-operatives.”

In the same volume (p. 107), he makes the point more sharply and clearly in the context
of the Ogoni in the Niger Delta: “Nine Ogoni were hung not for connivance or play but
for confronting state legitimacy on the most sensitive of terrains: the geographical terrain.
. ."
Finally, Watts (2003a, 10) is of equally strong opinion in an article written for a
special issue of the Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography. In that journal, he argues
that the Islamic extremism behind the September 11th terror attacks could be seen as a
call for an alternative development:
political Islam seems to meet all of the preconditions of hybrid forms of alternative
development, and would fit quite comfortably in Gibson-Graham and Ruccio’s frame of
reference. If development, as Gupta (1998) says, is orientalism transformed into a science
for action in the contemporary world, is not Islamism a vivid exemplar of “postdevelopment”, a case of religion transformed into cultural politics?

Gibson-Graham (2003a, 37) responds that this “[alignment] (despite protestations to the
contrary) [of] postdevelopment thinking with Islamic fascism . . . is a dance that need not
be performed. I know I certainly want to sit it out and wait for a new space on the floor.”
Watts then responds (2003b, 10), “. . . we, I gather, build differing ontologies. Mine,
slathered in real politics, the predictable monotony of business as usual, and the
objective, distanced apparatuses of truth confirmation; and hers, identifying and creating
instances of non-capitalist development (p. 36).” Whether such nearly ad hominem
attacks are useful, this certainly highlights the disagreements within Foucauldian
approaches about the nature of power and development.

Watts clearly uses the

Foucauldian notions of governmentality rather than the discursive readings of Foucault.
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2.4.2

Governmentality

The second strand of Foucault, and one that more deeply informs the case studies that
make up this project, refers to ‘governmentality’, the maintenance of power through
“microphysics” (Foucault 1977, 139) of everyday disciplining. Neoclassical economics
and development as structural adjustment or governance form part of this control of
conduct, by “rendering technical” (Li 2007, 7-10, 234) arrangements of power that are
centered on coercive states and exploitative corporations.

Watts (2003a) notes the

importance and problematics of governance as part of “governmentality,” though perhaps
with somewhat more optimism about its value as an antidote to neoliberal economics
(“high economism”) than I have:
Questions of governance, and sensitivity to multiple paths of capitalism, are powerful
antidotes to the absurdities of high economism. But there is a danger, as Hart (2002) has
signalled recently, that one loses sight of the interconnection across divergences, ignores
the ongoing struggles and processes by simply reading path-dependency from history,
seeing power in institutions as exercised only through rules and norms (culture). It is
against these lacunae that I wish to return to governance, but from a Foucauldian
perspective . . . (Watts 2003a, 12)
Government for Foucault (2000), referred famously to the “conduct of conduct”, a more
or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule
through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a
variety of spatial levels (Watts 2003a, 13).

First, Watts (ibid.) highlights Foucault’s relation of people and resources:
The things, in this sense, with which government is to be concerned are in fact men, but
men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those things that are wealth,
resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate,
irrigation, fertility, and so on; men in their relation to those other things that are
customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking and so on; and finally men in relation to
those still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes such as famines,
epidemics, death and so on… What counts is essentially this complex of men and things;
property and territory are merely one of its variables {Foucault, 2000 #4842, 201-22\;
emphasis added by Watts\}.

Secondly, Watts (ibid., 13-14) builds the notion of “governable spaces” from Rose’s
(1999) and Dean’s (1999) work. He takes the notion of governmentality from Rose
(1999, 21), as:
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“studies of stratums of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of particular regimes of
truth concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of speaking truth, persons authorised to
speak truth…. of the invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses for exercising
power… they are concerned with the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for ways
of seeking to act upon the conduct of others. . .”
Governing, that is to say what authorities wanted to happen in relation to what problems
and objectives and through what tactics, can be assessed through the analytics of
government, in other words the processes by which we govern and are governed within
different regimes, the conditions under which they emerge, operate and are transformed.
Dean notes that there are four dimensions to government so construed. The first he calls
forms of visibility (the picturing and constituting of objects). The second is the techne of
government (through what means, mechanism, tactics, and technologies is authority
constituted and rule accomplished). Third, the episteme of government (what forms of
thought, knowledge, expertise, calculation are employed in governing and how is form
given to what is governable). And fourth, forms of identification (the forming of subjects,
selves, agents, actors, in short the production of governable subjects) [emphasis in
original]. . .
The other [aspect is] taken from Rose’s notion of governable spaces as they emerge from
the four analytics of government detailed above. For Rose (1999, 32), governable spaces,
and the spatialization of government, are “modalities in which a real and material
governable world is composed, terraformed, and populated.” The scales at which
government is “territorialised” – territory is derived from terra, land, but also terrere, to
frighten – are myriad: the factory, the neighbourhood, the commune, the region, the
nation. Each of these governable spaces has its own topology and is modelled, as Rose
(1999, 37) puts it (through systems of cognition and remodelled through government
practice), in such a way that demands how such topoi have emerged: the social thought
and practice that has territorialised itself upon the nation, the city, the village or the
factory. The map has been central to this process as a mode of objectification, marking
and inscribing but also as “a little machine for producing conviction in others” (1999,
37). But in general, it was geography that formed “the art whose science was political
economy” (Rhein, cited in Rabinow 1984, 142). Modern space and modern governable
spaces were produced by the biological (the laws of population which determine the
qualities of the inhabitants) and the economic (the systems of the production of wealth).
Governable spaces necessitate the territorializing of governmental thought and practice
but are simultaneously produced as differing scales by the “cold laws of political
economy” (Rose 1999, 39).

Apter likewise, in his (2005) socio-historical analysis of the “spectacle of culture” in
Nigeria, relies on Foucauldian microphysics of power, as seen by discussion of colonial
control: “If the colonial rule was visible, even spectacular, its habitus was hidden in the
details and disciplines of new forms of etiquette and knowledge” (2005, 181).
Mitchell (2002; 2006; 2008) applies a similar perspective to the growth of the
economy, which he argues is in fact a quite recent phenomenon:
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In the twentieth century, new ways of administering the welfare of populations, of
developing the resources of colonies, organizing the circulation of money, compiling and
using statistics, managing large businesses and workforces, branding and marketing
products, and desiring and purchasing commodities brought into being a world that for
the first time could be measured and calculated as though it were a free-standing object,
the economy (Mitchell 2008, 1116).

Thus, what Callon et al. (2002, 196) calls the “caged economics” of the university is a
spectacle while the habitus of economics is hidden in the details of “economics in the
wild”; that is, economics participating in the production of the economy as an object.29
Mitchell forms very much the same argument as Carrier and Miller, in that the
“economy” is a recent construction that has created the world that it purports to describe.
He (Mitchell 2008, 1118-1119) uses the example of Edison’s development of an
electricity network:
Edison’s case. . . helps us to think about the question of virtualism (Carrier and Miller
1998). There is no simple divide between an experimental or simulated world of the
industrial workshop or business planning and a real world outside it. Every situation
offers a certain arrangement of the simulated and that to which it refers. . . Every instance
of building networks was simultaneously a demonstration and the thing being
demonstrated, something virtual and something real.

As a result, Mitchell’s privileging of the economy is open somewhat to the same
critique I make of Carrier and Miller, that the economy while powerful is not the only or,
in important ways, even the most important driver of exploitation. Thus, my cases look
at other drivers than economics, including business, religion, culture and geography.
With Thrift, I agree that economics has great influence on “the world” in particular of
academics, the World Bank and legitimization of certain kinds of inter- and intra-state
discipline. However, it has questionable influence on business (literature) or corporate
exploitation in Central Africa.

Furthermore, no matter what corporate executives,

neoclassical economists and development officials argue, business has critical influence
over exploitation (state and non-state) in producing as well as consuming areas.30
29

See especially Michell (2006).
Rangan and Kull (2009, 41) make a similar point in discussing Foucault’s “discursive formations” as part
of their examination of scale and political ecology:

30
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With these general theoretical points in mind, it is important to begin
substantively with the narrative that is the shift from orthodox neoclassical economic
theory to neoinstitutional economics, and the difference this makes to economic
development theory and World Bank research and high-level policy orientations in
particular.

Excessive emphasis on deconstructing rational knowledge often
obscures the ways in which sensibilities and emotions are evoked to imbue scientific or
policy discourse with legitimacy and authority.
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Chapter 3 From Neoliberal to Neoinstitutional Approaches
How does this new institutional approach fit in with neoclassical theory? It begins with the scarcity hence
competition postulate; it views economics as a theory of
choice subject to constraints; it employs price theory as
an essential part of the analysis of institutions; and it
sees changes in relative prices as a major force inducing
change in institutions.
How does this approach modify or extend neo-classical
theory? In addition to modifying the rationality postulate,
it adds institutions as a critical constraint and analyses
the role of transaction costs as the connection between
institutions and costs of production. It extends economic
theory by incorporating ideas and ideologies into the
analysis, modeling the political process as a critical
factor in the performance of economies, as the source of
the diverse performance of economies, and as the
explanation for ‘inefficient’ markets.
(North 1997, 19)

When I refer to neoinstitutional economics, I refer to one of two streams identified by
Bardhan (1989; see also Leys 1996, 82). Bardhan refers to Akerlof’s (1970) “Market for
Lemons” as a strand of “new institutional economics,” as well, though this is somewhat
rare in the broader literature. Indeed, Akerlof is not referenced in Harriss et al. (1995)
The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. However, the main
innovation claimed by neoinstitutional economists has to do with the nature of
information, and Akerlof’s work shares with neoinstitutional economics the
acknowledgement of imperfect information.

More commonly than Akerlof, Bates’

rational choice political economy has been widely associated with neoinstitutional
economics in the context of rational choice perspectives. Bates’ work has significant
influence on development, and his addition of politics provides important correctives to
neoinstitutional economics within rational choice perspectives in Harriss et al. (1995,
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chap. 3).31 However, his political economic rational choice view, with its concentration
on power, does not classify him for my purposes within the price-centered work of
neoinstitutional economics.
Orthodox neoclassical economists32 assume that information is costless.
Therefore, in a free market economy, prices depend only on technology, or
“transformation costs” (North 1990, 31).

Since the stock of technology at any given

time is globally consistent, then market transactions will move prices for a particular
commodity to the one equilibrium price whereby a gain to one actor necessarily means a
loss to another actor. That is, the market will be Pareto optimal. Upon changes in
technology, resources are allocated through the price mechanism to reflect the new
equilibrium price point.

Efficiency, then, is simply allocative efficiency; that is,

efficiency defined as the extent to which resources are distributed in a manner amenable
to selling a good for the lowest price possible. Two types of structures are relevant to
economic activity in this scenario. The market is the space for transactions, and the state
has a monopoly on violence in a particular territory. States are important for orthodox
neoclassical economists because they have the power to distort market activity by altering
the prices of transactions. With state intervention there is still only one equilibrium, but
that equilibrium reflects not only the existing stock of technology but also the effects of
the state distortion, whether it is subsidies, quotas, tariffs, quality control or other
barriers. As a result, economic policy improvement simply should have to do with
removing state-induced barriers to trade, or at the most providing some redistribution for
social welfare.

31

As noted in the introduction, Leys (1996) places rational choice perspectives appropriately into a broader
critical study of development from a political science (political economy) perspective.
32
In regard to policy-making in particular, they are also referred to as neoliberal economists. However, in
economic theory, they are typically referred to as “orthodox neoclassical economists.” See for example
Furubotn (1997, 361ff).
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3.1 Reasons for institutions: information costs underlie transaction
costs
The above description of orthodox neoclassical economics is by necessity simplistic, for
reasons of space.
economists address.

However, it presents the core assumptions that neoinstitutional
Neoinstitutional economists accept most core assumptions of

neoclassical economics, except the assumption that information is costless.

Rather,

because information has a cost, actors must enter into transactions with inequitable stores
of information. North (1997, 17) summarizes it in this manner, “. . . information is
incomplete, and there is limited mental capacity by which to process information.” Simon
(1986; see also North 1990, 23) refers to this as bounded rationality, which he describes
as the gap between the real world and decision-makers’ perception of it. In contrast to
the perspective of asymmetric information – particularly Akerlof's “the market for
lemons”33 noted above – bounded rationality considerations look not only at the
complexity and asymmetry of information but also cognitive shortcomings of all
individuals. Not only do individuals have inequitable stores of information and cognitive
shortcomings, but relatedly they have “different ideas (or mental models) of the way in
which the world about them works” (Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis 1995, 3). The
combination of limited computational abilities, different mental models and complex
realities mean that no individual has the requisite resources for obtaining the information
necessary to make fully rational decisions.34 Therefore, people ‘satisfice’. That is, they
exercise the level of rationality that they determine is necessary and feasible for dealing
with a particular situation.

33

See also Leys (1996, 82-83).
Herbert Simon was, unsurprisingly, also very influential in the field of artificial intelligence. See
especially Simon (1996) The Sciences of the Artificial.

34
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To bounded rationality, as Williamson (2000a, 96-97) argues, must be added the
tendency of individuals to try to mobilize information inequalities for their own benefit
through guile, or opportunism:
The two behavioral assumptions out of which transaction cost economics works are (1)
bounded rationality (on which account all complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete)
and (2) opportunism (on which account mere promise, unsupported by credible
commitments poses contractual hazards).
These behavioral assumptions apply
symmetrically to all [emphasis in original] forms of organization, which is to say that
economic actors in the private sector and public sector are described as being alike. . .
[A]ll contractual hazards would vanish were it not that bounded rationality is paired with
opportunism. Given the absence of bounded rationality, contingent claims contracting
would obtain. Given the absence of opportunism, contract as promise would everywhere
be efficacious.

North (1990, 29) uses the examples of oranges, used cars and life insurance to
demonstrate the character of opportunism. The seller of the oranges or the used cars
knows that the buyer does not know as much about the product on the market as the
seller. Therefore, the seller as a rational being would be expected to try to convince the
buyer that the product is more attractive than it actually is. Conversely, the buyer of life
insurance knows that they have more information about their health than the seller of life
insurance. Therefore, they will try to convince the seller that they are healthier than they
actually are.
Bounded rationality and opportunism, what Williamson (2000a, 96) calls
'behavioral assumptions', create an uncertainty about transactions that is absent from the
Pareto optimality of orthodox neoclassical economics. This uncertainty underlies the
transaction costs that neoinstitutional economists add to the costs associated with
applying technology to production of goods, defined as “transformation costs.” Goods
that actors would purchase in a market with costless information may not be purchased
when there are information constraints, because of the additional costs associated with
gathering information, negotiating between buyer and seller, and monitoring and
enforcing compliance with agreements (Coase 1937). North (1990, 41) comments, “in
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the absence of constraints, asymmetric information and the consequent distribution of
gains will lead to devoting excessive resources to measurement or indeed can lead to
exchange not taking place at all because the exchange is unenforceable.”
As a result of these transaction costs, neoinstitutional economists argue, those
with adequate power create, change and maintain institutions that constrain opportunism,
ameliorate information deficits, and help to decrease the uncertainty of transactions.
These institutions have the characteristic of remediableness (similar to satisficing)
whereby, as Williamson (2000b) notes, “an extant mode of organization for which no
superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is
presumed to be efficient.” As a result, there is no Pareto optimal single equilibrium for
states to distort or allow. Rather, the uncertainty associated with transactions means that
there can be multiple, remediably efficient, sustainable equilibrium conditions. This has
important consequences for neoclassical economic notions of development, which under
orthodox neoclassical economics involves “structural adjustment,” or simply freeing the
market from distorting state policies.
The integration of institutions moves consideration of efficiency and
sustainability, among other things, in significant new directions. As North (1990, 80)
discusses below, economic change must focus on adaptive efficiency (rule change) rather
than simply allocative efficiency (technology):
In allocative efficiency, the standard neoclassical Pareto conditions obtain. Adaptive
efficiency, on the other hand, is concerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way an
economy evolves through time. It is also concerned with the willingness of a society to
acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and creative
activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the society through
time.35

Coase (1992, 717) focuses more on the legal aspects of institutions in arguing that “what
are traded on the market are not physical entities but the rights to perform certain
35

The last sentence is more about normative development and will be addressed further below.
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actions.”

This perspective, when compared with North’s more historically oriented

analysis discussed subsequently, marks the significant division within neoinstitutional
economics (Bardhan’s CDAWN) between North and “transaction cost” economists
including Coase and more recently Williamson.

I first cover the transaction cost

economics of Coase and Williamson, and then integrate their perspective with North’s
“neoinstitutional evolutionary economics.”

3.2

Transaction cost economics

Coase applies the notion of buying and selling “rights” rather than goods especially to
questions about “the nature of the firm” (1937) in the classic piece by that name which is
widely seen as the founding document of neoinstitutional economics.

Williamson

follows Coase in concentrating on the role that firms play in minimizing transaction
costs. Because Williamson concentrates primarily on business organization, his work is
rather marginal to conventional economic development perspectives.36

However, in

addition to those cases where economic development focuses on enterprises,
Williamson’s examination of firms and governance has been applied at a macro level in
the World Banks’ emphasis on governance and reconfiguration of states and societies to
facilitate economic development. Therefore, while World Bank development research
and policy documents use North’s arguments more extensively in the rationale, the
governance basis of the policy documents actually reflects Williamson’s rationale more
faithfully though policy documents concentrate on state-centered governance rather than
any changes in corporate governance.
Williamson adds the concept of asset specificity to bounded rationality and
opportunism, in establishing a transaction cost theory of firm organization.

Asset

specificity refers to the difficulty of transferring resources to other uses after initial
36

However, see Dunning (2006) discussion of “a new paradigm of development,” from an international
business perspective. I discuss this further in the conclusion below.
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dedication to one type of production.

After a commitment is made to purchase a

particular resource, the resultant sunk costs make it much more difficult to change to a
different provider.37 Williamson (1975, 26-30) refers to the change in a transaction’s cost
brought about by asset specificity as the “fundamental transformation” whereby
exchanges that start out as 'large-number' conditions become small number conditions
after the exchanges take place because of the resultant increase in cost brought about
through purchase of a particular good. Put another way, if the seller misrepresents their
product, it becomes relatively more costly to rectify errors caused by opportunism by
changing products after the sale is complete.
In orthodox neoclassical theory, firms exist for technological reasons of
indivisibility or inseparability (Williamson 1975).

However, the “fundamental

transformation” resulting from imperfect information and asset specificity means that
firms do not simply buy resources, organize them, and sell the resulting products. Rather,
firms must determine whether it is better to “make” or “buy” goods. Is the manufacturing
cost of a good lower when it is manufactured inside the firm, or bought on the market?
Williamson (1985, 90; quoted in Furubotn and Richter 2005, 319)38 breaks down the
difference between markets and firms in the following manner:
The main differences between market and internal organization are these: (1) markets
promote high-powered incentives and restrain bureaucratic distortions more effectively
than internal organization; (2) markets can sometimes aggregate demands to advantage,
thereby to realize economies of scale and scope; and (3) internal organization has access
to distinctive governance instruments.

Williamson’s (2000c, 22) notion of governance for internal organization begins
with Commons’ (1934, 4) argument that “'[t]he ultimate unit of activity . . . must contain
in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality and order. This unit is a transaction.'”
37

Conditions brought on by asset specificity are also part of 'first mover' advantages, which is covered
below in Frynas’ (1998) examination of political instability as a competitive advantage for Shell. However,
Shell’s first mover advantages have little to do with sunk costs for the government as purchaser, but rather
with Shell’s resultant political connections and networks.
38
See also Williamson (1999, 19).
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Williamson (2000a, 106) uses this conception of transaction cost to underpin his
description of governance as “the means by which order is accomplished in a relation
where potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains
[emphasis in original].” In those cases, therefore, where the “potential conflict” threatens
market activity (“mutual gains”), the distinctive governance instruments brought by firms
can make productive activity possible. What are these advantages? The first advantage
of the firm that Williamson outlines is the firm’s ability to more effectively control
human interaction.

Given transaction costs, human beings are assumed to act in

particular ways given different conditions of control over resources. In the marketplace,
humans act more voluntarily and autonomously in leveraging asymmetrical possession of
information and other resources. However, when the hierarchical firm brings human and
non-human ‘assets’ under its purview, then neoinstitutional economists argue that the
firm can control these resources in very different ways and thus eliminate many of the
costs associated with market transactions. The firm has centralized control over nonhuman assets, while human assets are subject to differential levels of firm authority. In
particular, even with disputes regarding “human assets” there is a “presumption that
[they] will be resolved internally” (Williamson 1996, 99).

3.3

Evolutionary neoinstitutional economics

While Williamson concentrates on transaction costs and the make-or-buy decision, North
emphasizes that consideration of institutions brings with it the ability to insert ideas,
ideologies and power politics into exploration of economic systems.39 The larger camp
of evolutionary economics, within which North belongs, has a long gestation, indeed to
39

Many economists (for example, Harriss 1995) note that the study of institutions is fraught with issues that
are vexing for economists at least. Among other things, it is difficult to cost out institutional effects.
Secondly, study of institutions brings to the forefront conditions of complex and dynamic causality. This is
difficult to fit into conventional economic paradigms. Nugent (1998) proposes a set of solutions that
simplify study of transaction costs from both the supply and demand sides. First, break up demand-side
transaction costs into costs of information, costs of negotiating agreements, and costs of communicating
provisions. On the supply side, concentrate on collective action.
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the beginning of scholarly engagement with Darwin’s natural selection. The breadth of
evolutionary conceptions in economics draws the interest of scholars ranging from North
to Resnick and Wolff (Wolff and Resnick 1994). Given the case-study rather than
theoretical focus of this project, I do not seek here to provide an expanded analysis of
evolutionary economics and its Darwinian (as opposed to Newtonian) worldview.40
Suffice it to say that evolutionary economics is broadly concerned with applying
principles of variation, mutation and natural selection to economic change (Dopfer
2005b). This view retains basic economic conceptions of profit and some measure of
individual ambition. However, individual actions closely integrate with environmental
constraints.
Nelson and Winter, in their influential book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change (1982, 4), argue that though firms are motivated by profit and therefore are
engaged in looking for ways to improve profits, their actions are not “profit maximizing
over well-defined and exogenously given choice sets.” ‘Orthodox’ economics largely
ignores historical change, and in particular the notion of ‘natural selection’, which Nelson
and Winter describe thus:
Our firms are modeled as simply having, at any given time, certain capabilities and
decision rules. Over time these capabilities and rules are modified as a result of both
deliberate problem-solving efforts and random events. And over time, the economic
analogue of natural selection operates as the market determines which firms are profitable
and which are unprofitable, and tends to winnow out the latter.

Firms adopt decision rules that are analogous to routines (predictable behavior patterns)
and production techniques, and these patterns assume path dependent traits. As a result,
economic activity is both dynamic and stable. Nelson and Winter’s core concern is with
“the dynamic process by which firm behavior patterns and market outcomes are jointly
determined over time” (ibid., 18).

40

See Dopfur (2005) for a more general examination of evolutionary economics.
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North begins with the emphasis that ‘institutions matter’, but uses evolutionary
economics to engage institutions through study of economic history, institutions and
institutional change.41 Institutions matter because:
the subjective and incomplete processing of information plays a critical role in decision
making. It accounts for ideology, based upon subjective perceptions of reality, playing a
major part in human beings’ choices. It brings into play the complexity and
incompleteness of our information and the fumbling efforts we make to decipher it. It
focuses on the need to develop regularized patterns of human interaction in the face of
such complexities, and it suggests that these regularized interactions we call institutions
may be very inadequate or very far from optimal in any sense of the term (North 1990,
23).

North addresses questions of institutional sustainability and change by building an
edifice that integrates individual incentive with written rules and unwritten conventions
overlain by enforcement mechanisms.

He argues that neoinstitutional evolutionary

economics is about the interaction throughout history of formal and informal constraints,
underpinned by enforcement mechanisms. North uses the notions of formal and informal
constraints along with enforcement mechanisms to integrate economic underpinnings
with socio-cultural and socio-political notions of human interaction. He also uses these
three underpinnings to develop an economic history explanation for why the West has
developed economically while the Third World remains stagnant. I begin with North’s
conception of constraints, followed by his conception of individual incentive and finally
integrate North’s perspective on economic development with Williamson’s influential yet
ahistorical view of developed and under/non-developed economies.
For North, formal constraints (rules and laws) structure the measurement,
enforcement and policing of contracts and property rights.

As North (1990, 32)

emphasizes, the cost of contract policing must balance the benefits, or the transaction will

41

This, for example, makes Udehn’s (2001, 285) characterization of Nelson and Winter as part of
evolutionary neoinstitutional economics rather questionable.

61

not take place. Formal constraints range from constitutional structures at the state level
to rules governing employee behavior at the micro level:
The increasing complexity of societies would naturally raise the rate of return to the
formalization of constraints (which became possible with the development of writing),
and technological change tended to lower measurement costs and encourage precise,
standardized weights and measures. The creation of formal legal systems to handle more
complex disputes entails formal rules; hierarchies that evolve with more complex
organization entail formal structures to specify principal/agent relationships. . . [These
formal constraints] may lower information, monitoring and enforcement costs and hence
make informal constraints possible solutions. . . (North 1990, 46)

Informal constraints include extension, elaboration and modification of formal rules;
socially sanctioned norms; and internally enforced standards of conduct (North 1990, 38)
determining habits, routines, repetitive choices and conventions. Informal constraints
come from culture, which provides “a language-based conceptual framework for
encoding and interpreting the information that the senses are presenting to the brain”
(North 1990, 36-37). Informal constraints can also include reputation. They “...make it
possible for us not to have to think about problems or make [repetitive or routine]
choices” (1990, 22).
Informal constraints in productive economies, however, play a major role
regarding the quantity and quality of labor output:
Conventions about output, forms of organization designed to encourage work
participation and cooperation, and attempts to select workers who have an ideological
commitment to hard work have all become recent research agendas in the New Industrial
Organization (North 1990, 66).

There is a persistent tension in evolutionary economics between informal and formal
constraints. Formal constraints fit easily with economic structures. However, informal
constraints elide economic contexts (entrepreneurs maximizing utility given incentive
structures) with sociological and political contexts, bringing such institutions as religion
and culture (as cognitive models more than collective entities) into consideration. The
constraint of reducing all to the individualist language of economics results in some
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disconnects only partially relieved by game theoretic processes. For example, how does
one effectively get from the highly abstract individual incentives to the overflowing
symbolism of religion and organizational density of even a Robert Putnam? This latter
question buttresses the need for new institutional economic sociology, addressed at the
end of this chapter. As North (1990, 42) notes:
We simply do not have any convincing theory of the sociology of knowledge that
accounts for the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of organized ideologies or accounts for
choices made when the payoffs to honesty, integrity, working hard, or voting are
negative.

Both formal and informal constraints must be sustained by enforcement
mechanisms, so as to lower the costs of transacting.

These reflect the stage of

development, ranging from self-enforcement through pressure exerted by personal ties to
impersonal, independent third-party enforcement. One of the most important institutions
for an effective economy, North (1990, 54) argues, is an independent third party
enforcement mechanism that assures in particular the protection of property rights and
enforcement of contracts. This becomes a critical point for the subsequent discussion of
economic development.
These institutions (formal and informal constraints) and associated enforcement
mechanisms are driven not by natural selection, North argues, but by individual
incentive. This separates North from other evolutionary economists such as Nelson and
Winter. North thus distinguishes between institutions and organizations. Organizations
are “purposive entities designed by their creators to maximize wealth, income or other
objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the
society” (North 1990, 73). Individuals calculate payoffs of behavior depending on their
existing mental models. Based on these payoffs, activities either fall under the existing
rules of the game or, if the payoffs are perceived to outweigh the risks, actors
incrementally change the rules of the game. In North’s model of institutional change
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through purposive organizations seeking to maximize their utility, the entrepreneur and
entrepreneurship become prominent, more so than in Williamson’s concentration on
control and governance. Neoclassical economists define entrepreneurs as those who take
on risk, and organize productive resources in order to make a profit. However, the
orthodox neoclassical view of entrepreneurship is one-dimensional, with entrepreneurs
seeming only to show themselves briefly, when technological change or change in
demand induces changes in Pareto optimal equilibrium conditions. Entrepreneurs do not
institute change so much as they mobilize existing technology, engage in self-interested
and rational transactions, survive or perish, and therefore assume a role in establishing a
new equilibrium.
For neoinstitutional economists, given information costs, entrepreneurs are still
one-dimensional in the sense that they seek engagement in self-interested and logical
transactions. However, they contribute not so much to allocative efficiency (that is,
transactions are not automatically logical in a deductive sense) as to adaptive efficiency,
whereby they operate within and make marginal changes to existing institutional
environments so as to maximize their self-interest in the face of institutional moderators
of costly information:
in addition to thinking about current technology, he [the entrepreneur] can speculate on
the desirability of developing and utilizing some novel technological/organizational
arrangement of his own design. Then, of course, the set of potential alternatives is open
ended, and the idea of finding a definitive optimum (comparable to a classic Pareto
equilibrium point) has no clear meaning.
To say all this, however, is not to suggest that the conventional marginal calculus and
programming methods cannot be applied effectively in the solution of certain types of
problems connected with the firm's operations. As noted earlier, the orthodox approach
can be utilized to secure efficient treatment for some lower-level problems that arise
within the general framework of a firm. Decision making is a costly process and thus the
extent to which resources are used to find desirable arrangements is determined on the
basis of perceived costs and benefits. When the matter to be resolved is not too complex,
so that the extent of the information that must be collected and assessed is well defined
and manageable, the associated costs will be acceptable. Then, the usual marginal costs
and returns can indeed be calculated accurately or approximated. It is also true that, as a
practical matter, firms will always find workable solutions . . . and, relative to a structure
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actually in place, it will be possible to know marginal costs and returns, and to use the
information in making subsequent adjustments of position. What marginalism cannot do,
though, is guide the firm to "ideal" solutions . . . (Furubotn 2001, 138 [emphasis in
original])

For North, entrepreneurs are at the same time the central actors in institutional
change and themselves largely shaped by those self-same institutions. First, he makes
entrepreneurial individuals and groups the agents of institutional change in modern
economies.

Secondly, he constructs the entrepreneur as a neoclassical economic

individual to the extent that the entrepreneur engages existing constraints, given his or her
cognitive universe (mental models), in order to maximize his or her utility:
I intend to demonstrate that institutions basically alter the price individuals pay and hence
lead to ideas, ideologies, and dogmas frequently playing a major role in the choices
individuals make (North 1990, 22).

Thus, motivation and path dependence are very important parts of North’s conceptions.
Individuals act based on perceived payoffs combined with subjective models of reality
that color their preferences.
Motivation, for North, is a critical and at the same time complex aspect of human
behavior that underpins the notion of entrepreneurship.

Individuals espouse both

economic and non-economic motivations. Though the complexity of non-economic and
economic motivations defies easy study, “we can still take an important forward step by
taking explicit account of the way institutions alter the price paid for one’s convictions
and hence play a critical role in the extent to which non-wealth-maximizing motivations
influence choices” (North 1990, 26). By retaining the rigors of an economics based on
individual (rational) choice, but adding consideration of “ideas, ideologes and power
politics,” North seeks to integrate economics into social science:
Separating the analysis of the underlying rules from the strategy of the players is a
necessary prerequisite to building a theory of institutions. Defining institutions as the
constraints that human beings place on themselves makes the definition complementary
to the choice theoretic approach of neoclassical economic theory. Building a theory of
institutions on the foundations of individual choices is a step toward reconciling
differences between economics and the other social sciences (North 1990, 5).
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As Parto (2003, 7) emphasizes, such integration with social sciences must hold the
individual as fundamental:
The choice theoretic approach is essential because a logically consistent, potentially
testable set of hypotheses must be built on a theory of human behaviour. . . our theory
must begin with the individual" (North 1990, 5).

North then can define the core mechanisms underlying development as
institutional change:
Maximizing behavior of economic organizations . . . shapes institutional change by: (1)
the resultant derived demand for investment in knowledge of all kinds. . .; (2) the ongoing
interaction between organized economic activity, the stock of knowledge, and the
institutional framework . . .; and (3) incremental alteration of the informal constraints as a
by-product of maximizing activities of organizations (North 1990, 78).

To be defined as “development,” these mechanisms must be attached to the institutions
appropriate for economic growth.

Through definition of these institutions, both

transaction cost and neoinstutional evolutionary economists have formed judgments
about what “development” is and how countries have succeeded or failed in achieving
development. The essential question that economists as well as the World Bank and
associated multilateral development organizations ask, is, “Why the West, and not the
Third World?” Thus, the abstractions of neoclassical economics are filled with cases
from the “real world” of development success and failure.

3.4

Neoinstitutional economics and development

Though Williamson seeks to insert economics more effectively into business organization
literature through transaction cost economics, North’s work for application of economics
to general social science literature has had broader effects on development, because
neoinstitutional economists thereby disagree with orthodox neoclassical economists in
the faith put in the price mechanism as the only driver of economic growth and
development. Neoinstitutionalists argue that because there are costs associated with
transactions, and because resulting institutions survive as long as the powerful perceive
that existing institutions serve their interests, the price mechanism by itself cannot
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determine economic development.

It is critical that fundamental institutions of

productive development are protected and strong.
Furthermore, because institutions are created and sustained to serve the interests
of those with adequate “bargaining power” (North 1990, 16), effective economic
development (that is, modern Western capitalism) can only take place in environments
with appropriate institutions.

North (1997, 23) draws a sharp distinction between

neoliberal (the term for orthodox neoclassical economics applied to policymaking) and
neoinstitutional approaches to development policy in this context:
Neo-classical economists have implicitly assumed that institutions (economic as well as
political) do not matter, and that the static analysis embodied in allocative-efficiency
models should be the guide to policy; that is, 'getting the prices right' by eliminating
exchange and price controls. In fact, . . . getting the prices right only has the desired
consequences when agents already have in place a set of property rights and enforcement
that will then produce the competitive market conditions.

By including informal constraints as long term sustainers of institutions even given
changes in rules and enforcement mechanisms, North expands notions of institutions
beyond opportunism into the routine and convention of evolutionary economics (decision
rules and routine). Therefore, institutions not only provide order in situations of political
conflict (see above regarding transaction cost notions of governance) but more
importantly contribute to broad economic stability even if the economy is not effective at
maximizing social welfare. This opens up development approaches to the need for broad
and sustained intervention in societies with entrenched institutions supporting ineffective
economic development.

In connection with broader intervention, North argues that

promotion of liberal democratic institutions is very important because they increase the
breadth of social participation, they eliminate the capricious capacity of rulers and they
allow for third-party enforcement of economic transactions by independent judges (North
1990).
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How much difference can intervention make, however? Williamson suggests that
the chance for intervention to work depends on the mix of political and economic
development present within the economy. He (2000a, 13) forms a matrix organizing
states according to how their institutions relate to qualities of political and economic
development:
Economic Development
Developed Less Developed
Polity Above Threshold
Below Threshold

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

Table 1: Williamson Matrix of Development Types

The first cell, cell i, characterizes developed countries such as the United States, Japan,
France, Germany and others. They are developed economically and also are 'above
threshold' with regard to development of liberal democratic institutions. They represent
the position that all countries should adhere to, according to Williamson.
Cell ii represents less economically developed countries with political institutions
that are above the democratic threshold. Williamson suggests that developed countries
can promote economic development in such areas by making deals between those
offering aid and the political elite.

That is, it is important to strike deals that are

favorable both to incumbent politicians and welfare economists. In addition, because the
state is 'provisionally efficient' – that is, politicians have probably made all the deals they
can to retain bargaining power – the state of affairs of the economic institutions is
'irremediable' absent outside inducement. Therefore, the politics of reforming stateowned enterprises rests on three pillars.

The solutions must be political desirable,

politically feasible, and the political elite must be credible in their promises to sustain the
reforms. This is very similar to the basic policy arguments detailed in the World Bank's
(1995) Bureaucrats in Business, as well as Haggard et al. (1995).
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Williamson is decidedly less optimistic regarding cells iii, and iv. For polities
that have developed economies but authoritarian or totalitarian governments, he suggests
that it is usually up to accidents of history to change them. He mentions the Glorious
Revolution, the American Revolution and the Russian Revolution. For authoritarian
governments ruling over underdeveloped economies, he suggests that the only remedy in
the short- to medium-term may be humanitarian relief. In the ‘on-the-ground’ discussion
of the CCPDP below, I suggest that Calderisi as a “politically incorrect” (former) World
Bank official argues without attribution and pointing more to cultural than economic
reasons that Chad moves from a tenuous cell ii to a demonstrated cell iv during the
project’s “social welfare” lifecycle.
North (1990, 34-35) for his part looks across a substantive historical spectrum
from personal to impersonal exchange. “The shift from personal to impersonal exchange
requires a political, economic, and social structure that runs counter to the genetic
predispositions of millions of years of hunter/gatherer heritage” (North 2005, 42). The
“Third World,” by implication, is either still entrenched in or only just beginning to
emerge from this heritage. The Western world, however, has ranged through three time
periods. The first time period around the 1700s was characterized by small scale trade
and repeat dealing marked by highly personal exchange. The transaction costs were low
because repeated face-to-face exchange did not require independent enforcement. During
the second time period, exchange became larger and more widespread. As a result,
societies engaged in more impersonal exchange with constraints based on “kinship ties,
bonding, exchanging of hostages, or merchant codes of conduct.” These exchanges were
often set in a context of rituals and religious precepts. The modern economy, however,
can only exist because of the continued rise of third-party enforcement. Although actors
still attempt to “clientelize” transactions through codes of conduct and trust mechanisms,
the modern economy cannot exist without “a coercive third party” to enforce central
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formal constraints such as property rights and contracts.

“Effective third-party

enforcement is best realized by creating a set of rules that then make a variety of informal
constraints effective” (Ibid., 35). The idea, as discussed above, is that formal constraints
make informal constraints possible by creating the boundaries required for effective use
of informal constraints. With informal constraints in place, decisions can seem commonsense or obvious. However, if institutions are called into question, then the uncertainty
significantly increases the costs of making economic decisions because informal
constraints no longer apply as readily.
Because the kinds of formal and informal constraints, and not simply the
technological boundaries, determine economic sustainability as well as productivity, it is
important for neoinstitutional economists that economic development theories address
types of rules that underlie economies. In particular, do these rules favor redistribution or
production? Do they favor knowledge acquisition, risk, innovation and creativity? Even
if institutions do not favor such underpinnings of economic development, the economy
can persist for a long time simply because it is in the interests of those in power. North
argues, for example, that “the organizations that develop in [Third World institutional
frameworks, characterized by redistributive rather than productive activities] will become
more efficient, but more efficient at making the society more unproductive and the basic
institutional structures even less conducive to productive activity” (North 1990, 10).
Third-party enforcement, furthermore, is not a system that can be built rapidly.
Indeed, North argues, it has taken hundreds of years to construct the checks and balances,
neutral arbiters and judges, and consequent self-enforcement routines seen in the West:
Creating a system of effective enforcement and of moral constraints on behavior is a
long, slow process that requires time to develop if it is to evolve – a condition markedly
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absent in the rapid transformation of Africa from tribal societies to market economies
(North 1990, 60).42

This seems to go against the World Bank’s assertion below that it can intervene and help
countries to rapidly develop those institutions necessary for effective economic
development.
Institutions underlying economic productivity support individual initiative and
entrepreneurship, according to neoinstitutionalist definitions. The two most important
institutions are those that define and protect property rights, and those that enforce
contractual agreements. According to North (1990, 25), “The heart of development
policy must be the creation of polities that will create and enforce property rights.”
Property rights encourage and enable individual enterprise, but in neoinstitutional
economics are certainly not automatic. That is, governments and other organizations
often have supported institutional arrangements that do not support private property
rights. Without such protections, individuals have neither the incentives to innovate nor
the wherewithal to do so. North (1990, 54) continues, “the inability of societies to
develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both
historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.” Some of
the highest transaction costs surround contract negotiation, preparation and enforcement.
Therefore, neoinstitutional economists argue, it is critical for developing economies to
have strong institutional arrangements in place to enforce contracts upon their signing.
Property rights are also critical to contract negotiation, monitoring and enforcement.
Transparent and clearly defined property rights lower costs of information gathering and

42

North’s argument here seems to parallel Gramsci’s distinction between the weak civil society that
allowed the Russian Revolution, and the strong bulwarks of civil society in Western Europe that prevent
such a change there. The economic institutions of North’s “West” seem to parallel Gramsci’s bulwarks of
civil society, while the African “tribal societies” seem to parallel the weak Russian civil society.
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make it possible for actors to negotiate in confidence that they have rights to the property
that they are transacting.43
North moves quickly from the general model of organizational behavior and
institutional change to specific reasons how modern Western economies are different
from both their historical antecedents and present-day Third World economies.

He

places historical West and present-day Third World in the same basket.44 One of the
distinctions has to do with the development and distribution of knowledge. Modern
Western economies have grown in part because of investment in creation and distribution
of knowledge through protection of property rights and associated rewards for knowledge
creation:
The development of an incentive structure through patent laws, trade secret laws, and
other laws raised the rate of return on innovation and also led to the development of the
invention industry and its integration into the way economies evolved in the Western
world in modern times, which in turn underlay the Second Economic Revolution (North
1990, 75).

These institutional innovations have colored maximization behavior in the West up to the
present:
Discovering markets, evaluating markets and techniques, and managing employees do
not occur in a vacuum. They entail the development of tacit knowledge to unravel the
complexities associated with problems of measurement and enforcement. The kinds of
information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good part a consequence
of a particular institutional context (North 1990, 77).

The reason that the United States has been successful and the Third World not successful
lies in large part in the differential between promotion of knowledge creation and
distribution, and the associated incentive structures faced by individuals:
The United States has been immensely productive in the twentieth century. The
significant implication of this story is that the market for knowledge together with the
subjective perceptions of the players coincided to produce a private and public
investment in knowledge that approached the social rate of return.

43
44

See, for example, Eggertsson (1990).
Similar in form to the ahistorical nature of the Kuznets curve.
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Throughout most history the institutional incentives to invest in productive knowledge
have been largely absent, and even in Third World economies today the incentives are
frequently misdirected [from primary to higher education]. . . Why is there such a
contrast with the U.S. story? [Given rates of return, educational investment could have
been made privately, through voluntary organizations, or as a last resort through public
investment]. But the fact that such public investment was not undertaken or was
misdirected suggests not only high transaction costs resulting in imperfect markets, but
also that imperfect knowledge and understanding make up the subjective models of the
actors (North 1990, 80).

North (North 1990, 81) concludes the discussion of entrepreneurship and organizations
with a general statement about what has made for successful and unsuccessful
economies:
Obviously, competition, decentralized decision making, and well-specified contracts of
property rights as well as bankruptcy laws are crucial to effective organization. It is
essential to have rules that eliminate not only failed economic organization but failed
political organization as well. The effective structure of rules, therefore, not only rewards
successes, but also vetoes the survival of maladapted parts of the organizational structure,
which means that effective rules will dissolve unsuccessful efforts as well as promote
successful efforts.

In this conclusion, North explicitly indicates that economic and political organizations are
intertwined, and therefore accepts that effective economic development requires
associated political development. This tendency to blur economic and political lines is
reflected in the World Bank’s governance perspective below.

3.5

Social interregnum: ‘new institutional economic sociology’

As I discuss in the next chapter, there are disconnects (often dealt with only implicitly)
between economic rationales of World Bank research and high-level policymaking
departments, and the more socially dense project design work.

Whereas economic

research is based on neoclassical rationales of efficiency (allocative and adaptive), project
work

emphasizes

participation,

empowerment,

sustainability and decentralized responsibility.

accountability,

transparency,

These issues are only tangentially

addressed as “areas in need of work” by even neoinstitutional economists. For example,
North (1990, 26) only briefly addresses “non-wealth-maximizing convictions” that
constitute individual decision-making, and addresses these convictions as a problem to be
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resolved rather than a reality to integrate.

Work in the mold of new institutional

economic sociology makes more explicit the connections between neoinstitutional
economic and social (especially “social capital”) notions that inform World Bank
activities.
Granovetter (1985) argues, in his article “Economic action and social structure:
the problem of embeddedness,” that new institutional economics (primarily transaction
cost economists) reads institutions incorrectly because it posits false distinctions between
the market, unconstrained but subject to opportunism, and firms which are presumably
able to control opportunism through fiat. Granovetter argues instead that institutions are
sustained by more informal conditions of trust rather than formal institutional structures
designed to contain opportunism within hierarchy. Trust relations are not confined to the
market/firm dichotomy.

Indeed, business groups are quite important networks of

relations that sustain business activity. On the other hand, the familiarity of firm-level
relations can lead as much to opportunistic dealings as transparency.
Below the surface, however, the relations between neoinstitutional economics and
new institutional economic sociology seem better characterized as distinctions without a
difference. As Nee (2005, 53) comments:
Despite the contrast in focus, the transaction cost and embeddedness approaches appear
to agree that firms generally prefer social contexts where negotiating agreements is less
problematic and costly. In essence, the embeddedness approach differs from transaction
cost economics in its emphasis on informal solutions to address the problem of trust, as
opposed to formal institutional arrangements. Not surprisingly, therefore, Williamson’s
(1994, 85) response to Granovetter’s essay was, “Transaction cost economics and
embeddedness reasoning are evidently complimentary in many aspects.”

Embeddedness literature forms the margins of World Bank literature on social
capital, which is central to institutional supports for economic restructuring and
development as ‘governance’. In addition to formal rules establishing accountability and
transparency, notions of social capital underpin projects to affect more informal social
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aspects such as trust and “social density.” Social capital in the World Bank sense arises
more out of Putnam (e.g., 2002) and Coleman’s (1990) work, with antecedents from the
“civic culture” tradition of Almond and Verba (1963). Discussion and debate of social
capital, trust, civic culture, and ‘democratization’ work is outside of the scope of this
project, as they form the broad tangential context of social issues that inform the
neoclassical economic development core of World Bank rationales.

Embeddedness

literature, however, serves to more explicitly connect neoinstitutional economics and
formal institutions with social qualities of trust that allow the World Bank to associate
economic liberalization with more socially oriented conceptions such as democracy. A
problem with embeddedness work such as Granovetter’s, however, is that it engages
Williamson at the expense of North. When North’s informal constraints are considered,
as with Nee and Ingram (2001), the complementarities between neoinstitutional
economics and new economic sociology are even more apparent. Furthermore, as occurs
in Dunning’s (1997d) edited work Governments, Globalization and International
Business, North’s work is used to demonstrate affinities with neoinstitutional economics
but the basis of North’s assumptions in the rational (even if boundedly) individual are
either dismissed or disregarded.
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Chapter 4 From ‘Structural Adjustment’ to ‘Governance’
The core general objective of the World Bank45 is “Working for a World Free of
Poverty.”46 Though the core method for the bank of realizing this objective is through
neoclassical economic development, the World Bank is much more than simply a
machine run by neoclassical economists.

First, the organization is a bank, which

contributes to ‘poverty alleviation’ by choosing where to give loans as well as who to rate
as a good recipient for loans, an approval rating that is quite influential for other donors
(Paris Club, private banks, etc.). This is a basis of its power over national policies. I do
not concentrate on the nature of this financial power itself, but rather how Bank discourse
interacts with a particular project, the CCPDP. The Bank made a small loan to Chad (and
Cameroon, though I concentrate on Chad) equal to the government’s equity participation
in the project. It also, more importantly, allowed for private sector participation because
of its power to influence lending by other major public and private financial
organizations. Wrapped around the organizational definition are a series of discourses
that reflect economic development and poverty alleviation. The core discourse is of
neoclassical economics. That is, according to the Bank, development can only occur with
material resources, which can only increase through free-market interactions. Wrapped
around this is the World Bank’s broader mandate of poverty alleviation that justifies its
organization and size as “a different type of bank.” It is a bank dedicated to alleviating
45

The divisions of the World Bank (IBRD, IDA, MIGA, ICSID) become more important in project
implementation. Their differences matter much less to theoretical rationales.
46
I refer to “the Bank” frequently as a single entity. In reality, “the Bank” is made up of a myriad of
people and groups, with many divided loyalties and approaches to development. However, the documents
that make up what I consider “the Bank” approach are clearly hegemonic with regard to over-riding
development strategies. The disparate groups all must accede “in the last instance” to neoclassical
economics as the only means of achieving the economic growth necessary for effective development.
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poverty, which can only be done through effective neoclassical economic development.
The Bank can confidently declare this objective not out of a sense that it is one among
many organizations doing such work, but that because it bases policy on neoclassical
economics, it approaches poverty objectively and technically. Therefore, according to
the Bank’s position, sensible criticisms of Bank policy can only be about the quality of
implementation tactics, not fundamental strategies. This also justifies the size of the
Bank’s financial resources and the pressures it can bring to bear as a means of assuring
payment of the loans it makes, and therefore its AAA rating as a lender.
The neoclassical economic perspective is, of course, central to my project. The
research and high-level policy levels of the Bank in particular center their work on
neoclassical economics. I look at this work in the context of discussion papers (e.g.
Picciotto, Santiso), which offer more direct economic arguments as well as broader
assessment of contexts surrounding Bank work and World Development Reports. The
change to neoliberal thought was most broadly laid out by the ‘Berg Report’ (1981),
Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action.47 Likewise, the
report marking the shift to neoinstitutional approaches, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis
to sustainable growth (World Bank 1989), also professed to deal with Africa. Though
these reports marked the beginnings of substantial theoretical shifts, the language and
policy prescriptions only gradually percolate through World Bank literature and practice
before assuming ‘common-sense’ hegemony.

Such percolation occurred for

neoinstitutional economics through formal policy papers such as the Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF) and its primary policy tool, the Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS). These also center themselves “in the last instance” on economic growth
through market interactions.

However, they must concentrate on how to alleviate

poverty. This begins to create a tense overlay of ideas, for example how to connect
47

See Mosley (1991), for elaboration of the Berg Report and shift to development as structural adjustment.
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empowerment of local communities to basic ideas of neoclassical economics.
Empowerment would seem to bring forth ideas of a group or larger community coming
together to decide how to live out their own visions of the ‘good life’. However, this
vision must be connected to concentration on individual ambition and competition as the
only ways to achieve human welfare goals.

The difficulty of connecting the strict

explanatory forms underlying economic arguments with the much more diffuse
explanatory tools of poverty alleviation almost certainly underlies the delays in
translating high-level research discussion into policy frameworks.
The poverty alleviation perspective becomes central for me in the next chapter,
when the Bank designs, develops and implements particular projects such as the CCPDP.
Poverty alleviation is about health care, education, family planning (added somewhat
more recently to policy documents), nutrition, protection of local communities and
cultures, government accountability, government and community ownership, sustainable
development (environment), and a host of other goals. Though these goals are foremost
in policy documents, it only takes a small amount of digging to determine that every
policy document bases all other goals on the country’s willingness and ability to sustain
institutions (private property, contract enforcement, banking systems, macroeconomic
policy, etc.) that underpin effective neoclassical economic development. I structure this
chapter in the following manner. I first outline the shift to orthodox neoliberalism to
indicate the extent to which, and ways in which, the World Bank shifted from neoliberal
to neoinstitutional perspectives. This, then, provides a background from which I detail
the neoinstitutional shift, from development as ‘structural adjustment’ to development as
‘governance’. While development as ‘structural adjustment’ has fairly straight-forward
definitions, as is seen below, it is not immediately clear why it makes sense to call the
neoinstitutional shift in World Bank approaches development as ‘governance’.
Governance has many different meanings across disciplines and even within economics.
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For business, it refers largely to risk management,48 while for transaction cost economics
(Williamson 2000a, 106) it refers to tools for controlling opportunism. The World Bank
Institute (2001, 2) defines governance49 as “the process and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised.” It could therefore be argued that the World Bank’s
new approach is more accurately termed development as “empowerment,” “participation”
and “decentralization” than development as governance. However, as I argue throughout,
the center of development along neoinstitutional economic lines still remains economic
liberalization.

The differences between structural adjustment and governance-based

economic development therefore revolve around the institutions thought necessary for
such development. Structural adjustment simply involves removing government from the
economy and allowing prices to reflect free-market transactions. Governance proclaims
creation of institutions at all levels of society so that they support economic growth.
Governance institutions include judicial systems for enforcing contracts, anti-corruption
initiatives, and structures for effective management of revenues. As the discussion below
details, institutions supporting provision of health care, education, utilities, community
development and other social welfare distributions can only take place with effective
economic growth according to the World Bank.

4.1 Alleviating ‘crisis’ through rapid economic growth: from
‘embedded liberalism’ to orthodox neoliberalism
In the early 1980s, following the oil crisis and at the beginning of the Thatcher-Reagan
decapitation of the Keynesian welfare state, the World Bank began to gradually but
decisively move its high-level theoretical approach away from notions that state-led
modernization could provide technological fundamentals necessary to 'take off' (Rostow
1960). The higher interest rates brought on by stagflation and the weakening dollar
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See, for example, Osterio (2007) or http://www.focusonrisknow.com/focus/index.cfm/governance/
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205639/fy02_brief.pdf.
Accessed 06 December
2006.
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created a debt crisis in less-industrialized countries, which had received a veritable
largess of variable interest loans from more-industrialized countries’ banks flush in
petrodollars. When interest rates skyrocketed, less-industrialized countries were faced
with default or restructuring of their loans.
The World Bank and International Monetary Fund termed this a currency crisis,
requiring that the now highly indebted (especially with the ballooning interest rates)
countries rapidly earn currency by moving from state-led industrialization to export-led
(primarily cash crops) development. The basic thread was first laid out comprehensively
by the 'Berg Report' (1981), though at that time the World Bank did not fully abrogate the
previous approach of neoclassical Keynesian synthesis.50 The Berg report began with
some caveats. The economic crisis in Africa was due in small part to external and
internal constraints befalling Africa. Five internal constraints arose in significant part
from the postcolonial situation. First, human resources were underdeveloped due to the
colonial bias against African management and the lack of educational opportunities.
Secondly, many countries experienced political instability due to what the Berg report
attributed to “the pluralism of African societies and the difficulties of postcolonial
political consolidation”:
In some countries, the violence was sparked by liberation struggles, although in general
the decolonization process was remarkably peaceful. In the wake of independence,
violent internal conflict burst forth in many of the new nations, stemming from the
pluralism of African societies and the difficulties of postcolonial political consolidation.
Because cultures and languages are so diverse (probably more so in Africa than in any
other region), the process of national integration – building new institutions and loyalties
– inevitably involved strife. Also, since the borders that the new governments inherited
frequently cut across ethnic lines, clashes were almost assured (Berg 1981, 10-11).
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See, for example, later editions of Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947; 1965; 1983).
See also Paul Davidson’s (www.newschool.edu/cepa/events/papers/051005_Davidson.pdf) discussion,
“Samuelson and the Keynes/Post Keynesian Revolution: The Evidence Showing Who Killed Cock Robin.”
I am grateful to George DeMartino for assistance with this concept.
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Third, Africa gained independence with “insecurely rooted and ill-suited institutions.” In
particular, subregional groupings and colonial institutions were tabbed as unsuited to new
political realities and particularly those underpinning economic development. These “illsuited institutions” would seem to pre-figure development as governance, but were not at
that time considered a major reason for underdevelopment.

The final two internal

constraints included “a climate and geography hostile to development, and rapid
population growth” (Berg 1981, 9). External constraints included the rising price of oil,
lower prices for primary products resulting from declining terms of trade, and trade
barriers. The Berg Report suggested that because of these factors, more-industrialized
countries needed to lower their own barriers to primary products. However, the report
characterized external trade barriers as ambiguous deterrents at worst. For example,
external barriers such as preferential trade policies by the European Union actually
benefited sub-Saharan Africa by codifying preference for agricultural trade with Africa.
While the above constraints contributed to the economic crisis, “domestic policy
deficiencies” were considered more important in the report (24).

It is particularly

interesting for comparison with development as ‘governance’ that domestic policy
deficiencies were disconnected from the institutional deficiencies arising from Africa’s
colonial past. Rather, policy deficiencies only concerned macroeconomic structures:
. . . domestic policy deficiencies and administrative constraints have also been important
– in many cases, decisive – and will continue to block economic progress unless changes
are made. . . The focus of the analysis is on the efficiency with which resources are used.
Economic growth implies using a country's scarce resources – labor, capital, natural
resources, administrative and managerial capacity – more efficiently. Improving
efficiency requires, first, that a country produce those things which it can best produce as
compared with other countries and, second, producing them with the least use of limited
resources. While the analysis which follows will be restricted to these efficiency
considerations, it is recognized that policymaking inevitably has to embody wider
political constraints and objectives. However, the record of poor growth in most SubSaharan African countries suggests that inadequate attention has been given to policies to
increase the efficiency of resource use and that action to correct this situation is urgently
called for.
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The main problem in sub-Saharan Africa according to the Berg Report was that
the public sector was too deeply involved in economic production, which distorted
incentives, moving resources away from the most efficient sectors. The report listed four
internal policy factors as critical contributors to economic crisis.

First, trade and

exchange rate policies failed to provide incentives for agriculture and export industries.
Secondly, technical and economic aspects of public policy, planning and resource
allocation were weak.

Thirdly, economic organization was not decentralized,

emphasizing the private sector and competition. Finally, governments were much too
large, and thus diverted resources away from production.
To earn necessary currency, states had to open up significantly to trade with the
world market, and the only way to trade competitively was for each country to mobilize
their comparative advantage. To do so, they needed to remove constraints on resource
redistribution. The main sustainable comparative advantage that most African countries
had was export (cash) crops. Therefore, countries needed to increase the productivity of
agriculture by removing constraints on competition. Constraints on competition included
overvalued currencies, trade barriers, marketing boards and state-owned enterprises.
Though the Berg report marked a rather clear break from state-led
industrialization, other documents reflected the gradual nature of the move to policy
hegemony. For example, the 1983 World Development Report (World Bank 1983, iii)
acknowledges names such as David Korten (see Korten 1995), Robert Chambers and
Amartya Sen (at the time one of the most prominent 'development economists'). The
work was written under the general direction of Anne Krueger, whose classic piece in the
1970s was “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society” (Krueger 1974), a
critique in particular of quotas as a tool of trade policy. However, she had only been at
the Bank for a relatively short time. The 1983 report mentions the need for developing
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countries to “continue their efforts to adjust their economies to the new external
circumstances and thereby regain the confidence of their creditors.” However, the report
combines discussion of macroeconomic efficiency and decentralization with continued
concentration on strengthening of public sector management as a contributor to
development. Private contracting, in the context of public services is mentioned as a
marginal and problematic solution at the end of a chapter (World Bank 1983, 56) on
managing state-owned enterprises:
This chapter has suggested that government interventions can result in large losses
of efficiency and should therefore be selective. In the face of compelling political
and social pressures, governments will always be tempted to do more than can be
accomplished efficiently. Yet today's widespread reexamination of the role of the
state is evidence of a new realism. In the search for greater cost-effectiveness in the
provision of services, governments are exploring ways of tapping private initiative
and simulating competitive conditions. The most common approach is to use
private contractors in a variety of fields, from road maintenance to garbage
collection. This serves to mobilize new managerial resources and, if well
supervised, can greatly improve the quality and reduce the cost of services. Where
reliance is placed on markets, however, governments are finding that price
distortions can exact a heavy toll.

Much of the document deals not with structural deficiencies but rather with
project management by government, parastatals, and private sector entities.

This

concentration represents the endstages of neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis within World
Bank theoretical approaches.

As the 1980s continued, neoliberal economics and

structural adjustment became pervasive and sharply focused as these policies replaced
project management-oriented solutions. This kind of crystallization is repeated with the
shift to neoinstitutionally based development as ‘governance.’
The tone of development policy was clearly different by the late 1980s. No
longer did development pieces emphasize efficient and effective organizations,
particularly development states, or specific modernization projects. The formula for
development policy consisted of trade opening, privatization, tightening fiscal policies,
and comparative advantage. The 1987 World Development Report (World Bank 1987)
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reflects this with principal contribution from Anne Krueger, who would remain at the
Bank until 1988 before moving over to the IMF. This report concentrated on barriers to
growth and adjustment, and industrialization and foreign trade. One can see in this report
that the priorities of the 1983 report were switched almost diametrically. Whereas the
1983 report emphasized development project management and marginalized structural
change, the 1987 report emphasized structural shifts.
mentioned only briefly in the post-adjustment context.

Development projects are
Even medium term policies

concentrate on removing trade barriers; reduction of public expenditures; “market-based”
interest rates; a stable exchange rate; and removal of price controls, investment
regulations, and such labor market regulations as higher minimum wage.
There is almost no mention of corporations, including multinational corporations,
in the 1987 development report. This demonstrates how sharply focused World Bank
concentration was on changing government policies. Corporations were only mentioned
in relation to particular sectors (e.g. service versus manufacture) or in the context of
providing an attractive regulatory environment for corporations.

Unlike even the

neoinstitutional literature, corporations were nearly invisible, and indeed were primarily
placeholders for sectoral interactions (e.g. agricultural corporations, manufacturing
corporations). Their internal organization was irrelevant.51

4.2 Moderating neoliberalism: Institutions and ‘sustainable growth’
The shift to neoinstitutional approaches began in the late 1980s (even as structural
adjustment was crystallized in policy), which researchers argue was spurred on by a
number of events.52 First, the end of the Cold War removed the primary state-based rival
for “the West.” Secondly, increasing globalization provided indications that government
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Watts (2008, 60) makes this point in the context of petroleum and the “resource curse”: “What is the
most striking aspect of these articulations of oil politics and civil conflict is that the agency of the oil
companies. . . have no analytical presence in the models of rebellion or civil war.”
52
See overview in Pender (2001).
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facilitation was necessary for effective economic growth. Thirdly, the World Bank was
under significant pressure from the record in Africa, where structural adjustment
programs were widespread and yet the continent was not progressing as planned.
Fourthly, the example of externally focused and yet statist Asia brought into further
question the efficacy of simply removing constraints to the free market. Questioning
about “what to do next” were amplified by the Asian economic crisis and the Mexican
economic crisis, the latter of which happened to a “model member” of the market
liberalization countries. These conditions and the pressure on the Bank brought about
intense social movement pressure, which clearly had an effect on how the Bank
advertised itself and interacted with key stakeholders.
One can see in particular in discussion papers that social movement pressure
became very important beginning in 2000, as a direct result of the “Battle in Seattle” and
demonstrations in Genoa, Prague and elsewhere. However, social movement pressure is
approached differently depending on the level of abstraction that documents are written.
In high level research and policy reports, social movement pressure is mentioned matterof-factly as one of the contexts of the shift to the governance approach. However, the
rationale for the governance approach is economic. At the level of World Development
Reports, shifts in economic theory are very important for the argument, and social
movement pressure tends to be downplayed if mentioned at all.

However, the

Comprehensive Development Framework, Poverty Reduction Strategies and other policy
structure documents downplay social movement pressure but incorporate the discourse of
social movement pressure (e.g. transparency, poverty reduction, sustainability,
environment, local empowerment) into most of the documents, often only tenuously
connected to the neoinstitutional economic theory that provides objective justification.
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The brand of neoinstitutional economics used by the World Bank is primarily that
which concentrates on social and political underpinnings of economic growth. These
include property rights protection and contract enforcement in particular.

Only in

marginal texts about small and medium enterprise development, or tactics about
privatization of public utilities, would the transaction cost work on “make or buy”
decisions come into discussions.

Thus, because this project is primarily about

interactions between petroleum multinationals and rural areas of Central Africa, “make or
buy” discussions have little relevance because they are primarily about how business is
constructed internally rather than broader interactions.

This is fascinating, though

detailed exploration is beyond the project at hand. The Bank’s bylaws prohibit political
involvement, yet structural adjustment and especially governance approaches to
development are primarily about changing governments and civil society in the interests
of providing appropriate inducements for corporations and individuals who undertake
economic growth. A fully neoinstitutional approach would involve extensive exploration
of choices not only between when to produce through public versus private corporations,
but also would privilege projects that help businesses of all sizes to decide between
contractual transactions on the market and integration of production within corporate
hierarchy.
Picciotto (2002) provides a broad-based and direct exposition of the shift from
neoliberal to neoinstitutional approaches.

In papers on scaling up and “putting

institutions to work,” he states that World Bank policy changes are required by the
globalization of the global economic environment:
The upgrading of development ambition from investment operations and country
strategies to global policies would extrapolate a secular trend that has propelled the
development business from the pioneering phase of projects conceived as “privileged
particles of development”; to the neo-classical phase of macro-economic adjustment; to
the advent of environmentally and socially sustainable development and most recently to
the adoption of country based comprehensive development frameworks. Because the
global economy is increasingly interconnected, the development enterprise must be
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reshaped to reflect shared objectives, distinct accountabilities and reciprocal obligations
between rich and poor countries. Because development is a social transformation process,
the development paradigm must become holistic. Because incentives matter,
development metrics must be reconsidered to emphasize results (Picciotto 2002, 1) . . .
The urgent need to reform economic institutions arises out of three main factors: (1) the
growing interdependence of the international economy and the physical environment; (2)
the explosive impact of demography and technology; and (3) the tight fiscal constraints
on governments and development agencies (Picciotto 1995, 17).
These factors are interrelated. The world economy has become global not only as a result
of trade liberalization but also because of innovations in telecommunications and
information technologies. These technologies have made governance failures more
visible. The fiscal constraints that plague the public sector are themselves the indirect
result of unstable monetary and fiscal policies triggered by global shifts in exchange
rates, interest rates, and capital flows (ibid.).

Picciotto (1995; 2002) uses Hirschman’s (1970) notions of voice, loyalty and exit
to explicitly characterize how the World Bank’s shift in approach reflects the shift to
neoinstitutional (“new institutional”) economics
By the turn of the century, the scaling up process had culminated in the promotion of
country based poverty reduction strategy papers and associated debt relief for deserving
highly indebted poor countries (Picciotto 2002, 3).
These shifts in development practice were accompanied by a partial retreat of
neoclassicism and a surge of interest in the new institutional economics. Whereas market
failure dominated development thinking in the pioneering years, the risks of government
failure emerged as a major concern of decision makers by the eighties. In the nineties, the
scaling up challenge was revisited to take explicit account of the complementary roles of
the state, market and voluntary sectors. By the time the millennium development goals
were framed, the doctrinaire views of market fundamentalists and anti-capitalist
protesters had been set aside and a pragmatic mix of market-friendly, people-friendly and
environment-friendly policies had laid the foundations for a new development consensus
[emphasis added] (ibid.).

The consensus of development practice according to Picciotto has three legs. The
first leg is the exit option; that is, removal of government constraints on the market
mechanism.

Piccioto (2002, 7-8) indicates the difference between neoliberal and

neoinstitutional approaches to development when he argues:
the disappointing results observed at the global level [in the 1980s] suggest that the exit
option may have been overemphasized. It is not enough for developing countries to adopt
outward oriented policies in order to create a sustainable enabling environment for
private enterprise, innovation and investment. Such policies must be backed by
organizational structures and behavioral norms that facilitate business transactions and
protect property rights, promote competition and open up opportunities for the poor to

87

participate in the market economy. Hence, the hierarchy of the state needs strengthening.
Equally, human development programs and pro-poor organizations must be promoted to
implement people friendly and environmentally sustainable policies. To this end, the
voice option needs to be energized [emphasis added].

Governments are primarily responsible for the second leg, the ‘loyalty’ option.
Governments provide the enabling environment in the form of infrastructural services
that are critical to smooth operation of the present-day globalized economy. These
include roads, telecommunications, electricity and other large public goods that cannot be
efficiently provided by the market. In addition, governments provide the ‘level playing
field’ of property rights, “the functioning of finance and labor markets, and broader
governance features such as corruption” (World Bank. 2005, 1). Governments
accomplish such regulation through effective “property rights, regulation, taxes, finance,
infrastructure, corruption, and other areas of government policy and behavior” (ibid, 2).
Market activity can only take place effectively in an environment where institutional
‘rules of the game’ are transparent, where organizations are held accountable, and where
there is sufficient infrastructure for globally competitive production.
The final leg, the ‘voice option’, is civil society. In order for economies to
operate efficiently, it is necessary for appropriate organizations and behavioral norms to
be respected. This is the realm of the voluntary sector or civil society. Civil society
organizations also go beyond the requirements of neoinstitutional economics for
infrastructure, legal systems and macroeconomic policies, to support the ‘pro-poor’ as
well as ‘environmental protection’ initiatives necessary for an economic development
that is broad and sustainable. These include provision of adequate education, health care
and nutrition. In order for civil society to have a voice, it is necessary to support a
political environment that is responsive to civil society concerns.
democratic structures become part of broader economic development.

88

Thus, liberal

As with the shift from embedded liberal to neoliberal institutions, it takes time for
World Bank researchers and policymakers to integrate concepts accepted in discussion
papers into policy documents and project plans. The Bank must filter the neoinstitutional
shift through the lens of poverty alleviation as it plays out in particular projects.
Institutions are required to empower poor people, and to create efficient markets where
benefits flow to poor people (World Bank 2002, 3). The Bank accomplishes this in the
following ways. First, World Development reports concentrate on ‘big ideas’ associated
with the shift. For development as governance, the big ideas were broken into three sets:
governance, enabling environment and capacity building. Secondly, the Bank creates new
project templates. For development as governance, these include the Comprehensive
Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Thirdly, the Bank
gradually works formulas into all country interactions. For development as governance,
the formula included ‘empowerment’, the rule of law, sustainable development, country
and local ownership and decentralization, participation, accountability, transparency,
anti-corruption and many other facets that changed somewhat depending on the nature of
the project.
In addition to discussion papers, where ideas are explored most widely, the World
Bank explores ‘big ideas’ through special policy reports. In Sub-Saharan Africa: From
Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank 1989), the World Bank explicitly downplayed
macroeconomic policy and allocative efficiency. Macroeconomic adjustment policies
became part of the ‘enabling environment’, to be supplemented by ‘capacity building’
and ‘governance’:
although sound macroeconomic policies and an efficient infrastructure are essential to
provide an enabling environment for the productive use of resources, they alone are not
sufficient to transform the structure of African economies. At the same time major efforts
are needed to build African capacities-to produce a better trained, more healthy
population and to greatly strengthen the institutional framework within which
development can take place. This is why the report strongly supports the call for a
human-centered development strategy made by the ECA and UNICEF.

89

A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public
institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must
go hand-in-hand with good governance-a public service that is efficient, a judicial system
that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public. And a better
balance is needed between the government and the governed. (World Bank 1989, xii). . .
Weak capacity in both the public and private sectors is at the very core of Africa’s
development crisis. In the most fundamental sense development depends on the capacity
to initiate, sustain, and accommodate change. Africa’s governments were grafted onto
traditional societies and were often alien to the indigenous cultures. Its economies were
dualistic, with modern sectors that remained highly fragile. Many governments proved
unable to cope with the political stresses of rapid modernization and the unstable external
environment of the 1970s and 1980s.
The structural adjustment programs of the early 1980s aimed to improve resource
allocation primarily by correcting distortions in prices and markets. But these programs
only set the stage for increasing production. It was soon appreciated that, to bring about
real and enduring development, a transformation of the production structures was
required and, furthermore, that the capacity of people and institutions to deal with change
must be enhanced (World Bank 1989, 38).53

From Crisis to Sustainable Growth downplays difficulty of the paradigm shift
associated with moving from neoliberal to neoinstitutional approaches, arguing, “It was
soon appreciated that. . . the capacity of people and institutions to deal with change must
be enhanced.” This contention is at odds with Picciotto’s argument that the World Bank
only hesitantly came to supplement market liberalization with institution building. This
hesitancy is also demonstrated by the fact that both the Berg report and this 1989 report
mention the problems African governments inherited from colonial structures. However,
the Berg report downplayed the destructive power of these structures and concentrated on
the macroeconomic policy deficiencies. The 1989 report centered on the problems that
governments inherited from their colonial histories, as well as dualistic market structures
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One of the most fascinating aspects of From Crisis to Sustainable Growth is the concentration on
informal and ‘traditional’ economic institutions. Entrepreneurs are seen as often operating best in informal
economies where bureaucratic restrictions are by definition absent. In a similar manner, the Bank argues
that local tontines (or savings societies) have proven to be quite effective for acquiring finances necessary
to build economic organizations. However, to support economic activity in the present-day environment of
globalization, these informal economies and local savings societies must be ‘scaled up’ through larger
banking organizations and corporations. Multinational corporations assist in a number of ways. First, they
can provide financing. Second, they can provide technological knowhow. Third, they can provide the
experience with best practices necessary to survive in the current global environment.
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and generally weak organizations. These weaknesses according to the 1989 report made
governments unable to cope with market liberalization.
The difference between Picciotto’s analysis and the 1989 World Bank report also
indicates the spectrum of thought that the Bank moves through in shifting from one
paradigm to another. At the level of discussion papers, there is more room for directly
assessing the efficacy of World Bank policy, but analysis is more adherent to economic
conceptual constraints. As focus sharpens from discussion through high level policy
research (From Crisis to Sustainable Growth) to lower level policy research (World
Development

Reports)

and

policy implementation,

there

seems

to

be less

acknowledgement of error, and more assumption of rapid and rational shift from one
approach to another. In addition, economics becomes steadily more buried in policy and
project goals.
A second important high level policy research document was the World Bank’s
(1995) Bureaucrats in Business. This report sought to concentrate on why, even though
they were clearly (according to the report) less efficient producers than private firms,
states still owned a significant proportion of enterprises in developing countries. At the
time there had been over a decade of divestiture efforts. To make this argument, the
Bank moved away from concentration on development as shift from inefficient to
efficient incentive structures (that is, shift from state control to private sector control) and
moved toward concentration on development as shift from governance structures that
support ineffective economic activities and toward governance structures that support
effective economic activities.
The Bank sought to demonstrate three items in the report. First, divestiture and
other economic reforms improve economic performance. Secondly, politics can impede
reform and perpetuate inefficient economic institutions, thus creating sustainable
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inefficient equilibria. Third, countries that have implemented successful strategies to
overcome the obstacles of politics utilize three aspects of the political context. Reform
must be desirable to political decision-makers. Second, overcoming opposition to reform
must be politically feasible. Finally, reform must be judged as credible; that is, promises
to protect private property and compensate fired employees must be believable. Because
of the difficulty surrounding transformation of entrenched institutions, the World Bank
suggests that times of economic and political crisis and transition, including change in
regime or political coalition, are often the best times for creating more effective economic
institutions.54
According to Bureaucrats in Business, the basis of sustainable reform in contexts
of inefficient economic institutions sustained by entrenched political constraints is the
well-formed contract (written or unwritten). To improve incentive structures, contracts
must accomplish three things. They must address problems of inequitable information
between parties.
compliance.

They must include sufficient rewards and penalties to assure

And finally the parties in the contract must demonstrate credible

commitment to “attaining the desired outcome – improved economic performance”
(World Bank 1995, 109).

This report was heavily influenced by neoinstitutional

thinking, employing the assistance of Nobel winners Oliver Williamson and Douglass
North, among others (including Picciotto and Bates).
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, World Development Reports have
continued to elaborate and formalize development as ‘governance.’

Strategies for

development as ‘governance’ have advocated broader roles for government and broadly
interventionist projects to prepare the ground for decentralized development management
whereby local individuals and groups gain the proper orientations for market-friendly
54

See Haggard and Kaufmann (1995) for extended discussion of economic liberalization and political
transitions.
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development and then increasingly define their own development projects.

Three

qualities are formalized throughout the reports, and these qualities mirror somewhat the
three legs of Picciottio’s development chair. Governance (“loyalty”) provides the rules
and enforcement mechanisms for assuring accountability and transparency. The enabling
environment (“exit” and “loyalty”) provides the macroeconomic, infrastructural, and
regulatory foundations for market-friendly institutions.

Finally, capacity building

(“voice”) refers to ‘scaling up’ community dynamics so that local groups are empowered
to exercise the control appropriate to market-friendly participation in the global economy.
Governance is the foundation of the new World Bank concentration because all
economic and social initiatives depend on accountability and transparency. Governance
is also most directly related to the core transaction cost economic notion of market vs.
hierarchy being driven by decisions about how to reduce transaction costs associated with
opportunism. However, transaction cost economics deal primarily with questions about
whether to make or buy products. The World Bank, however, defines governance policy
much more broadly to cover rules and governing structures as well as habits,
perspectives, micro-interactions and social identities at all levels.

Evolutionary

neoinstitutional economics covers this broader view somewhat, but even with the
addition of new economic sociology concentration on networks does not cover social
identities to the extent that the World Bank integrates social identity.
The topmost aspect of governance has been the fight against corruption, which
recently became the main objective of World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz before he
was forced to resign due to questions about favoritism toward a friend. Pasternak (2006,
10) echoes Picciotti in arguing that while corruption was considered to be a country’s
internal prerogative and therefore counter to the charter, globalization (and other
transformations) changed this. Pasternak also, even more explicitly, refers to the impact
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of social movements (“anti-globalization movements”) on policy changes by
international financial institutions:
This situation has changed dramatically in just a few years. Three major processes caused
corruption to become the center of attention for the international community as a whole
and for IFIs in particular. Firstly, the effects of globalization radically increased
economic and political interdependence between the countries and raised the costs of
corruption for the developed nations. Secondly, the collapse of the Communist block
brought the Cold War to an end and opened the doors to western ideologies of
democratization and liberalization. Thirdly, the negative consequences of liberalization
and privatization policies, which according to some studies were partially caused by
corruption, brought about the anti-globalization movements.

Pasternak continues (10-11) with an explicit critique of privatization if it does not
concentrate on corruption:
In the environment of the global market place, greatly facilitated by the IFIs, the efforts
of the institutions to promote development and to help countries to bypass economic
crisis through adjustment and investment lending faced enormous difficulties. While
corruption was a major problem in most of the IFI's client countries, the loans provided
by the IMF, the World Bank and later on the Regional Development banks created two
major problems. First, rapid privatization and market liberalization provided exceptional
opportunities of quick enrichment for local entrepreneurs who had connections with
corrupt government officials as well as for the officials themselves. In the former
communist countries entrepreneurs, through bribes and connections, were able to buy
billions worth [of] state owned assets for a relatively small amount of money. They then
on sold the assets for the market price and with the opening of the capital markets moved
the money out of the country.
Economic liberalization opened new markets and trade opportunities, yet it also increased
the impact of corruption on the economies of the Western countries. As western
corporations became more involved in businesses around the world the problem of
corruption, mostly in terms of solicitation of bribes, collusion and patronage, became a
big part of their experience abroad [emphasis added].

For Pasternak, the World Bank needed to increase concentration on corruption because of
the collapse of Communism and the negative consequences of liberalization (partially
caused by corruption) bringing about “anti-globalization movements.”55

55

Pasternak makes the particularly interesting argument that western corporations largely became involved
globally only recently. It was only then that they began to experience corruption. I show in Chapter 6 that
western corporations have been intimately involved for generations in these areas, and that Pasternak’s
argument offers a clear example of how corporate involvement has been ignored in World Bank policy
documents.

94

The World Bank has expanded governance into much more broadly political
arenas as well.

Incorporating liberal democratic political change, the World Bank

Institute (2001, 2) defines governance thus56:
Related to the analytical and empirical R&D/research work conducted: Governance is the
process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised:

(ι)

the process by which governments are selected, held accountable,
monitored, and replaced;

(ιι)

the capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently, and to
formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and,

(ιιι)

the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social
interactions among them. We have operationalized governance from this
definition, by unbundling its definition into components that can be
measured, analyzed, and worked on in concrete fashion.

Each of the three main components of Governance can be unbundled into six
subcomponents, namely: i) Voice and Accountability; ii) Political Stability and lack of
Violence; iii) Quality of the Regulatory Framework; iv) Government Effectiveness; v)
Control of Corruption, and, vi) Rule of Law. Clearly, from this approach a broadening of
the approach has taken place, transcending narrow corruption concerns [emphasis in
original].57

Pasternak and others argue that the challenges brought by globalization, challenges that
require going beyond considerations of static comparative advantage, have meant that the
World Bank must advocate a much broader mandate involving not just governmental exit
from the market but exercise of public authority and even processes (for Kaufman et
al.2000/, ‘traditions’ as well) surrounding how governments are changed.

That is,

democratic institutions become an explicit concern underlying economic development.
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http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205639/fy02_brief.pdf.
Accessed 06 December
2006.
57
Kaufman et al {, 2000 #4658} define governance along the same lines but with subtle but clear
differences.
Governance consists of the traditions and [traditions not mentioned by World Bank Institute] institutions
by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes:
- the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced,
- the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies [management of
resources is not mentioned], and
- the respect of citizens and the state [citizens and state not specified by World Bank Institute] for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.
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This directly political approach seems to clearly violate Article IV, Section 10 of
the Articles of Agreement.58 This is entitled “Political Activity Prohibited”:
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions,
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article I.

Mantilla (2006, 25-26) addresses this question in regard to truth commissions:
One possible limitation on involvement could be the requirement that the Bank shall not
interfere in a country’s political affairs or be influenced by the political character of its
members. In this sense, only economic considerations are to be relevant to World Bank
decisions. Thus, discussions of the meaning of “political affairs” should be encouraged.
It is clear that the Bank may not convene a tribunal to judge a member country’s policies
during an armed conflict or a repressive regime. But could it facilitate financial support to
an unstable country afflicted by armed conflict and human rights violations? If so, under
what conditions? Do those conditions constitute judgment of, or interference in, the
political affairs of the member state?

Whether expansion of governance to include how regimes change violates the prohibition
against political activity, it is clear that the World Bank is going beyond transaction cost
opportunism or evolutionary economics historical accident, seeking to formally intervene
in the promotion of broad-based political ‘governance,’ even if only in a facilitative
manner. Even more than this, the Bank extends governance into interactions at all levels
of society, and into the dynamics of social identity.

Because market-friendly (and

therefore “pro-poor”) institutions are not necessarily present in societies, it is necessary to
include capacity building to scale up appropriate individual and collective behaviors and
to create and promote behaviors that are absent (e.g. respect for individual ambition and
risk-taking).
With government and other actors providing necessary surveillance for economic
transparency, the enabling environment then provides the bedrock upon which individual
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interactions can effectively promote development. This includes the macroeconomic
policies associated with structural adjustment, including reduction of trade barriers,
currency adjustment, and interest rates and other financial regulation. Governments are
responsible for sustaining appropriate macroeconomic policies. However, they have
additional roles under development as ‘governance,’ because of the need to incorporate
proper orientations toward market activity within populations. First, governments are
responsible for facilitating the development of infrastructure (e.g. transportation,
communications and utilities) necessary to scale up development for global competition.
This need not necessarily mean that governments actually take charge of the public
service production itself, but rather coordinate the most appropriate public and private
service delivery organizations. Secondly, governments are responsible for developing
judicial institutions that enforce contracts and protect property rights. The latter are basic
institutions of neoinstitutional economics. The World Development Report for 2002
(2002, iii) states:
Effective institutions can make the difference in the success of market reforms. Without
land-titling institutions that ensure property rights, poor people are unable to use valuable
assets for investment and income growth. Without strong judicial institutions that enforce
contracts, entrepreneurs find many business activities too risky. . . And weak institutions
hurt the poor especially. For example, estimates show that corruption can cost the poor
three times as much as it does the wealthy.

Neoliberal policies assumed that there was no need for an enabling environment, and if
only the government removed itself from production decisions, the market system would
spontaneously achieve efficient equilibrium. For development as ‘governance’, however,
it is necessary to create conditions amenable to market-friendly production. These are
‘level-playing-field’ requirements, whereby global entrepreneurs can be sure that if they
invest in a country they will have the necessary utilities, property protections, and
transaction enforcement to build competitive industries.

97

Capacity building refers to the need to create well-trained, entrepreneurial
individuals that can contribute to enterprise growth.

For the Bank, economic

development must involve deep social transformation creating the personal orientations
necessary for decentralized development. Decentralized development is the goal of the
World Bank’s new orientation.

Therefore, with basic rules and surveillance

(governance), a “level playing field” for competition (enabling environment), the final
necessary ingredient is a populace that is empowered to take local ownership of
economic development. Capacity building entails the following, from the “Governance
and Anti-Corruption”59 segment of the World Bank Institute website:
disseminating conceptual guidance and lessons from practices and facilitating learning
from each others’ experiences on ideas and practices that promote responsive (matching
public services with citizens’ preferences), responsible (efficiency and equity in service
provision without undue fiscal and social risk) and accountable (to citizens for all
actions) public governance in developing countries.

Governance, the enabling environment and capacity building all accord with
evolutionary economics, though only governance fits closely with transaction cost
economics. However, whereas evolutionary and other neoinstitutional economists are
unsure of the efficacy of intervention in cases of low democracy and below-threshold
economic development, the Bank assumes that it has the tools to enable the necessary
intervention.

The role of the World Bank, then, revolves around helping less-

industrialized countries to build capacity for efficiently operating liberal democracies and
market economies.
Capacity building also includes provision of basic needs including health,
education, nutrition and family planning. The 1990 World Development Report on
Poverty describes interaction between poverty alleviation and economic growth thus
(World Bank 1990, iii):
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A review of development experience shows that the most effective way of achieving
rapid and politically sustainable improvements in the quality of life for the poor has
been through a two-part strategy. The first element of the strategy is the pursuit of a
pattern of growth that ensures productive use of the poor's most abundant assetlabor. The second element is widespread provision to the poor of basic social services,
especially primary education, primary health care, and family planning. The first
component provides opportunities; the second increases the capacity of the poor to
take advantage of these opportunities.

Concentration on ancillary social services provides the integration mechanisms between
neoclassical economic growth (in the neoinstitutional form) and the “poverty alleviation”
mandate of the World Bank. Bank documents particularly in the realm of specific policy
frameworks seem to concentrate on issues of health care, education, nutrition and other
provision. However, at the end, the Bank believes that these social services are only
available when the central issue of economic growth through market-friendly
mechanisms is taken care of.

4.3 Comprehensive development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Throughout the 1990s, the Bank continued to institutionalize the new theoretical
approach to development as ‘governance for poverty alleviation in the new globalized
world’. In 1995, James Wolfensohn was selected as the World Bank President, and in the
years following he exercised critical influence in consolidating the Bank’s ‘renewed’
concentration on poverty alleviation. In 1999, largely in response to increasing criticism
of the World Bank’s orthodox neoliberal approach in light of the 1994 Mexican financial
crisis, as well as continuing (if muted after the 1997 Asian financial crisis) admiration for
East Asian directed market economies, Wolfensohn presented a draft memorandum
laying out his new vision for the World Bank. Entitled “A Proposal for a Comprehensive
Development Framework,” this document laid out in broad brush a ‘holistic’ framework
that was ‘results-oriented’ and emphasized ‘country ownership’ and broad ‘partnerships’.
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The CDF was originally described by Wolfensohn in his draft memo60 using the
following language:
What is necessary is an overarching framework - an approach agreed with the
government concerned - which will allow us all to work together to meet our goals for
poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability [emphases added]. On the basis of
such work, we would then be able to present a right-hand side of the Country Balance
Sheet which would allow for a more comprehensive analysis and more soundly based
action. . .

This language was refined in the World Bank report Toward Country-Led Development
(World Bank 2003, iii):
Development strategies should be comprehensive and holistic, and shaped by a long-term
vision. Past emphasis on short-term macroeconomic stabilization and balance of payment
pressures overwhelmed longer-term structural and social considerations (for example,
expanding and improving education and health facilities, maintaining infrastructure, and
training a new generation of public officials).

The Country Balance Sheet described by Wolfensohn consists of the following two sides.
On the left side are the macroeconomic issues61 such as those that formed part of the
structural adjustment programs. On the right side are the
structural, social, and human aspects. It must go beyond the familiar statistics of infant
and maternal mortality, unemployment and children in school, to address fundamental
long-term issues of the structure, scope and substance of societal development. . . [W]e in
the development field have been less successful in giving an accountable presentation of
the status of structural work and social progress (Wolfensohn 1999).

Incorporating the “structural, social and human aspects” required a broad and deeply
invasive development structure, aimed at assessing and if necessary intervening in
government and civil society processes at all levels.

With the Comprehensive

Development Framework, like with previous documents, Wolfensohn defined
governance in close connection with transaction cost economists such as Oliver
Williamson. However, Wolfensohn’s broader framework accorded more closely with
North’s evolutionary economics, in that history, ideas and power were important.
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for monetary and fiscal policy” (Wolfensohn 1999)
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However, while neoinstitutional economists put little faith in intervention for change
because of the long-term historical nature of institutional change (North) or the perceived
lack of requisite political environment for development (Williamson), Wolfensohn and
the World Bank created a framework for broad and deep intervention designed to develop
capacities at all levels for participation in the market-oriented economy.

These

interventions went far beyond economic institutions. Indeed, the policy agenda was
packed with initiatives for broad social participation (governments, private sector,
religious groups, ethnic groups, environmental organizations, and so on) and basic needs
development (water, education, health, nutrition, family planning, environmental
sustainability).62 These initiatives are placed under the umbrella of development as
‘governance’ because they are woven together by the rules, regulations and organizations
that the World Bank argues promote transparency, accountability and openness. The
macroeconomic side requires private property protection and contract enforcement. The
social development side requires transparent revenue allocation.
In addition to being “holistic,” the Comprehensive Development Framework is
“results-oriented”:
Development performance should be evaluated through measurable, on-the-ground
results. The traditional emphasis on disbursement levels and project inputs has measured
resource allocation and consumption. What really matters is impact on people and their
needs (World Bank 2003, xviii).

This call for results-oriented measurement and evaluation seems a critique not of
structural adjustment but the state-led modernization of the past.

However, it also

reflects how ‘participatory’, ‘comprehensive’ development is expected to be conducted.
Such development is still to be conducted in a particular manner, vis-à-vis the following
quote from the World Bank website63 on the results focus for the CDF:
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World Bank emphasis on densely designed packages whereby local control of development is established.
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The process of defining a long-term vision and a national development strategy therefore
includes identifying desired goals in terms of quality of life among potential beneficiaries
of development assistance and setting realistic, monitorable, time-bound and preferably
quantitative targets, and progress indicators related to those goals.

Thirdly, the Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank 2003, xviii) argues
that development ultimately be owned by the country because they are responsible for
final design and implementation:
Development goals and strategies should be “owned” by the country, based on citizen
participation in shaping them. While donor-driven aid delivered under structural
adjustment was sometimes effective, in many cases painful and lengthy adjustment
measures were eventually undone. When countries have greater say in shaping reforms,
governments and their citizens will be more committed to seeing them through.
Recipient countries should lead aid management and coordination through stakeholder
partnerships. Partnerships built on transparency, mutual trust, and consultation can
improve aid coordination and reduce the inefficiencies, asymmetrical power
relationships, and tensions of donor-led aid initiatives.

By 2000, development as ‘governance’ was formalized within Poverty Reduction
Strategies. The 2000 World Development Report – Attacking Poverty (2000) provided
the structure on which the Poverty Reduction Strategy paper was based. Though calling
economic reform central to development, the report offered a vision going far beyond the
macroeconomic reforms central to structural adjustment. In addition, the report covered
the post-World War II history of development as a process of increasing understanding of
the complexity of development.

It offered a three-pronged approach to poverty

reduction:
Promoting opportunity: Expanding economic opportunity for poor people by stimulating
overall growth and by building up their assets (such as land and education) and increasing
the returns on these assets, through a combination of market and nonmarket actions.
Facilitating empowerment: Making state institutions more accountable and responsive to
poor people, strengthening the participation of poor people in political processes and
local decisionmaking, and removing the social barriers that result from distinctions of
gender, ethnicity, race, religion, and social status.
Enhancing security: Reducing poor people’s vulnerability to ill health, economic shocks,
crop failure, policy-induced dislocations, natural disasters, and violence, as well as
helping them cope with adverse shocks when they occur. A big part of this is ensuring
that effective safety nets are in place to mitigate the impact of personal and national
calamities.
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Poverty Reduction Strategies moved focus deep into the microstructures of public policy,
all with the stated purpose of strengthening opportunity, empowerment and security for
the poorest and most marginalized. These strategies proposed to affect change through
decentralizing responsibility, accountability and voice so that the marginalized would
have voice, resources and incentives to benefit from “expanded economic opportunity.”
This again seemed to represent a major shift in development thinking, though in many
ways very different from neoinstitutional and even evolutionary economics. It replaced
the pessimism of evolutionary economics regarding short-term directed change, and the
almost complete focus on opportunism of transaction cost economics, with an energetic
and multi-faceted strategy for intervening in societies to affect the kinds of institutional
changes that neoinstitutional economists argue are necessary for effective economic
development.

The World Bank went still further and instituted a broad-ranging

articulation of culture and society including dynamics of ethnicity, gender and inequality.
Given this, deeper reading of the Bank’s policy rationales indicates that freemarket economics is still central to development.

Considerations of poverty and

inequality may affect the rate and sequencing of reform, or distributional initiatives
accompanying reform. However, ‘pro-poor’ development revolves around the benefits of
trade openness, floating currency, smaller government, and private enterprise
involvement in all productive activities including public utilities.

Thus, local

participation involves multiple strands that modify one another. First, economies must
develop within realities of global interaction. Therefore, local initiatives must be scaled
up to permit competition in the global economy. At the same time, Poverty Reduction
Strategies emphasize the need to encourage information flow to poor people that also
enables them to engage in the global marketplace:
Investment and technological innovation are the main drivers of growth in jobs and labor
incomes. Fostering private investment requires reducing risk for private investors-through
stable fiscal and monetary policy, stable investment regimes, sound financial systems,
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and a clear and transparent business environment. But it also involves ensuring the rule of
law and taking measures to fight corruption-tackling business environments based on
kickbacks, subsidies for large investors, special deals, and favored monopolies.
Special measures are frequently essential to ensure that microenterprises and small
businesses, which are often particularly vulnerable to bureaucratic harassment and the
buying of privilege by the well-connected, can participate effectively in markets. Such
measures include ensuring access to credit by promoting financial deepening and
reducing the sources of market failure; lowering the transactions costs of reaching export
markets by expanding access to Internet technology, organizing export fairs, and
providing training in modern business practices; and building feeder roads to reduce
physical barriers (World Bank 2000, 8).

Secondly, revenue from economic growth allows for the funds necessary to affect
participatory development at the local level, development that includes strengthening
security of the poor, investment in social welfare, and empowerment of the poor to
“effect their own futures,” the assumption being that these futures will involve gaining
resources through participation in the global market.

Thirdly, pervasive inequality;

corruption; weak banking and financial systems can make rapid privatization destructive
to an economy. Therefore, it may be necessary to sequence or delay market liberalization
so as to make institutions prepared to enforce the rules of the game that make effective
economic development possible. Fourthly, international action by developed countries is
necessary including opening of their markets, conditional debt relief and provision of
public goods.
Critical to the Poverty Reduction Strategies, as with the Comprehensive
Development Framework in general, is the concept of “ownership.” This underlies the
attribution of PRSP authorship to countries. In this view, sustainable development can
only occur if countries commit to transformation from deep within government
bureaucracies and deep into local communities. Thus, PRSPs emphasize participation by
broad sectors of society in the process leading to publication of the PRSP. This most
emphatically does not mean that PRSPs are written according to country-inspired

104

templates and designs. The design is explicitly and meticulously laid out on the World
Bank website. Most importantly:
The fact that solutions to poverty therefore cannot be based exclusively on economic
policies, but require a comprehensive set of coordinated measures lies at the heart of the
rationale underlying comprehensive poverty reduction strategies. Economic growth,
however, remains the single most important factor influencing poverty, and
macroeconomic stability is essential for high and sustainable rates of growth.
Macroeconomic stability must therefore be a key component of any poverty reduction
strategy.64

Thus, ownership, empowerment, participation, local control, authorship and most
importantly concessional loans are all based on the non-negotiable assumption that
economic growth is critical for poverty alleviation, and macroeconomic stability is
necessary for economic growth.

4.4 International business and ‘development as governance’
The Comprehensive Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategies name
three major sets of domestic actors (state, market, and civil society) but concentrate
policy recommendations primarily on particular state and civil society organizations, so
as to ensure that “the market” functions effectively. While development following the
Comprehensive Development Framework and resultant poverty reduction strategies is reconceived as holistic, participative, comprehensive, pro-poor and sustainable, business
organizations are emphasized as being “at the heart of the development process” (World
Bank. 2005). Multinational corporate actors are mentioned only briefly in the context of
development reform, however, with regard to upholding ethical investment practices,
labor and environmental codes (World Bank 2000, 12, 107).

Small business

development is more prominently mentioned, as part of reforms (microfinance, land
tenure, deregulation, removing obstacles for women) geared toward helping the poor to
establish and run small businesses, and upgrade their skills and information in order to
compete given the global economy. However, the main mention of business is abstract,
64
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in terms of ways that public policy and civil society mobilization can improve the
“business environment.” This is still very much a neoliberal approach to firms, an
approach that unlike the “transaction cost” approach to neoinstitutional economics, does
not move appreciably into the hierarchy of the corporation to look at business
organization.
Because of this gap in research and high-level policy documents and project
designs, it is important to look elsewhere for information about World Bank interaction
with multinational corporations in the context of development as ‘governance.’ The
primary references relating directly to business organizations, and not the “business
environment,” are tactical. They do not resemble at all the comprehensive plan that
development as ‘governance’ holds for state and civil society. Rather, documents include
criticisms of pressure on business to intervene in non-business arenas, some literature
indicating that businesses need to work harder on anti-corruption and promoting
transparency, and overviews of corporate social responsibility.
The background paper to the 11th International Business Forum (World Bank
2006a, 12-13), “Business and the Millennium Development Goals: The Business
Challenge Africa”, uses quite pointed language regarding criticism of business, and
responses that businesses feel they need to make:
in the midst of the noise of NGO campaigning and defensive corporate communications
[emphasis added], the most important linkages between larger businesses and poverty
reduction are often missed. The focus - within the framework of “corporate social
responsibility” - is often either on large companies doing good (in the form of
philanthropy, which in all but a few cases is unable to achieve the scale and sustainability
needed) or avoiding doing bad (in the form of signing up to one or another of the myriad
of international codes, which can shift the focus and energy towards box-ticking, instead
of outcomes). In fact, the most important and sustainable impact business can have is
simply by doing what it does best: doing business.
The most important contribution, by far, that business makes to the achievement of the
MDGs is through the central role it plays in generating economic growth. As the UN
Economic Commission for Africa notes, achievement of the MDGs “will not happen
unless there is sustained economic growth at a minimum level of 7 per cent - such growth
will only come as a result of private sector efforts”. Leaving aside the surprising fact that
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the MDGs make little reference to the private sector, the strategy for meeting them must
be private-sector focused. Specifically, the emphasis should be on tackling the binding
constraints on growth: putting in place the right climate for business; investing in
infrastructure; and facilitating international and regional trade.

The most interesting aspect of this paper, directed as it is toward business interests, is that
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and international norms for corporate behavior are
dismissed as window dressing and ‘box checking’, respectively.

This paper thus

indicates that while development initiatives by government and civil society should
concentrate on alleviating poverty through pro-poor projects, business as the driver of the
economic growth that is critical to such development projects should simply be given
leeway to do whatever business thinks is necessary for achieving its own growth.
The World

Bank

Institute introduces

the website section “Business,

Competitiveness and Development,” in the following manner:
The Business, Competitiveness, and Development Program of the World Bank Institute
seeks to address the need for a better understanding of the role business can play in
development issues, through multi-sectoral partnerships. The program addresses the clear
need for broader acceptance of multi-sectoral partnerships, corporate governance,
transparency and social responsibility as vital components of corporate strategy, and
highlights the importance of these issues in relation to poverty reduction, good
governance, anti-corruption and country competitiveness.65

The World Bank approaches corruption as primarily an issue driven by the public sector
including state-owned enterprises and only hesitatingly engaged in by private business.
As a World Bank report on an e-conference,66 regarding corruption states:
Of critical importance is the necessity of understanding the business environment before
prescribing or applying anti-corruption measures. Recognizing the dynamics that impact
all levels of the supply chain, the e-discussion participants emphasized the importance of
understanding the business environment of a specific country or sector. Corruption—be it
at the customs house, withing [sic] the banking system, or in property markets—is one
facet of the business environment, and the government has core responsibility for the
functioning of this environment. As one participant noted, while the private sector has a
role to play, in the end, “governments, not companies, are responsible for managing the
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legal and regulatory framework.” Therefore, for a successful broad anti-corruption
initiative, obtaining government buy-in and securing political will is imperative.

The primary task for business is to figure out ways to alleviate the pressure of corruption
within a country, and to judge tradeoffs between maintaining integrity, retaining brand
and financier confidence, and maintaining competitiveness. Enterprises simply need to
“learn to operate on a level playing field on which the ability to compete and produce
efficiently, not privilege or evasion, is the key to long-term success”(World Bank 1989,
142). The report indicates (p.9) thus:
Ensuring effective risk management, aligning with customer expectations, complying
with laws and regulations, meeting the demands of ethical investment funds, and safeguarding reputation and brand are some of the factors that contribute to the business case
to combat corruption. 67

In addition to figuring out how to most effectively operate in corrupt
circumstances, business can contribute to anti-corruption initiatives through collective
action programs that pressure governments to curtail corruption.
Doing business requires “understanding the business environment,” and
corruption decreases competitiveness by increasing the costs of such understanding,
according to the Bank.

Transparency enhances the effectiveness of government in

decreasing transaction costs associated with information gathering, by making
information more clear. In this, as well as most World Bank approaches to the private
sector, business is considered to simply be the warehouse of efficient economic
organization which increases competitiveness and therefore increases economic growth.
Entrepreneurs seek maximum self-interest in whichever institution they reside, and an
institutional environment of transparent laws allows businesses to devote resources to
production rather than rent-seeking.

Businesses themselves should not be given
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significant responsibility for transparent action. It is up to the government to provide
transparent environments that enable economic growth.
Though, as previously seen, the Bank indicates its doubt about CSR as an
appropriate mechanism through which business should ‘keep it’s own house in order’,
CSR takes pride of place on the World Bank’s Business, Competitiveness and
Development webpage. Concentration on CSR is presented there68 in what seems to be
an unintendedly ironic manner:
Over the past decade, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has risen in global
prominence and importance. Corporate governance scandals such as those at WorldCom,
Enron, Parlamat, Daewoo, and Tyco profoundly affected major capital markets
worldwide, and placed issues such as ethics, accountability, and transparency firmly on
the business, regulation and policy agendas. Additionally, issues such as peace,
sustainable development, security, poverty alleviation, environmental quality and human
rights are becoming increasingly interlinked, and are having a profound effect on
businesses and the business environment. Although not traditionally responsible for
finding solutions to these challenges, it is in the private sector's best interest to be part of
the solution rather than part of the problem [emphasis added].
Unfortunately, few companies, particularly in the developing world [emphasis added],
have the skills or competencies to work in this new operating environment. Strategic
capacity-building is imperative in educating these businesses about C[S]R, so they may
access new markets and improve their competitiveness on a national, regional and global
scale.

That is, CSR has become important because of the scandalous manner in which many
corporations in more-industrialized countries have conducted business. However, it is
most important for the World Bank to assist in building capacity of companies in lessindustrialized countries because they in particular do not have adequate training (as
compared with more-industrialized countries) in how to act responsibly.
This concentration again illustrates two broad aspects of the World Bank’s
approach to business and development. First, business is normally not meant to be at the
forefront of establishing economic ‘rules of the game’ necessary for sustainable
economic growth. Secondly, the global environment has made it necessary for the World
68
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Bank to emphasize corporate responsibility (at least among less-industrialized countries
where there is less capacity for responsible business practice) and therefore devote
resources to increasing capacity. This orientation of the World Bank will be a central
focus of the CCPDP, as addressed in the next chapter. While the World Bank made
economic restructuring the central requirement in justifying its imprimatur on the project,
the design of the project itself centered on issues that are also part of the “corporate social
responsibility” argument whereby organizations concentrate on environment, local
participation and ‘empowerment’, accountability and transparency.
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Chapter 5 The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project
Petroleum was discovered in Chad during the early 1970s (Guyer 2002). However, the
World Bank argued that petroleum companies had been unwilling to make the necessary
investments in Chad because of increased risks associated with Chad’s political
instability. First, political instability, evidenced by coups and undemocratic institutions,
was endemic and therefore corporations were concerned about political risk. Second,
corporations were further dissuaded from investment by the relatively low quality (high
sulphur content) of the petroleum. However, on the other hand, Chad had such an
inhospitable climate that it could not establish an adequate comparative advantage in
export agriculture.

Therefore, petroleum represented a final lifeline.

In addition,

according to the Bank, Chad had also made moves toward democratic institutions, it fit
(admittedly tenuously) into “cell ii” of Williamson’s matrix of economic development.
That is, the government had enough responsiveness that external persuasion of
government elite had a chance to induce the changes necessary for economic
liberalization.
Given this context, Chad was presented as a very good test environment for the
new Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction Strategy
(PRS). However, the CDF and PRS contained much more ambitious stated agendas than
simply creation of basic institutions (contract enforcement, private property) underlying
effective neoclassical economies (the neoinstitutional approach).

The World Bank

sought to make Chad a test case for the broad social, cultural and political intervention
for economic growth and social welfare that the CDF and PRS entailed. In this context,
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corporations, the World Bank, and governments created volumes of documents relating
to the project, including 19 volumes on environmental considerations alone. The World
Bank justification in particular sought to inscribe a bright line from the ‘governance’
approach to social aspects of project design and implementation. It argued that its record
of commitment to governance made it the logical choice to deal with the political risks
associated with Chadian and Cameroonian government deficiencies. Rather than taking
the funding lead, the Bank would take the lead in designing protocols for Chad and
Cameroon to develop the public infrastructure necessary to support petroleum production
and to effectively manage the revenues from petroleum production in the interests of
social welfare.
Ruptures in the project’s social welfare objectives, design and implementation
have occurred early and often even in the short history of project implementation. The
Chadian government used 18% ($4.5 million) of the $25 million signing bonus for
military hardware (Pegg 2005, 13). This was roundly criticized and Chadian President
Idriss Deby was lectured by World Bank officials for the damage that this purchase made
to Chad’s global reputation (Calderisi 2006, 192). However, in the early stages of project
implementation, these issues were counterbalanced by stated evidence of the commitment
of the government to liberal democracy, structural adjustment and revenue management.
As time has elapsed and Chad has become increasingly unstable politically,
elements of the original design continue to be diluted. In 2006, the Chadian government
dispatched with the future generations fund and only retained a 70% priority poverty
strategy after tense negotiations with the World Bank (World Bank 2006b). These
negotiations, among other things, involved threats by the Chadian government to move
toward the Chinese if the World Bank did not negotiate. In 2007 and 2008, Chad
continued to battle instability, with rebels advancing to the outskirts of the capital in early
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and mid-2008.

This instability, however, does not seem to affect the petroleum

production pipeline, which continues to produce apace though prospecting for new fields
was slowed by the violence. In 2006, the World Bank gave the CCPDP a ‘satisfactory’
but ‘likely unsustainable’ rating because the pipeline produces as promised and the Bank
designed what was promised.

In September 2008, the Bank quietly ended its

participation in the project, citing failure of the Chad government to stand by its
commitments.
As the project unraveled, World Bank officials such as Robert Calderisi (2006)
became more terse and self-described “politically incorrect” in their estimations of
“Africa,” increasingly blaming African leaders and culture, and suggesting replacement
of aid with either African ‘bootstrapping’ or intervention for cultural change. These
reactions seemed to represent movement of Chad into Williamson’s classification of
countries ‘below the threshold’ of democracy as well as below the threshold of economic
development (“cell iv”).
I detail the Chad narrative in the following way. I first locate petroleum in the
broader neoclassical economic framework, because scholars of political economy
(especially the neoclassical approach) attach distinct qualities (“Dutch disease” and the
“resource curse”) to extractive industries and especially petroleum. I then detail the
World Bank rationale for involvement in Chad’s petroleum development, along with the
broad and extensive documentation and organizational structures created per the CDF
and PRS. In the final sections of the chapter I narrate how the project has played out to
the present day. What has transpired almost from the beginning is degeneration of social
welfare aspects as the authoritarian Chad government gutted or discarded the Future
Generations Fund and other revenue management programs; as rebel groups increasingly
threaten the capital in a civil war with regional pressures; as Chadian people continue to
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receive little of the petroleum revenues; and as the petroleum production continues,
relatively insulated from political instability, in a manner similar to commodity-rich
states across Africa.
I end with a note about corporate involvement in the project. The consortium of
petroleum corporations managed development of the petroleum pipeline so that it was
completed ahead of schedule. In addition, the consortium duly prepares regular reports in
regard to community meetings, environmental compliance, building of community
structures (schools, hospitals, agricultural extension, fiber optics) and the quantity of
revenue given to the government.

Twenty-five such periodic reports69 have been

prepared to date. However, as Massey (2005, 273) notes as well, these reports are rarely
critical. In addition, they are limited to the project area and thus, even as civil war has
raged across much of Chad and the government has continued to reject or ignore revenue
management structures, the consortium barely mentions this instability in their
relentlessly positive reports. As I note in the conclusion, there is as yet very little
systematic study of corporate approaches and strategies outside of the reports. Such
study is critical for truly understanding corporate involvement in the project, and in the
absence of such material, the experience of Nigeria is critical.

5.1 Petroleum industry and neoclassical economic development
Neoclassical development economists generally approach petroleum from the perspective
of “Dutch disease.”

Corden’s (1982, 829-831) model of ‘Dutch disease’ posits an

economy with three goods: the booming tradable, the lagging tradable, and the nontradable. The booming tradable attracts labor away from the lagging tradable, thus
slowing the lagging tradable’s development.

In addition, by bringing in increased

revenue, the booming tradable increases demand across the board, thus raising the price
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of the non-tradable. Because the price of tradables is set by the international market and
therefore will not change when an economy is relatively small internationally, the
exchange rate will appreciate (see also Olukoshi and Herbst 1994, 457).
Following upon characteristics of Dutch disease, neoclassical economic
perspectives posit four characteristics of petroleum that underlie its risks for
development. First, the price of petroleum has historically been highly volatile. This is
due to both political reasons, particularly the cartelization of petroleum-producing
countries in OPEC, and economic reasons given that oil is a ‘primary product’ and
therefore terms of trade loss vis-à-vis industrial and other products can affect it.
Secondly, petroleum is a nonrenewable resource. Thus, countries can only benefit from
petroleum production for a relatively short time, and therefore must diversify in
preparation for the exhaustion of petroleum resources. Thirdly, because of the large scale
of resources required for petroleum production, and therefore the size of corporations
required to manage the supply chain from exploration through sale, petroleum revenues
tend to concentrate in the hands of governments.

Scholars70 often assign these

characteristics the appellation of “resource curse.” The “resource curse” connection
relates closely to the neoinstitutional economics concentration on corruption.
Because of the risks of relying on petroleum production, neoclassical economists
argue that specific policies must be followed in order to gain its benefits. Gelb (1988, 5)
makes a contrast between ‘capital-deficit’ and ‘capital-surplus’ oil exporters:
capital-surplus oil exporters such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have small populations,
exceptionally underdeveloped non-oil economies (aside from activities financed by oil
revenues), and very large, low-cost reserves that guarantee the comparative advantage of
oil for the foreseeable future. Their capacity to absorb revenue has been far lower than
the maximum oil revenue they could extract, especially at the prices prevailing between
1974 and 1984 (Gelb 1988, 5-6).

70

See Gelb (1988); Pegg (2005); Ross (2001); Collier (2000). Watts (2005) provides a good critique of
resource curse literature.
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Capital-deficit oil exporters, however, are hamstrung by having the opposite conditions.
That is, they have relatively small, high-cost reserves which therefore means that their
capacity to absorb revenue is much greater than the oil revenue they are able to extract.
As a result, capital-deficit oil exporters such as Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia and Chad
must carefully manage oil revenues and ‘sterilize’ them so that these revenues do not
negatively affect the more sustainable comparative advantages.
Gelb (1988, 93-94) indicates that governments must take actions to assure that
petroleum plays a constructive role in development, during both boom and bust cycles.
According to Pinto (1987) and Gelb (1988), the following variables are particularly
important in determining success or failure. Reflecting the concentration in the 1980s on
orthodox neoclassical theory, these policy variables concentrate primarily on currency
and comparative advantage, the tools of allocative distribution. First, fiscal and monetary
policy must allow the exchange rate to adjust in response to petroleum price signals. For
example, Indonesia adopted a crawling exchange rate peg that allowed the exchange rate
to depreciate as the price of oil fell. In addition, the Indonesian and other governments
established a ‘stabilization fund’ (Katz and International Monetary Fund. 2004, 10)
whereby excess petroleum revenue was ‘set aside’.

According to the International

Monetary Fund:71
A strong case may exist for placing the fund's assets abroad, since investment in domestic
nongovernmental financial assets would transmit resource volatility to the economy.

The government could then use this stabilization fund during petroleum price downturns
to moderate exchange rate shifts and therefore decrease possibility and magnitude of
crises.
Secondly, because the government typically receives the largesse from the
petroleum boom, it should allocate a substantial portion of this largesse to the lagging
71
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export sector. In Africa and other less-industrialized countries, this is typically export
agriculture. Allocating resources to export agriculture prevents that sector from suffering
as much from the price distortions brought on by the drastic increase in currency because
of demand for oil. By sustaining incentives for farmers to produce export crops and
retain a portion of earnings from export agriculture, the government makes it more likely
that when the price of oil drops, agricultural goods can still compete on the world market.
Gelb and Bienen (1988) argue that distorted distribution occurred in Nigeria because
Nigeria formerly had a comparative advantage in agriculture. It should be emphasized
here that the World Bank justified the CCPDP by among other things arguing that Chad’s
comparative advantage in export agriculture does not generate the revenue necessary to
provide for Chad’s welfare needs.
Finally, governments should allocate funds toward productive activities in
general. They should thus follow general neoliberal economic principals. These include
privatizing state-owned enterprises in the interests of efficiency; decreasing the price of
government services by among other things charging user fees for such items as
education, health care and water; deregulating prices and interest rates; and liberalizing
trade policies in general (Olukoshi and Herbst 1994). These assure that economic actors
can mobilize resources across the economy for production of the most profitable goods.

5.2 The World Bank and extractive industry reform
Neoclassical economic arguments about “Dutch disease” and “resource curse” are critical
parts of World Bank policy rationales regarding petroleum and other extractive
industries. However, the Extractive Industries Review reform examination arose in 2000
not from recognition of economic ‘realities’ but rather out of what the World Bank Group
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itself72 termed pressures from environmental and human rights “stakeholders.”

As the

EIR final report background (Salim 2003, vii) comments:
In June 2000[sic], at the annual meeting in Prague, WBG President James Wolfensohn
responded to criticism from the nongovernmental community about WBG involvement in
extractive industries with a promise to review the Bank’s role in this sector. In July 2001,
the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) was initiated with the appointment of Dr. Emil
Salim, former Minister of the Environment for Indonesia, as Eminent Person to the
review.73

The EIR was thus clearly a politically actuated document, designed to relieve the
by then quite hot social movement pressure on the international financial institutions.74
In November 1999, the WTO Ministerial Meeting shut down in Seattle without
agreement in the face of both internal protests and massive external protests. During the
following months, each meeting of the multilateral economic organizations was visited
by large demonstrations. The World Bank meeting in Prague was no exception, except
that at this meeting the IFIs decided to interact with “non-governmental stakeholders”
including Ricardo Navarro, Chair of Friends of the Earth International. Wolfensohn’s
promise to look at extractive industries came in response to Navarro’s presentation of a
petitionary challenge regarding extractive industries.

Wolfensohn promised that the

review process would be independent and based on discussions with multiple
stakeholders.
The process came under criticism almost immediately, as the World Bank argued
that its staff should be a stakeholder, after former Suharto ally Dr. Emil Salim was named
the Eminent Person of the review, and after the review process was located in
Washington, DC rather than in Salim’s home country of Indonesia. After over three
years of conferences and visits with local civil society actors affected by extractive
72

International Finance Corporation. 2008. Extractive Industries Review, International Finance
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The annual meetings were in September 2000.
For discussion of strategies to remove social movement pressure in the context of “democracy,” see
Robinson (1996) and Almond and Verba (1963).
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industries, Dr. Salim and the EIR workgroup presented their conclusions in December
2003. Somewhat surprisingly, the EIR conclusions concentrated criticism and need for
change on multinational corporations as well as governments and the international
financial institutions.

The EIR conclusions (Salim 2003, iv) also centered their

arguments on the need for more civil society participation in project designs from the
beginning:
Although governments are consulted directly and continuously by the WBG through its
Board of Executive Directors, and companies are clients of the WBG in terms of
financing and risk insurance, civil society is left out and has no direct official links with
the institution. But it is civil society – local communities, indigenous people, women, and
the poor – who suffer the negative impacts of extractive industrial development, such as
pollution, environmental degradation, resettlement, and social dislocation.

This argument fits in with the CDF and PRS concentration on civil society, but does not
employ the neoinstitutional economic arguments as basis for this participation. Rather,
while the report acknowledges the “resource curse” economic arguments, it concentrates
on examining who has the power vis-à-vis project operations. Typically, governments
and corporations have the primary power along with IFIs.
Most importantly for my project, the EIR (Salim 2003, 65) advocated that the
World Bank Group shift completely out of petroleum sector support and instead increase
investment in renewables:
the WBG should phase out investments in oil production by 2008, the year of the first
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and devote its limited scarce resources to
investments in renewable energy resource development, emissions-reducing projects,
clean energy technology, energy efficiency and conservation, and other efforts that delink
energy use from greenhouse gas emissions. During this phasing out period, WBG
investments in oil should be exceptional, limited only to poor countries with few
alternatives. Meanwhile, the WBG should build local capacities of developing countries
to help them negotiate better deals from foreign companies, with the funds used for
poverty alleviation through sustainable development.

The EIR accompanied this tough language regarding MNCs negotiations with additional
calls for greater MNC accountability. MNCs were not simply businesses doing business
in this report. In regard to MNCs and human rights, the report found:
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The EIR received many testimonies concerning the military and police being involved in
securing company control over territory and protecting their operations. In other cases,
companies were reported to be using private militia. When conflicts arise between
corporations and local community interests, human rights abuses and violations are often
reported. In the case of indigenous peoples, when extractive industries operate on their
traditional lands and territories without their consent, it is seen as a human rights
violation in itself that, in turn, often leads to other human rights violations (Salim 2003,
39).

Governments and MNCs also often followed labor standards in word but not in deed:
While the WBG supports the CLS as an overall policy commitment, it often undermines
labor rights through its advice at the WBG country policy level. Unions have complained
that their views have been ignored, creating distrust and fear of massive job losses,
thereby contributing to unemployment and further poverty. In October 2003 the World
Bank Group published Doing Business in 2004, calling on developing countries to reduce
the scope of employment legislation, to reduce minimum wages, and to replace collective
negotiation by contracts “at will” between employers and employees—reinforcing the
impression of many developing-country unions that the World Bank Group remains
fundamentally anti-worker (Salim 2003, 40).

The EIR conclusions were quite penetrating, indicating that while economic goals were
generally reached, the Bank was not able to follow through on promises of greater
governance and pro-poor orientations of projects:
The knowledge, power, financial, and technical resource gaps between major extractive
industry companies, civil society, developing-country governments, and local
communities throughout the world are profound. The inequalities between local
communities and transnational companies are not just economic in nature; they include
access to political power and information and the ability to know and use the legal system
to their advantage.
The EIR found that WBG involvement in the extractive industries sector until recently
may have exacerbated these imbalances (Salim 2003, 42).

The World Bank Group (WBG) took a further ten months before publishing the
Management Response to the report on 17 September 2004. In it, the WBG rejected the
notion of phasing out oil production investments, arguing that it should not be
constrained in supporting initiatives that contributed to development, and that oil industry
projects made up such a minor part of total global oil production that the World Bank’s
contribution to global warming was relatively negligible. In addition, the WBG replaced
“free, prior and informed consent” with “free, prior and informed consultation,” arguing
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that no one group should have a veto over projects.

More generally, the WBG

concentrated on fraternal relationships with corporations rather than power inequalities
between corporations and other organizations.

As a result, it highlighted voluntary

corporate responsibility initiatives for human rights, labor and environmental protection.
The management response itself came under intense criticism from EIR Eminent
Person Emil Salim (2004). He characterized the Bank management attitude as “Business
as Usual with Marginal Change”:
I stand firm by my recommendations and my analysis, that a better world, especially in
the EI sector demands a fundamental change in the way development is understood and
implemented. The environment and the poor have paid enough subsidies to rich
extractive industries and to governments. The balance needs to shift so an equal concern
for the well being of people, the environment, and profit can be achieved effectively.
The WBG cannot have it both ways, if it continues along the line of the Management
Response in the current form; it should not proclaim that it is in pursuit of sustainable
development for poverty alleviation in the EI sector. As a leading global public
development institution, the WBG needs to be able to stand its actions by its words. The
citizens of the world deserve more than double speak.

The EIR in the end exposed the fissures between governments, corporations,
social movements and IFIs, and demonstrated the tendency of the WBG to remove
power, inequality and politics from development documents. In doing so, it came under
intense criticism not only from without but from within, from independent monitoring
organizations. The focus on voluntary corporate initiatives, in addition to backgrounding
unequal power relations, forms an important part as well of the World Bank narrative and
policy framework for the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project. However,
the wider narrative corroborates the playing out of the inequality between corporate,
government and other organizations, as well as the important influence of external
pressures which Bank actors attempted either to mollify or marginalize.75
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See also discussion in the conclusion about corporate and World Bank responses to social movement
pressure through CSR and other strategies.
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5.3 Chad: A poor country with little or no comparative advantage
I concentrate in this project on the Chad side of the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
Development Project because petroleum corporations engage on a sustained basis with
the people of Chad in particular, and my project is primarily about how such interaction
differs in the context of the shift from neoliberal to neoinstitutional economic
development approaches. The CCPDP was designed, developed and implemented at
roughly the same time as the EIR, the 2000 WDR Attacking Poverty, and development of
PRSs. All of these interactions make up the story of the CCPDP, and so analysis must
combine document examination, policy implementation details, and narratives regarding
interactions among very different sets of actors. I begin the CCPDP story primarily from
the view as seen in the World Bank. This approach does not foreground the challenges
and successes of social movements seeking to grow in an increasingly globally
interconnected world. It also does not concentrate on how the people of the Doba region
of Chad work through uncertainty about how to respond to the project, and whether it
will truly bring progress in human welfare for them. Both of these groups (social
movements and people of Doba) are part of the story I tell, of course, but my story here is
about what I see as the rise and fall of the CCPDP, the presence of external social
movement pressure, and final results that look very much like the catalyst for the
sustained horrors that the people of Shell’s Niger Delta know so well. The stories from
social movements and the people of Doba await other studies.
The CCPDP arose in the 1990s out of a sense that it fit in very well with the
neoinstitutional/CDF shift percolating in the high-level research and policymaking
departments of the Bank. Here was a country with almost no meaningful welfareenhancing comparative advantage, given the arid climate which is so bad for agriculture.
Because of resource scarcity and poor government, the country had some of the lowest
human development indicators in the world. Here also was evidence of an unexploited
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and potentially very rich resource, petroleum, a resource that had not been exploited from
Chad because the political risks exacerbated the problem of relative low quality
petroleum. The Chad petroleum project is thirty years in the making (Guyer 2002, 110),
but Chad’s oil is of a lower quality with relatively higher refining costs than other
possible sources, and Chad has a history of corrupt government and underdeveloped
infrastructure.

This made the country more internationally controversial and less

attractive to petroleum companies as a source of oil. The Bank also acknowledged
broader regional concerns having to do with the violence and documented human rights
abuses in such areas as the Niger Delta.

However, according to Bank-sponsored

examinations of Indonesia, the correct institutional incentives can make petroleum a
positive contributor to development.

By approaching development in Chad (and

Cameroon) through development as ‘governance’, the Bank could both prove this point
of petroleum development success and demonstrate the efficacy of governance-centered
development.

As former World Bank spokesperson Robert Calderisi (2006, 181)

comments in The Trouble with Africa:
No one could doubt that the pipeline project, if properly managed, could transform the
Chadian economy from one entirely dependent on fickle weather conditions and
international aid to one with a chance of charting its own future.

In addition, this was a potentially very rewarding project for the Bank with
relatively low risks given low expectations of success. However, though the regime in
power was authoritarian and rather unstable, the Bank argued that the regime gave
important evidence that it was at the threshold for political flexibility necessary to
promote the kinds of institutional changes that allowed for effective economic growth.
Chad had demonstrated some commitment to transparency and accountability by
conducting multiparty elections in 1996, privatizing 45% of its state-owned enterprises,
and spending 10% of its budget on basic services (Calderisi 2006, 179). Heilbrunn
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(2004, 38) seems to agree with the optimism generated by Chad’s government prior to
the project kickoff:
. . . Chadian President Déby has enacted progressive reforms of his government from a
despotic to a military dictatorship to a bureaucratic regime. Two factors may explain
Déby’s reforms. One, is the sterilization of oil revenues that removes them from his
immediate access. He does not have the funds to pay security forces needed to protect a
despotic regime. Two, Déby is responding to international pressures that are funding the
oil exploitation. Despite these two factors, the sustainability of his reforms is contingent
on his ability to protect his regime and reversal is always possible. However, it is
probable that the steady liberalization will empower political parties and social groups
that will be reticent to relinquish the freedoms they have acquired.

The World Bank presentation of the Chadian context seemed clearly to place it in
cell ii of Williamson’s matrix (less economically developed countries with political
institutions that are above the democratic threshold), and would therefore be applicable to
the neoinstitutional mode of neoclassical economics in that there was enough political
flexibility to allow for the institution-building that is critical to economic development.
However, it was clear by the project design that neoinstitutional economic justifications
by themselves were not persuasive enough to allow the space for the project to proceed.
The Bank had to couch the project in broader language of human welfare and progress.
The Bank approached the project from three major viewpoints.

The

macroeconomic viewpoint is covered above, in that institutionally powerful exploitation
of petroleum could serve to give Chad a comparative advantage in petroleum production
by lowering the transaction costs compared to the benefits.

The development as

‘governance’ viewpoint encompasses not only building of institutions but CDF-inspired
social welfare concentration (health, education, nutrition, family planning, bridges,
utilities, microfinance and so on) and sustainable development through protection of the
environment. The CCPDP design was packed with documents covering these issues,
including the 19-volume environmental impact assessment created by the petroleum
corporations. The third viewpoint is the business viewpoint. The Bank became involved
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to mitigate political risk through the reputation of its high debt rating, reputation as a
longtime development organization, and new focus on development as governance. The
Bank’s Concept Paper76 outlined the rationale for supporting the project:
World Bank involvement will ensure greater public consultation, local participation and
attention to environmental and other socio-economic issues. World Bank participation is
also needed to provide the political risk mitigation77 needed to support the huge
investments the private sector expects to make and to attract millions of dollars more in
debt financing. Catalyzing private investment to benefit the countries is one of the main
reasons the Bank may be involved in the project.78

The CCPDP provided the other side of the social movement coin from the EIR.
Whereas the EIR was developed explicitly to respond to social movement concerns, the
World Bank participated in and enabled the CCPDP despite those same concerns.
Publicly, however, as with the EIR the Bank indicated willingness to acknowledge social
movement concerns. Clearly, the intense social movement pressure of the late 1990s into
2000 had an impact on presentation of the project. Critical viewpoints are still referenced
on the World Bank CCPDP website from Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Amnesty
International and Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monitoring du Projet Pétrole
Tchad-Cameroun (GRAMP/TC). However, the GRAMP/TC website only has general
76

http://go.worldbank.org/2Q72D32120. Updated 21 April 2000. Accessed 22 January 2009.
See also Massey (2005, 254):
Although bank loans would be a small proportion of the costs, its support was vital to encourage
private investment, as well as to endorse the 'ethical' validity of the project in the wake of other
mismanaged, corrupt and environmentally disastrous oil projects in Africa.
However, Oliveira (2007, 285) notes that corporations were well benefited by the World Bank assumption
of risk:
The Chad consortium, critics predicted, could not be expected to side with the Bank in pressuring
Chad to comply to previously defined regulations, as this might jeopardise its own position. The
third obstacle is that the private sector gets more out of this scheme than it gives: World Bank
involvement gets companies cheaper credit and a high-profile institution with which to share blame
if things turn out badly -- in short, it makes projects happen. But in return for this boon, companies
can take refuge in a business-only perspective that puts the Bank at the centre of public
responsibility.
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It is interesting how the Bank and other corporate capitalist development organizations commonly
sequence priorities. First is always participation, environment, socio-economic concerns (e.g. poverty,
inequality). Second, but usually more fundamental to policy considerations, are items more geared toward
corporate security and finance, including political risk mitigation. This fits roughly into the argument
detailed in Moore’s (1995) Debating Development Discourse.
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information about Chad rather than evaluations of the CCPDP, and the CRS link is
invalid. 79 However, different from the EIR, the Bank characterized the policy rationale
shifts underpinning the CCPDP as being internally generated by World Bank actors. The
World Bank “soon appreciated that, to bring about real and enduring development, a
transformation of the production structures was required and, furthermore, that the
capacity of people and institutions to deal with change must be enhanced” (World Bank
1989, 38). Given this appreciation, the World Bank argues, the CCPDP is designed to
involve government and civil society sectors in consultation throughout the
implementation of the project.

5.4 Project Design: Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development Project
The Chad Cameroon Petroleum Development Project was estimated to cost $3.7 billion
in total. Of this, the Bank agreed to provide a loan ($39.5 million) to Chad in order to
underwrite its portion of the 3% combined equity stake that the governments of Chad and
Cameroon were expected to have.80 The IFC agreed to mobilize $100-300 million dollars
to the petroleum corporations. In addition, the IDA financed two capacity building
projects at a combined cost of $100 million.

A three-company oil consortium

(Exxon/Mobil 40%, Petronas Malaysia 35% and Chevron 25%) made up the private
ownership. Shell and Elf had pulled out earlier. In addition, the Bank had long used its
AAA debt rating and influence with bilateral and multilateral public and private creditors
to compel particular actions from governments. This rating was mobilized to provide
protection from political risk.
However, the Bank argued that it offered more important institutional resources
than loans. As with most production activities, multinational oil companies and their
financiers should be responsible for petroleum production, because they have the
79
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Cameroon was given approximately $45 million [verify amount], but in this project I concentrate
on the Chad case.
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resources and know-how to develop the oil industry.

Therefore, multinational

corporations would provide the bulk of the seed money as well as the scaled up
entrepreneurial skills. However, governments should provide the enabling environment,
in the form of laws, appropriate macroeconomic policies, and infrastructure conducive to
neoclassical economic development. In return, they would receive revenue from their
equity stake as well as, in the case of Chad, royalties. Civil society should also contribute
to building people’s capacity to thrive in an environment amenable for corporate
intervention. The World Bank would mobilize its declared advantage by designing a set
of strategies to strengthen the institutions underpinning effective neoclassical economic
development. The Bank and the Chadian government supported these initiatives with a
plethora of sub-plans including a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper with ownership
attributed to the Chadian government, the corporate-led Environmental Assessment, and
the multiple volume primary project plan which includes the Future Generations Fund,
the Independent Advisory Group, the External Compliance Monitoring Group, the
Environmental Management Plan, Revenue Management Oversight Authority, the IDAsponsored Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project and Management of
the Petroleum Economy Project, and others. These documents can usefully be divided in
five sections, according to the main project segments. The first segment, the plan and
funding for the petroleum production itself, is addressed above and is primarily laid out
in the Pipeline Development Project itself. The supporting documents address alleviation
of the macroeconomic pressures associated with petroleum development; contribute to
government effectiveness (governance); serve to underpin local ownership, security and
empowerment; or affect surveillance of the overall project.
The Bank designed the macroeconomic initiatives to manage oil revenues and
avoid ‘Dutch disease’ effects of volatile and temporary oil revenues.

The earlier

structural adjustment projects that the Chad government undertook assisted with
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neoclassical macroeconomic indicators. The Project Appraisal (13 April 2000) noted as
an important justification for the project that Chad had already undertaken or committed
to basic structural changes required for economic growth. These changes were laid out in
a 2000 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which was then finalized with a 2003
PRSP:
The 1995-99 fiscal consolidation and economic reform program helped improve
significantly the public finance situation, stabilize money and credit conditions, and
introduce major structural reforms aimed at reducing the role of the public sector,
liberalizing the economy, increasing competition, and favoring developmental use of
public resources. Chad weathered well the impact of the 1994 devaluation of the CFA
franc and attained an average real growth rate of 4 percent p.a. during the 1996-99
period; the government's current primary balance deficit has turned into a surplus; fiscal
revenue increased from 6.2 percent of GDP in 1995 to 9.4 percent in 1999; and
inflation averaged 4.5 percent p.a. between 1995-1999. Economic and financial
performance was, however, affected by vulnerability to climatic and external shocks - e.g., the energy crisis in Nigeria and the unfavorable world market prices for cotton.
By end-1999, the Government had privatized 45 out of fifty publicly-owned enterprises
and had initiated a time-bound program to privatize the remaining parastatals,
including the politically-sensitive cotton sector. Most price controls have been lifted,
and important regulatory reforms were undertaken to liberalize telecommunications,
open trade, rationalize and streamline taxation, and encourage private investment in
energy and other sectors. Chad’s transition to the oil era would build on this foundation.
The Government intends to continue these efforts. Over the 2000-2002 period, Chad
will seek to maintain macroeconomic stability, consolidate public finances and
complete the unfinished structural reform agenda, while at the same time developing
with civil society a comprehensive strategy for poverty reduction. To this end, Chad is
launching the development of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), with the
support of the Bank and IMF. Under the PRGF arrangement concluded with the IMF,
Chad will define strategies and programs in the priority poverty-reduction sectors,
increase public expenditure for poverty-reduction activities, and foster the participation
of communities, beneficiaries, and the private sector (Project Appraisal, p. 5).

However, for petroleum production, additional policies needed to be part of the
project design so as to prevent the “Dutch disease” factors. In this vein the Bank argued
that oil revenues should be part of the general budget rather than assigned to secret
allocation mechanisms.

These revenues would come from a royalty payment; an

upstream production tax; and a corporate pipeline tax. In addition, Chad would receive
dividends from its equity participation in TOTCO and COTCO (Moynihan et al. 2004, 4).
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The government had passed a Law on Petroleum Revenue Management in 1999 that set
aside a percentage of oil revenues explicitly for poverty alleviation (health, education,
transport and rural development). Related to this, the project documents required that the
Chadian government approve creation of a “Future Generations Fund,” whereby some oil
revenues were placed in a foreign account. This account would not affect currency flows
in the country and thus would prevent temporary skewing of monetary incentives away
from other export industries, and would also prevent depreciation of the currency. As a
result, it could be put aside to soften the blow of eventual oil depletion, and to promote
sustainable development. This fund is akin to the stabilization fund mentioned in Pinto’s
(1987) Indonesia example in the 1980s, whereby petroleum funds are prevented from
adversely affecting prices of tradeable goods that would underpin economic growth in the
absence of petroleum.
The second set of initiatives related to public sector governance. Not only was it
imperative for the Bank that the government commit officially to macroeconomic
adjustment and distribution of petroleum revenue to poverty alleviation sectors, but the
government then needed to have adequate capacity to implement these forms in an
efficient and transparent manner. This required making government decision-making
increasingly more bureaucratic. Scholars cited some evidence that Chad had moved
toward more bureaucratic institutions.81 To assist these moves with capacities82 related
directly to petroleum production, the IDA sponsored the Chad Management of the
Petroleum Economy Project (IDA $17.5 million), which dealt with five components of
general civic structure of government:
1. public financial management
2. poverty database and reporting system
81

See Heilbrunn 2004.
It is interesting to see capacity building associated with government in the CCPDP. In much of the
literature, capacity building refers to strengthening civil society while governance refers to government.
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3. civil service reform
4. oversight and control capacities
5. monitoring of economic reform
The Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Enhancement project ($25 million,
of which IDA funded approximately 90%) also dealt with government strengthening,
covering policies more directly related to the petroleum project. In the second of two
segments (the first dealt with capacity-building surrounding the Doba project), the project
information document (p. 3) outlines the following measures related to government
management of petroleum production:
The second main component of this capacity building project is designed to build
the capacity of the government to manage the further development of the petroleum
sector as whole [sic]. This Petroleum Sector Management Component will have two
sub-components: (a) preparation of a regulatory framework specifying, inter alia, the
environmental regulations governing petroleum exploration and production in Chad;
and (b) the development of a Petroleum Sector Information Management System, and
operational support. As regards the latter, the project would help Chad to: (a) retrieve
and organize existing seismic and other information; (b) develop a storage and
information management system; (c) reprocess and re-interpret some of the existing
geological and geophysical information, using state-of-the-art techniques; and (d)
negotiate complex contracts with private oil investors to maximize the benefits to
Chad.

The third, and certainly most documented, aspect of the project dealt with aspects
seemingly only tangentially related to the macroeconomy, but rather related to creating
populations that were healthier, more educated and had underlying welfare supports to
allow for participation in the economy. These “capacity-building” initiatives are central
to the Bank’s argument that the project represents a new way of doing development:
governance for poverty alleviation.

However, more importantly, the Chadian

government had already committed to neoliberal economic restructuring before the
project was designed and instituted. Economic restructuring was therefore a prerequisite,
a confidence-building proof of seriousness, for the World Bank’s non-economic
commitments.

Given this, the project was covered over by a myriad of measures

designed to define, implement and monitor ownership, empowerment and security as per
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the 2000 WDR Attacking Poverty. The government of Chad was encouraged to complete
a Poverty Reduction Strategy paper in which it laid out long term goals for social and
economic development. Though the document displayed the government of Chad as the
author, it was constructed according to a standard form followed by PRSP documents, in
keeping with the Bank’s conception of ownership given the necessity of specific types of
institution-building for economic growth and therefore poverty reduction. Typical of the
standard form is the statement (Government of Chad 2003, 10) that the Chadian
government sought to “consolidate the gains made with adjustment programs by
integrating them with the new globalized economic order . . .”
Likewise, the 19-volume Environmental Assessment, written by Esso and
COTCO before creation of the project document, put down a set of requirements related
to environmental security and population security (especially employment, compensation
and resettlement). This document is particularly important as the primary non-production
contribution by corporations (both the private oil companies and the government oil
companies) to the project.

In it, the consortium of public and private corporations

commits to a range of environmental protection measures; compensation; and
resettlement initiatives. This initiative is described by Guyer’s (2002) project briefing,
which notes NGO participation:
The [Environmental Assessment] is the result of a round of baseline studies and the
Environmental Impact Assessment undertaken by the consortium, negotiations in the
light of World Bank environmental standards, and critique by the NGOs. It contains
provisions on the entire range of measures to meet standards for the protection of the
natural and human environment. One particularly contentious social issue was the
compensation paid to people who would lose houses, crops, fields or permanent trees.
The location of the entire construction was planned to require the minimum of
dislocation; 4,120 land users were compensated along the pipeline, fixed facilities and
road easements, but no more than 150 families in Chad are likely to need resettlement in
new houses in new locations. Most compensation was for loss of crops and economic
trees. In both countries, the land itself belongs to the state, so people can only be
compensated for the loss of improvements.
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The assessment process involved consultations83 with both international NGOs and local
groups. Local groups were consulted for purposes of information sharing, determining
project land needs, and creating a framework for reducing adverse impacts.84

The

environmental assessment also included an oil-spill response plan and extensive visits
with people along the proposed route in order to get feedback on compensation,
protection of cultural and community artifacts, and other impacts.
With respect to the CCPDP itself, the Petroleum Management Capacity Building
Enhancement project contained the most important capacity-building policies (p. 3):
i. Building environmental, social and technical capacity, both in the Ministry of the
Environment (MEWR) and the Ministry of Petroleum (MMEP), starting with the
Doba project.
ii. Mitigating induced impacts on the producing region through the financing of rapid
intervention measures such as health facilities and water-wells.
iii. Supporting development activities in the producing region, including the
establishment of a pilot development fund to test financial and implementing
mechanisms for complementary rapid intervention measures and mid-term
development activities that will be proposed by the community and local NGOs.
iv. (a) Implementing a communications campaign to limit influx of migrants into the
region; (b) supporting the development of a management information system (MIS),
and (c) implementing communication and consultation activities to generate
accurate information regarding the project and support information dissemination
and dialogue with all stakeholders.
v. Building government's capacity to deal with legal, financial and other technical
aspects of the Doba project.
vi. Provide operational support for coordinating project implementation.
Items ii, iii and iv(a) are designed in part to help mitigate the impact of the project
on the producing region specifically.

Capacity building, in Guyer’s (2002, 112-113) words, involves:
development in governance, the strengthening of accountability and communications,
specialist training, infrastructure growth and planning capacity in all the major economic
83

. The word “consultation” is very important in the context of the EIR process above, whereby the EIR
group referred to FIPC as “free, prior and informed consent” but World Bank management replaced this
with “free, prior and informed consultation.”
84
World Bank. 2000. Projects - World Bank Group Approves Support for Chad-Cameroon Petroleum
Development and Pipeline Project. Accessed 2008 July 8 2008. Press Release. Available from
http://go.worldbank.org/HEIYT0LAT0.
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sectors. The World Bank Group’s investment and technical support are devoted to the
many component tasks of meeting this agenda.

In line with capacity building goals of participation, the Bank and the government, as
well as representatives of the multinational oil companies, set up participation sessions
directed toward traditional leaders, womens’ groups and farmers among others. They
designed these participation sessions as a means to ascertain felt needs and concerns of
stakeholders, needs and concerns that were noted in the project documents.
The fourth initiative has to do with monitoring the project as a whole. A number
of organizations were set up to monitor these initiatives.

The Bank formed an

International Advisory Group (IAG),85 consisting of six (decreased to five) members who
were “independent of any party associated with the project and are persons of eminence
and respected for their expertise.”86 The IAG was tasked with advising the Bank on
implementation of broad project goals. From 2001-2007, the IAG undertook 13 trips to
assess these goals. In addition, an External Compliance Monitoring group was set up to
monitor compliance with the Environmental Management Plan. This group (consisting
of the consulting firm D'Appolonia S.p.A. of Italy) monitored the legally binding
requirements that are part of the plan, in the process of ten pre-completion and three postcompletion visits to the project.87

Requirements monitored included resettlement,

compensation, construction of community infrastructure (houses, roads, etc.), handling of
waste, and prevention of worker injury (OSHA guidelines).
The Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Revenues Pétroliers (CCSRP) was
created as a result of the 1999 petroleum management law, and is made up of
representatives of the government, parliament, supreme court and civil society. It was
charged with approving all direct oil revenue allocations and disbursements. The World
85

http://www.gic-iag.org/ehome.htm. Accessed 8 July 2008.
http://go.worldbank.org/BJ0RXNJR90. Accessed 8 July 2008.
87
http://go.worldbank.org/GMGLF041K0. Accessed 8 July 2008.
86
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Bank Inspection Panel is “an independent forum to private citizens who believe that they
or their interests could be directly harmed by a project financed by the World Bank. The
Panel receives requests for inspections, makes an independent assessment of Bank
Management's response to each, and recommends to the World Bank's Board of Directors
whether the claims should be investigated.”88 The final monitoring group is the Comité
Technique National de Suivi et de Contrôle (CTNSC), an interministerial group also
charged with monitoring environmental and social impacts of the project.

5.5 The project on the ground: inserting all actors and removing
“political correctness”
The contexts outside World Bank research departments were very different from the
preparation and rationale documents covered above. The World Bank suggested (1989,
38) that its governance approach was prompted by rapid internal assessments that
structural adjustment was not enough to assure effective economic development.
However, the actual context underlying ramp-up of the EIR, CDF/PRS and CCPDP
paints a very different picture from the CCPDP documents. While the EIR explicitly
acknowledges the role of external social movement pressure in prompting the World
Bank Group to act, the CCPDP makes only passing reference to that same external
pressure accompanying the entire contract development process. The messiness of the
project, like successful as well as unsuccessful projects, played out very differently from
the reports. First, social movement actors presented very different realities from those
found in the project documents. These realities were filled with corporate actors, politics
and human rights concerns. Corporations were not simply containers of entrepreneurship
and technology. Rather they were political organizations as well, with questionable
histories of supporting military abuses, disregard for labor rights, environmental
despoliation and government repression. World Bank current and former officials, most
88

http://go.worldbank.org/5MGHQ1ZQ01. Accessed 8 July 2008.
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importantly Robert Calderisi in his book The Trouble with Africa (Calderisi 2006, 178),
also acknowledged concerns about corporations.

However, Calderisi as well as

Wolfensohn also presented social movements such as Environmental Defense Fund as
Washington-based impersonators who simply want publicity for themselves and do not
speak for the people of Chad and elsewhere whom they presented as generally very
supportive of the CCPDP.89
In a major difference with IFIs regarding underpinning of project design,
advocacy organizations painted a very different picture about why the monitoring and
revenue management frameworks were added into the project. Whereas the World Bank
(as shown) presented these innovations as part of its evolution as a development
organization, whereby changes were internally driven by awareness of shortcomings,
external social movements argued that the project was only changed because social
movement organizations were able to come together themselves and then mobilize the
voices of local Chadian (and Cameroonian) organizations so that the world media would
hear local criticism of the project. As Korinna Horta of Environmental Defense Fund
relates (2002, 174) in regard to environmental considerations of the project:
The costs of forest destruction were largely being borne by local communities and
indigenous peoples whose forest-dependent livelihoods were being destroyed.
Pipeline construction and the pressures of logging and wildlife poaching which
would certainly accompany it could do nothing but aggravate the existing situation.
Yet, when we surveyed the Cameroonian NGO community about the pipeline, we found
out that most had no information at all about the project and the few who had heard about
the project were unaware of its routing.
The first thing to do was to piece to gather [sic – piece together] as much information
as possible about the project, to put it in its political context and to create the political
space for local groups to get their voices heard in international media and decisionmaking platforms.

89

I could devote an entire project to the role of social movement pressure in the CCPDP and other
instances of corporate-led globalization. However, in this project I primarily rely on social movement
reports (from CRS, EDF, Amnesty International and elsewhere) to fill out the story of Chad from 1999
through the present. See O’Brien (2000) for concentration on multilateral economic organizations and
social movements.
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Many groups expressed doubts about the project itself (petroleum production in a
period of global warming) as well as about how it was designed. The World Bank
argument that the Chad government had shown credible moves toward being more
accountable with revenues was widely criticized. One of the main sources for World
Bank optimism was the 1998 Revenue Management Law. However, others argue that the
Chadian government was pressured by the IFIs to pass the law in order to receive any
revenues or further project financing. That is, the law was not a spontaneous measure by
a government accountable to its citizens, but rather a result of semi-coercion whereby the
government was informed in no uncertain terms that the petroleum project would not be
completed unless the law was passed. This assessment seemed on the mark when the
Chadian government repealed the future generations fund in 2006, soon after the pipeline
was completed and petroleum began to flow. The government also started directing
money into the general fund and out of the poverty prioritization fund so as to increase
military funding. When the World Bank threatened aid cutoff, the Chadian government
called the bluff and said it would go elsewhere for funding. In the end, before World
Bank participation in the project was cancelled in 2008, the two entities signed an
agreement ending the future generations fund but retaining an interim commitment to
revenue distribution to human welfare sectors.
The impact of social movement pressure on IFI, government and corporate
policies in light especially of the period immediately following the “Battle in Seattle” is
an important topic, and the case of the CCPDP can lend useful insights. This topic itself
should therefore be covered as a separate project.90 The “noise of NGO campaigning”
referenced earlier is important for the project at hand in that it helps bring to light the
devaluation of politics in the project rationales and documents, contrasted with the strong
90

A useful set of documents to begin with is Horta (1997; 2002a; 2002b). However, for examples of
Environmental Defense Fund working closely with Dupont, McDonalds and other corporations, see the
CFO Conference proceedings by Mintz (2008). For critical perspective see Noble (2007).
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political interactions among contending parties in the actual contexts surrounding
contract signing and production implementation. Almost from the beginning, contrary to
the design, the CCPDP integrated into familiar contours of the ‘oil complex’, covered so
well by Watts, supplemented by Apter and others, and which I detail in the next chapter.
An authoritarian government gradually assumes control over revenues. Local people
affected most by petroleum production are presented as supportive but unskilled, and
only gradually compensated if at all. The World Bank claims success and the high road,
arguing that it seeks only to use critical skills that it is in sole possession of, in the face of
self-seeking or uninformed NGOs, and with assistance of corporations seeking simply to
make a profit by mobilizing their entrepreneurial talent and technological know-how.
Production is isolated from regime instability so that, even in the face of civil war at the
steps of the president’s residence, petroleum still flows.
One of the Bank’s major rationales for kicking the project off in the late 1990s
was that the Chadian government had shown credible moves toward building an
accountable democracy with respect for human rights.

However, in the period

surrounding contract signing, human rights organizations collected numerous cases of
human rights violations. As an AFROL article91 recounts during that time:
Media harassment quickly reappeared and in November 2000, a former senior public
servant, Garonde Djarama, was imprisoned for an article he had published in a Chadian
weekly newspaper. He had criticized the government for not reacting strongly enough
against the racist killings of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya.
The same month, the renown [sic] World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), accused
the Chadian government forces of putting children "on the front line in order to detect
mines and if reluctant they are reportedly killed." The government allegedly makes use of
forced recruitment of child soldiers from Southern Chad to the armed forces in the north
of the country.
In January 2001, the MDJT claimed that government troops had executed prisoners of
war, including one of the movement's leaders, Yaya Labadri. Executions of prisoners of
war are seen as a serious war crime and the Chadian government quickly denied the
charges. The case has still not been investigated by an international body.
91

http://www.afrol.com/features/10276. Accessed 18 March 18, 2009. See also Gary (2005, 10).
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The Bank and the consortium were particularly targeted by critical studies from
Oxfam, Amnesty International, Environmental Defense Fund and Catholic Relief
Services.

The environmental assessment itself, as well as many of the initiatives

designed into the project, seemed certainly to come out of social movement publicity and
pressures for protection of basic welfare, human rights and the environment. Having
given the economic rationale (lack of comparative advantage) the Bank was under
significant pressure regarding its self-proclaimed non-economic value added of
environmental, human rights, and human welfare protection.
Many activists also criticized the Environment Management Project consultations
with local people that involved representatives of the multinational petroleum
corporations along with military escorts:
In a country in which the population has been traumatized by more than 30 years of war
and more recently by massacres perpetrated by the military on civilians in the region near
the oil fields, the presence of the military during the consultative sessions was enough to
dissuade people from expressing their opinions. As a result, the losses that people will
suffer have been poorly evaluated and the compensations they have been allocated are
not proportional to the damages they will sustain, nor do they conform to the will of the
victims (Djiraibe and Turshen 2002, 171).

Korinna Horta (2002, 175) adds:
The only serious public debates about the project were organized by courageous local
civil society organizations themselves with the support from outside church groups and
others. These took place in the towns of Donia (1998) and Bebedja (1999) in oilproducing regions and led local groups to call for a moratorium on financing for this
project until adequate legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms would be in place
to ensure transparent and equitable use of the oil revenues and the protection of human
rights and the environment.

She continues that these pressures convinced the Bank to then pressure the Chadian
government to pass the Revenue Management Law (which happened, with a vote of 108
to zero) and include the IAG in the project design. However, this set back project
development for over two years, and so according to Horta the World Bank worked to
divide Northern and Southern organizations in the minds of outside interested parties. In
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the World Bank’s presentation, Northern organizations were against the project while
Southern organizations were very much for it.

Horta (2002, 176) dismisses this

characterization:
The delay of a final decision on the project led Exxon-Mobil to set-up a large-scale
operation in both Washington and Brussels to systematically lobby and obtain support for
the project from lawmakers, government officials and the media. At the same time,
pressure was building up within the World Bank to speed up the approval process and
allow no further 'caving in' to NGO concerns. Amongst its initiatives to neutralize NGOcriticism of the project, the World Bank spread information about a split between NGOs
with Northern NGOs purportedly opposing the project for their own selfish reasons while
Southern NGOs were giving it their full support as a poverty alleviating instrument. To
make the point, a group of representatives of so-called Chadian and Cameroonian civil
society representatives were flown into Washington in the fall of 1999 to lobby for the
project. These individuals had no affiliation with any groups or, in the case of a religious
representative, had come to Washington without knowing the objectives of their visit.
Embarrassingly, their written statement was identical to an official statement in support
of the project published by the Chadian embassy. For good measure, a Senegalese dance
troupe from Paris was brought to the 1999 World Bank/ IMF annual meetings in
Washington, to be paraded as Africans who had come to show solidarity with the project.

One of the most influential figures was former World Bank spokesperson Robert
Calderisi, a self-professed critic of “political correctness.”

He (2006, 184-187)

characterized social movement interventions in the manner that Horta warned against,
including the suggestion that “Washington-based” organizations were self-serving and
out of touch:
…international environmental groups were having a field day. Led by the Environmental
Defense Fund, the Center for International Environmental Law, and the Bank
Information Center – all based in Washington DC, a worldwide campaign had been
whipped up against the project. Some international groups with limited exposure to the
Bank’s work or dated information on the project had genuine concerns that needed to be
addressed. But the Washington, DC, groups, who should have known better, simply
twisted the facts. . . once an unqualified supporter of nongovernmental organizations of
every kind, Wolfensohn began drawing distinctions between “good” and “bad” NGOs . . .
US organizations such as the Environmenal Defense Fund were still determined to stop
the project, as if it were a litmus test of their strength as a public interest group or a
trophy for display on their entrance hall for future donors.

Wolfensohn, according to Inter Press Service, backed Calderisi’s comment about “good”
and “bad” NGOs up in the days prior to the Prague development meetings in 2000, and in
reference to the CCPDP:
139

"I have 1,000 Africans working at the Bank, who unanimously support the ChadCameroon pipeline. And I vigorously support the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. This is not
for people in Berkeley to decide (referring to Northern NGOs). This is for people in Chad
to decide. And I think it's important that we have a proper balance between the Berkeley
mafia92 and the Chadians, and I for my part, am more interested in the Chadians"
(Mutame 2000).

Calderisi reflected the tensions between the Bank and social movements, tensions which
did not appear in the CCPDP though they appeared briefly in the EIR. Four main actors
thus shared the stage in Calderisi’s view of the negotiations. On the one side were the
Bank and ExxonMobil (along with its partners Chevron and Petronas), who sought
simply to effectively extract petroleum in such a way that aided the people of Chad at the
same time that it brought some profit to the petroleum companies. On this side were also
the people of Chad, broadly presented as favorable to the project though they had little
voice. On the other side were Washington-based NGOs and the Chadian government,
both seemingly bent toward sabotaging the World Bank’s important contribution to
human welfare in Chad.
Calderisi (2006, 188) argues that two factors saved the project. First, Wolfensohn
and ExxonMobil head Lee Raymond had developed a personal chemistry:
Wolfensohn was convinced that Raymond was firmly committed to doing the project
properly and acting similarly in other international ventures. The Bank had been pressing
international companies to become better “corporate citizens,” so Wolfensohn could not
easily drop the project if someone he trusted was doing all he could to heed the Bank’s
advice.

The second factor was “an even larger controversy” in the form of a transmigration
project that the Bank was planning for China. It turned out that the location was within
traditional Tibetan boundaries, and so “. . . the activists pounced. They turned a wellintentioned agricultural development project into Bank collusion in China’s illegal

92

One wonders whether Wolfensohn grasped the irony of using such a term as Berkeley mafia which had a
previous more infamous association with Indonesian economists, educated at Berkeley, who assisted
Suharto with the economic aspects of his brutal dictatorship. See Klein (2007, 82ff), for example.
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occupation of Tibetan land. . .” (Calderisi 2006, 189). This major global initiative
eclipsed the Chad project:
The pipeline did not exactly slip by in the shadow of the larger controversy. There was
suspense about the final result until the very end. But, in the homestretch, there was
more concern with fine-tuning the design than overcoming any important hurdles. The
storm had broken, and there was a sudden stillness in which reasoned arguments rather
than sensationalist claims could again be considered (Calderisi 2006, 189).

After the agreement was signed, the Chadian government became the center of
World Bank consternation. In particular, the government used a large part of the signing
bonus to purchase arms. While this bonus was not covered under the revenue sharing
portion of the agreement, it decreased the government’s reputation as a credible partner.
“Throughout this period, the president of Chad showed no signs that he understood the
bargain he had made with the rest of the world” (Calderisi 2006, 191). Thus, all parties
were defined, with Calderisi matching arrogant clumsiness of the Chadian government
with the arrogant urbanity of the “Washington-based” environmental NGOs (also known
as the “Berkeley mafia”).
As the project proceeded, advocacy groups pointed to evidence, including the first
IAG report,93 that the project was proceeding on two tracks. On the one hand, the
petroleum production facilities were constructed ahead of schedule. On the other hand,
the capacity building frameworks that the documents called for were delayed. As a
result, when revenues began flowing into the London Citibank accounts, they languished
there rather than being distributed to education, health, nutrition and other local
development projects. The lagging of human welfare development was exacerbated in
2005, when Deby used the rebel threat to his regime as the primary excuse to scrap the
future generations fund and route more oil revenues to the general fund so they could be
used for military purchases. The World Bank immediately froze funds and entered into
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http://www.gic-iag.org/doc/IAGReportofMissiontoChadCam.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2008.
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negotiations about how to revise the management mechanism. By the middle of 2006,
the Bank and the Chadian government had entered into a new agreement whereby 70
percent of the revenues would be spent on “priority poverty programs” while 30 percent
would go into the general budget. The pact was accompanied by promises to create a
new PRSP, which has not been completed to this day. By the beginning of 2007, the
Chadian government was unclear about whether the security situation would allow the
70-percent threshold for priority poverty programs to be met.94
Not only was development seemingly proceeding on two tracks, but monitoring
could be seen as two-track as well, with transparency of reports ahead of compliance with
recommendations. Massey (2005, 273) labels this “transparency over compliance”:
Transparency, at least in terms of the Bank's contribution, has been assured by regular
electronic publication of the monitoring reports, and the various bodies have fulfilled
their remits satisfactorily. However, transparency to what effect?
A succession of reports by the IAG and ECMG, as well as a report by the Bank's
Inspection Panel have detailed environmental and social failings that are either not
addressed, or inadequately and/or temporarily, addressed. The monitoring mechanisms
have to a large extent been window-dressing. In terms of civil society and 'stakeholder'
input, "a foot in the door is quite distinct from a place at the table" (Clark, Fox, and
Treakle 2003, 285). The ascendancy of transparency over compliance was emphasised by
the Bank's disjointed response to its own Extractive Industries Review that accepted the
findings but proposed no change to existing policy.

A Bretton Woods Project article concurs95:
The work of external monitors can indeed provide much value added but can also be used
as a public relations tool and a fig leaf for poor implementation of social and
environmental commitments.
The specific case of the ECMG's work in the Chad-Cameroon projects is a case in point.
The ECMG's technical expertise on issues ranging from hazardous waste management to
archaeological heritage protection has helped fill gaps in the information about project
impacts. Its meticulous checklists and access to company records have further added to a
systematic knowledge base about the implementation of a complex environmental
management plan.
Unfortunately, however, the ECMG's work has not made the difference on-the-ground
that it could have. There are inherent structural problems when the ECMG has to make
repeated recommendations about serious problems - such as intense dust pollution that
94
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diminishes visibility, damages fields and crops and affects public health - which are not
adequately being solved after several years of ECMG warnings.

The CCSRP, charged with approving all oil revenue disbursements, was also
compromised. In 2004, President Deby appointed his brother-in-law to the central bank,
which automatically made his brother-in-law part of the CCSRP (2005, 259). In May
2004, the primary civil society representative acted as a whistleblower at one of the
public sessions:
In May, [Therese] Mekombe, as vice-president of the CCSRP, reiterated the College's
complaints. She responded to a self-congratulatory presentation by an Exxon executive at
an oil and gas conference in London with a whistle-blowing speech designed to
embarrass all connected with the project.96 Mekombe argued that the College remained
underfunded, understaffed and deprived of information by both the consortium and the
Chadian government. In these circumstances, it could not do the job it was set up to do.
The Exxon executive replied that he would be happy to provide any information the
CCSRP required, whilst reiterating the benefits that oil would bring. However, Mekombe
continued to paint a negative picture of both the oil consortium and the Chadian
government, stating that Chad's natural resources were being exploited in an atmosphere
of suspicion and lack of confidence. She further claimed that most of the Chadian
population was disillusioned with the project. This outspoken rebuke at least shows that
the College is not comprised entirely of placemen or women. Mekombe's remarks
prompted action by the World Bank to ensure that by October 2004 the CCSRP had wellequipped offices, technical support and better access to information. However, the fact
that the key revenue management mechanism was marginalised during the early phase of
the project suggests fundamental, perhaps fatal, flaws at the heart of the Doba Model
(2005, 260).

By 2008, the Chadian regime was threatened by very credible overthrow, with
rebel troops occasionally appearing on the outskirts of the capital. Through all this,
however, petroleum production continues virtually without pause. As a 11 February
2008 Reuters article97 states:
A rebel attack on Chad's capital a week ago did not affect the country's 140,000-160,000
barrels per day (bpd) of oil output but the violence disrupted prospecting and plans for a
new refinery, the oil minister said.
"Production has continued as normal," Oil Minister Emmanuel Nadingar said on Monday
amid burned papers and broken furniture at his ministry building, which was looted
following the Feb. 2-3 assault on N'Djamena by eastern rebels.

96
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See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3748061.stm.
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL11653282
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Current and former World Bank officials, and those sympathetic to their
positions, increasingly question the efficacy of aid (Calderisi 2006); call on African
countries to develop themselves (ibid.); or in other situations (e.g. Zimbabwe) call for
outside occupation or regime change (Collier 2008). The picture presented is of a Bank
that tries to design projects that help impoverished people, but African governments
almost hopelessly stuck in corruption and instability. This is nearly akin to cell iv in
Williamson’s matrix, with below threshold political and economic development. The
prevailing sentiment is that the Bank has tried but the domestic situation is hopeless.
However, unlike Williamson's actors in transaction cost economics, current and former
World Bank officials portray actors in Chad in collective terms, and also venture in some
cases (e.g. Collier) to suggest imperial reassumption of sovereignty or suggesting the
reverse: replacement of aid with ‘bootstrapping’.
In the meantime, the World Bank worked both to downplay the significance of the
CCPDP and to burnish the Bank’s role. George Monbiot (2006) wrote in May 2006:
The World Bank's attempts to save face are almost funny. Last year it said that the
scheme was "a pioneering and collaborative effort ... to demonstrate that large-scale
crude oil projects can significantly improve prospects for sustainable long-term
development.”98 In other words, it was a model for oil-producing countries to follow.
Now it tells us that the project in Chad was "less a model for all oil-producing
countries than a unique solution to a unique challenge.”99 But however much it
wriggles, it cannot disguise the fact that the government's reassertion of control is a
disaster both for the Bank and for the impoverished people it claimed to be helping.

The World Bank then declared in December 2006100 that the Bank’s participation
in the project was satisfactory, as was the outcome and borrower performance. The Bank
was rated as satisfactory because of the quality of project design and preparation, as well
98
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as the fact that revenues were being generated as predicted, and the production sites were
under private control. For this reason, the consortium of petroleum companies was also
rated satisfactory in performance. However, sustainability was unlikely because the
government seemed unlikely to make the commitments required to develop the capacity
necessary for managing petroleum revenue. The Chad government participation, for its
part, was satisfactory in design but unsatisfactory in performance. On the whole, the
project seemed to succeed in design and petroleum production, but likely fail in
government implementation of revenue management and capacity building.101

This

seems a blatant admission that the primary goal was documentation of intended welfare
protections and enhancements rather than deep commitment to realizing those changes.
Throughout the CCPDP design, development and implementation, most of the
public burden of justification for the project lay with the World Bank.

As within

neoclassical economic theory and World Bank research and high-level policy, the
consortium of petroleum corporations concentrated on designing and constructing the
oilfield and the pipeline, though they also fulfilled environmental and social
documentation requirements directly connected to the project. There was very little
reference to the contestation narrated by social movements, current and former World
Bank officials, and news outlets. The project was completed ahead of schedule, and the
ECMG has completed 25 volumes of periodic (quarterly, semi-annual and annual) reports
over the last 8 and one-half years.102 These reports adhere religiously to the area around
the oilfield developments, and among other things do not acknowledge social movement
presence or instability even during the height of conflict in early 2008 when the capital
was besieged and the oil ministry ransacked.

101
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Even revenue management disputes

http://go.worldbank.org/NK5U64X7U0
See Project Reports at http://www.esso.com/Chad-English/PA/Newsroom/TD_ProgressReports.asp.
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between the Chadian government and the World Bank in 2005 and 2008 are only briefly
acknowledged.
As the World Bank narrative is incomplete without investigation of politics
outside of the official reports, so it is necessary to look at the petroleum consortium
outside of the formal reports. The anecdotes in this chapter assist with a small but
important amount of context. However, as I indicate further in the conclusion, better
understanding of corporate approaches to the CCPDP requires the kind of in-depth,
medium- to long-term engagement that is found regarding petroleum production and
broader key commodity exploitation in Nigeria. I detail some of this latter literature in
the following chapter, which provides an effective if incomplete supplement to the
existing material on corporations and the CCPDP.
On 9 September 2008, the World Bank announced that it was ending support for
the project: “. . . once again the government did not allocate adequate resources critical
for poverty reduction in – education, health, infrastructure, rural development and
governance.” After the quite vitriolic and public 2006 disagreements and subsequent
negotiations, this announcement seemed quite low key and perfunctory.
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Chapter 6 Force and consent: The petro-state and the oil complex
The “normal” exercise of hegemony is characterized by
the combination of force and consent, in variable
equilibrium, without force predominating too much over
consent… [But] between force and consent stands
corruption-fraud, that is the enervation and paralyzing of
the antagonist or antagonists. (Gramsci 1971; cited in
Anderson 2002)
It is generally assumed by mainstream development
literature that the exploitation of the peoples of the Niger
Delta and the devastation of their environment began
when crude oil was discovered in the area by Royal
Dutch Shell in 1956. The truth is that Europe’s plunder of
the Delta, and indeed the entire continent, dates much
farther back, to 1444, when the Portuguese adventurer
and former tax collector, Lancarote de Freitas, sailed to
the West African coast and stole 235 men and women
whom he later sold as slaves. De Freitas’s trip was to
trigger the Atlantic slave trade, which, before it was
displaced by the trade in palm oil in the 1840s, saw
several million able-bodied young men and women
taken from the Delta and its hinterland and shipped to
the plantations of North America, South America, and
the West Indies (Okonta and Douglas 2003, 6).

At this point, Chad is an unstable country, with an authoritarian leader, and sustained and
even deepened poverty since initiation of the CCPDP.103 It would seem, then, in the final
analysis that the World Bank’s optimism about the ability of IFIs to break destructive
institutional fixity is misplaced at least in regard to the “resource curse,” and transaction
cost economics is correct. One would be tempted to believe that no matter what the
“generous developed countries” try, they cannot break through the crust of deterioration
that is African institutions below both the economic and political development threshold
on Williamson’s matrix.
103

Between 1975 and 2000, the HDI index for Chad rose faster than the average HDI for low-HDI
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2000 and 2005, however, the Human Development Index for
Chad dropped precipitously while the HDI for other low-HDI countries continued to rise. Please see
Appendix 1.
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Thus, people still rely on the insights of books like Calderisi’s The Trouble with
Africa and Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden, suggesting that perhaps only historical
accident or basic humanitarian aid can assist such areas. These volumes assume that
Western governments, multilateral development agencies, and even multinational
corporations are politically weak and perhaps even naïve in trying to help developing
countries. Gould (2007) makes the argument, based on resource curse assumptions, that
the World Bank and corporations were naïve in trusting their power to influence the
Chadian government.104 He argues that only strong political intervention by the World
Bank could have prevented the government from engaging in an “obsolescing bargain”
(see Vernon 1971) whereby authoritarian elites used the sunk costs and “institutional
fixity” of the project to extract greater concessions from the World Bank. In the stories
given by Gould, Calderisi, Collier and others, the elite of these countries hold the cards
and manipulate external generosity toward their selfish ends.

And yet petroleum

production is sustained in southern Chad.
I argue that the CCPDP was not a case of failed institutions or external
organization naïveté, but instead a hyper-documented project with a hyper-restricted
scope, pointing to larger strategic objectives than simply putting an oilfield in Chad and a
pipeline to transport the petroleum to the coast. The previous chapter detailed the level of
documentation, which was certainly extensive. The scope was both geographically and
temporally hyper-restricted in that the targeting of revenue to social welfare only covered
construction of the Doba oilfield and the pipeline from Chad to the Cameroonian coast.
Even this scope was further limited in that the loan was paid and the World Bank
contribution to the project ended early in 2008 with the World Bank arguing that the
104

A similar criticism to mine is made by Mary Lynn Cramer, regarding the 2008 economic crisis, in
“Stiglitz's Foolishly Flawed Morality.” http://www.counterpunch.com/cramer12152008.html. Accessed
17 December 2008. Stiglitz, Cramer writes, “chalks the whole affair up to naiveté on the part of his fellow
economists, bankers and bureaucrats. (Hey, he tried to tell them!)” See Stiglitz, Joseph. “Capitalist fools.”
http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2009/01/stiglitz200901. Accessed 17 December 2008.
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Chadian government continually refused to follow revenue distribution requirements.
Petroleum production, however, will almost certainly extend far beyond the Doba
oilfield. Indeed, as I explore in this chapter, Fah (2007) argues that the CCPDP makes
Chad a central point in Gulf of Guinea petroleum exploration.
Chad, throughout colonial and postcolonial history up to the CCPDP, has been an
impoverished, commodity poor, marginalized country at the confluence of major global
power struggles.105 The CCPDP only adds a volatile and valuable global commodity to
the mix, as Fah (2007, 105) relates:
The production capacity of the pipeline is currently 225,000 barrels of oil per day; and it
will decline only after it reaches a peak in a couple of decades. However, the size of the
investment signifies a commitment to a much longer-term exploitation. By the time the
Doba field, estimated at a total reservoir of one billion barrels, is emptied, other fields
already being explored in Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Central African Republic are
expected to take over (Oliveira 2007, 282) (Eriksson and Hagströmer 2005).106

The Chad government itself is clearly focusing on unsupervised exploration, as
McGregor (2008, 10) argues:
The government is actively encouraging new exploration in the promising Lake Chad
Basin as only the existing Doba Basin oil fields are subject to the oversight and
supervision terms of the 2000 agreement. The distribution of all new revenues from the
industry will be completely unsupervised by outside agencies. Unfortunately the industry
has created very little local employment, most of which is menial and low-paying.

Looked at from a regional focus such as Fah and Roitman (2001; 2004) employ, it is
clear that petroleum exploitation is a regional initiative especially considering its relative
scarcity. Fah provides a general description of the flows of migrants, guns and other
inter-regional forces that characterize the Chad basin:
The geographical location of the region thus exposes it to many different influences
ranging from Arab North African countries such as Libya with it [sic] religious
ambitions, and Egypt, an important intellectual centre for Arabs (notably with regard to
pilgrims making the hajj to Mecca), as well a disseminating centre for various
commercial and religious ideas. Beyond this exposure to its Arab and African
neighbours, local populations face day-to-day competition over access to natural
105
106

See, for example, Roitman (2004) and Fah (2007).
See also Eriksson (2005); Oliveira (2007, 282).

149

resources that are faced with environmental challenges, especially expanding
desertification and the drying up of Lake Chad (Fah 2007, 101).

To restrict the CCPDP only to Doba and the Cameroon pipeline means that the
project is severely limited at best and perhaps even a cynical move for long term
corporate profit enhancement.107

The fact that the project is unsustainable but still

satisfactory according to the World Bank, the private consortium and other lenders
underlines the (cynically) limited scope of the project.
This view of the project has many advantages over the neoclassical economic
view. In particular, it does not require artificially constrained variables such as treatment
of states and corporations, even individual persons, as discrete identities with selfcontained interests interacting with one another.

Instead I work in this chapter to

spatially and temporally connect phenomena that are left out of the neoclassical economic
view. In addition to the evidence from literature on the Chad basin, the CCPDP narrative
closely tracks other key bodies of literature on international development, commodity
exploitation, business and Central Africa. Together, this literature points to intimate
corporate involvement with states and other key institutions of power; diverse ways that
these corporate and state powers attempt to disguise the nature of their activity; and the
Band-Aid® nature of CSR and other social welfare accessories to commodity
exploitation.
I begin with the hyper-documentation and how it fits into other instances of what
Rose (1999, 177) refers to as the “birth-to-presence of a form of being that pre-exists” but
nevertheless requires expert intervention at every turn to adapt the form to external
changes.

The realities of commodity exploitation in Central Africa and Nigeria

especially provide compelling evidence that such exploitation has little to do with the
myths presented by neoclassical economists. Combining the historical, cultural, political
107

Keenan (2005, 399) makes the point that cynics may see the instability as in their interests, though the
political risk could be quite high.
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economic and geographic forces compelling “development” in the context of the CCPDP
requires a robust analytical frame. Neoclassical economics is now left far outside of
discussion, taking up a niche not unlike the niche it occupies in business literature.
However, in contrast to business literature where neoclassical economics provides some
analytical assistance for “applied” business,108 neoclassical economics takes its place here
as a critical part of the mystification, naturalization and justification of petro-capitalism.
The nature and context of the CCPDP does its part to help undermine the benevolent
nature of World Bank policies even in this era of development as “governance,”
“comprehensive development” and “local ownership.” As we saw in Chapter 2, Schmitz
(1995) and others have questioned the transformative nature of World Bank rhetoric,
particularly the “governance” rhetoric so recently made popular. Others, such as Weaver
(2008) and Leiteritz and Weaver (2002), focus on the “hypocrisy” that is disjunctures
between organizational culture and stated objectives in the World Bank.

These

approaches are quite useful in sustaining the scholars’ relative objectives, which are in
themselves useful. For Schmitz, the primary objective is to point out discrepancies
between discourse and strategic aims, while Weaver looks at discrepancies between
“talk” and “action” in terms of sociological organizational theory. However, I do not
address this discourse perspective on development here, and instead find the
“governmentality” literature more useful for study of productive margins (Mantz 2008).

108

The introduction to the Harvard University program in Business Economics concisely articulates the
role that economics methodology plays in business:
A joint degree offered by the Department of Economics in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences and the
Harvard Business School , the PhD in business economics combines economic analysis with the
practical aspects of business. This degree is primarily intended to prepare students for careers in
research and teaching in business administration and related fields of economics. The general
management approach of the Harvard Business School is an important ingredient in the program.
The program can be distinguished from the Harvard PhD in economics by its greater emphasis on business
fields and its focus on the use of economic analysis and statistical methods in dealing effectively with
management problems in these applied business fields.
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Li (2007, 232-233) provides an excellent exposition of World Bank “birth-topresence” of communities in the context of Social Development projects and
governmentality in Indonesia:
Community is assumed to be natural, yet it needs to be improved. Communities are
assumed to have the secret to the good life (equitable, sustainable, authentic, democratic
– however the good is being defined), yet experts must intervene to secure that goodness
and enhance it. . . [Yet it is] unclear whether talk of community applies to present or
future forms. . . Even when the object of desire – the authentic, natural community – is
found to be intact, experts on community argue that it is vulnerable to degeneration
because it lacks the capacity to manage change. It is the paradox of community that
makes it an exemplary site for governmental intervention: trustees do not direct or
dominate; yet they always have work to do.109

Li, like Watts below, uses Foucault’s notion of governmentality quite effectively in
undermining the idea that Bank notions of participation and ownership mean
decentralization of decision-making power, whereby such people as the small farmer or
the local community leader are supported in working to improve life as they see fit. The
Bank version of development is rightly called governance-based because the
decentralization applies to the responsibility more than the power, as seen in the CCPDP
discussion above about “ownership.” Structural issues relating to the neoclassical model
of economic growth are still central to the development model. The mode of promoting
this, however, has moved from state-centered structural change to the micro-organization
of individuals and small communities, so that their conduct accords with the
liberalization project. As Mawdsley and Rigg (2003, 271) argue, “the substantial shift
towards more participatory language and approaches, while welcome, is still underpinned
by utilitarian values, in which a depoliticized version of ‘empowerment’ is valued
primarily for its contribution to the main goal of economic growth.” This also echoes
Leys’ (1996, 81) argument that the 1994 World Development Report’s “treatment of the
issues at stake as if they were purely 'technical', by excluding crucial political and social
considerations, is purely ideological.”
109

Governance is about disciplining bodies,

See, for a business perspective on authenticity, Burnett and Hutton (2007).
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surveying at the most local scale, and perhaps most importantly locating responsibility
for failure at all levels, bottom to top, of a society. Thus, as Ferguson argues in The AntiPolitics Machine (1994), failure may not be entirely outside of the purpose of
development interventions. The “failure” of the social welfare portion of the CCPDP,
combined with success of petroleum production, seems to fit well with Ferguson’s
argument that development “failure” nevertheless leads to “successful” spread of the
bureaucratic state, though in the case of Chad it is not the bureaucratic state so much as
the consolidation of the petroleum enclave as the state remains unstable.
Craig and Roberts (2006, chapter 6) detail a similar situation in Uganda, where a
District Development Project (DDP) showed great success in the early stages, but
performance suddenly declined precipitously.
[The lauded development successes of the DDP unraveled because they] had been
overwhelmed by another system – the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) – that by then was
channeling huge resources down to local governments. In one district, an exasperated
woman councillor expressed the difficulty:
You government people, you come down here looking for answers to
your project, but you don’t realize you’re not the only thing going on
here. Don’t hold us responsible, you set us up for this, look beyond
yourselves for once and you’ll see the world is larger than you think
(2006, 171-172).

This “hyper-documentation” can therefore also usefully be referred to as “hyper-project”
in that the sheer number of project interventions and requirements can overwhelm the
“target” community. That the representative of the target community lectures the funders
on their myopia regarding the world is particularly ironic.
As the second section, covering Nigeria history of European commodity
exploitation, demonstrates, the “form of being that pre-exists” has been one part of the
spectacle that is commodity exploitation for generations. Looking at Nigeria, we see the
same kinds of realities and the same kinds of myths that are narrated today (incapable
natives, the need for an invasive civilizing mission, the hiding of exploitation in
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contracts, isolation of resource production from wider social, political and economic
contexts, the important role of everyday and spectacular violence). Apter (2005, 151)
describes transition to formal colonial rule in Nigeria, for example, as “assertion of a new
economic order, pursued in the language of fair trade and rational contract.” This could
describe such transitions generally, including the rise and fall of the CCPDP as part of the
ramping-up process for petroleum exploitation in the Chad basin. In Nigeria, like in
Chad, the spectacle of Nigerians repeatedly changed depending on the nature and type of
exploitation. For example, in the transition to formal colonial control, the same Nigerians
went from people “endowed by nature [with] ‘commercial faculty’” (Baikie 1856, 385386; quoted in Apter 2005, 148) to infantile savages (Mockler-Ferryman and Day 1892;
quoted in Apter 2005, 152). Apter (2005) details quite well the nature of the spectacle in
Nigeria, while authors such as Rowell (2005) and Okanta and Douglas (2003) cover the
violence experienced by Nigerians who have directly encountered commodity
exploitation through the generations.
Watts, through articulation of the “oil complex” and the “petro-state” takes up the
narrative where Apter leaves off, providing a more general theoretical framework to the
work by Apter as well as Rowell (2005) and Okanta and Douglas (2003) regarding
petroleum exploitation in Nigeria and elsewhere. Watts (2005a, 53) accepts the enclave
nature of oil-centered capitalist forms, but rejects the idea that oil-dependency is itself
generative of predation, as resource curse literature tends to assume. Rather, what he
calls “petro-capitalism” produces specific configurations of “territory, identity and rule”
from particular realities into which it is inserted. Watts concentrates on the example of
the Niger Delta, but his form of analysis can bring important lessons about the most
effective manner of looking at insertion of petro-capitalism into the primarily “inutile”
(Lemarchand 1986, 29) “geographic expression” that is Chad within the Chad basin.

154

In

addition

to

demonstrating

the

need

to

understand

existing

political/economic/cultural relations, Watts more specifically notes that multinational
corporations are invisible in resource curse literature. As I indicate in previous chapters,
this is a characteristic of neoclassical economics in general, and indeed is an important
strategy for business.

The CCPDP’s hyper-documentation, restricted scope, halting

progress, and premature ending seem to validate the “business case” perspective on CSR
and broader business involvement in social welfare. As Frynas argues below in the
context of Shell in Nigeria, Shell Petroleum schedules community development programs
to last as long as pipelines are being built.

When the pipelines are complete, the

community development programs are ended as well. Not only does the CSR record
show restricted timelines, where social involvement lasts only as long as necessary for
production, but it belies evidence that Frynas details of corporations benefiting from
social conditions inimical to human welfare, such as first mover advantages of political
instability in Nigeria. I only scratch the surface of business literature in this project, but it
is clear that any examination of development must account for corporations as political
and cultural as well as economic actors.

6.1 Poverty, spectacle and creation of locality
There is little in-depth coverage of history in the neoinstitutional economic view of
Africa, including Central Africa. Likewise, there is little historical background in World
Bank research and policy literature, and certainly not in Bank project documents. In
particular, corporations are essentially invisible in historical accounts by neoclassical
economists and World Bank documents.110 For transaction cost economists, history is
nearly irrelevant in that what matters are the mechanisms rather than the substance of
institutions. At all periods of history, opportunism exists with imperfect information so
that institutions must be built to overcome these limitations.
110

See Watts (2008, 60).
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For evolutionary

neoinstitutional economists like North, history in “underdeveloped” areas consists of
stagnant “genetic predispositions of millions of years of hunter/gatherer heritage” (North
2005, 42). For World Bank high level researchers and policymakers (e.g. Berg 1981, 1011), there seem to be three periods of history in Central Africa preceding the 1980s
currency crises.

First there was precolonial stagnation, where people had incipient

entrepreneurial abilities but did not have the skills or institutions through which to
develop their economies effectively.

This was followed by authoritarian colonial

institutions that concentrated too much on state-led growth. Following liberation, most
countries continued to follow this model and thus were beset by inefficient economic
production, corruption and maladapted institutional proclivities.
Calderisi (2006) acknowledges some of the brutality associated with the slave
trade, colonialism and the Cold War. However, he argues that the record is mixed and
anyway the slave trade ended generations ago and countries such as India and Pakistan
are not blaming their colonial history for their problems. Regarding British colonial
history, Calderisi (2006, 22) comments that “The British used ‘indirect rule’ in Nigeria,
relying on local chieftains to ensure the smooth administration of the vast interior.” This
demonstrates for Calderisi that colonial powers sometimes actually contributed to the
welfare of colonies through more efficient authority structures (as well as infrastructure).
He places nearly all of the blame for subsequent ‘underdevelopment’ in Africa on three
features: culture, corruption and correctness (2006, Chapter 4). Paramount among these,
sustaining the destruction, is culture. Calderisi (2006, 82-83) lists common cultural
attributes which he argues affect people in sub-Saharan Africa more than elsewhere.
•

An unquestioning family loyalty sustains corruption and punishes
individual quest for betterment.

•

A focus on the present – “[enjoying] life as it is” at the expense of the
future hinders saving and progress.

156

•

Unwillingness to disrespect elders means that “Africans accept
dictatorship and high-handed elected officials as their lot. . . Some of this
deference has an ancient lineage, as many national leaders are only a
generation or two removed from traditions of village leadership. . .”
(Calderisi 2006, 83).

•

Love of language encourages hyperbole and divisiveness. Religious
conviction also contributes to fatalism and acceptance of hardship.

These cultural shortcomings are then nourished by a political correctness that is loathe to
criticize destructive leaders (for Calderisi) like Mugabe or Mbeke or to recognize that
African culture underlies most of the failure of sub-Saharan Africa to develop.
Calderisi is joined by Collier (2008) in decrying political correctness as the
problem. In a recent opinion piece, Collier comments:
Leaders in such sad little states as Zimbabwe and Burma are quite ridiculously powerful.
They have turned parliament, the news media and the judiciary into mere implementers
of their strangling systems of control. But the extraordinary lack of external restraints on
these dictators is poorly understood. Many people are still trapped in a politically correct
mindset that sees a strong rich world bullying a weak poor world. . . [However] like
virtually all rich countries, Germany [for example] has learned that there are real
advantages to limiting its own sovereignty and pooling it with neighbors and allies. But
the governments of failing states such as Zimbabwe and Burma have refused to share any
sovereignty with anyone. . . So how can the grossly excessive powers of the Mugabes
and Shwes of the world be curtailed? After Iraq, there is no international appetite for
using the threat of military force to pressure thugs. But only military pressure is likely to
be effective; tyrants can almost always shield themselves from economic sanctions. So
there is only one credible counter to dictatorial power: the country's own army.

As counterpoint to the spectacles that are culture, history and development in Africa for
the Bank and neoclassical economists, scholars have undertaken high quality
examinations of history and culture the breadth of which fill many volumes. I focus on
the Niger Delta and in particular that material which informs petroleum production. The
Niger Delta and much of greater Nigeria have been in contact with Europeans for
approximately 600 years. In recent years (since Shell/BP began work in the Niger Delta
in 1956), the Niger Delta has been a flashpoint for interactions between local people (the
most publicized example being Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Ogoni rights movement or the Niger
Delta insurgent groups), Shell/BP, successive corrupt (mostly military) governments, and
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British and recently U.S. administrations. Thus, this region offers a very good point of
departure for looking at what Watts terms the ‘oil complex’ and the petro-state, and a
good jumping-off point for re-examining the present and probable future of places such
as the “model development project” that was the CCPDP.
Though the Nigerian history is coherent in important ways, it cannot be a fully
coherent conspiracy.

While “the British,” “Shell” and other collectivities appear

throughout the history, “they” are not themselves unitary rational individuals that put
their stamp on all of these decades. Rather, this history is about sustained approaches to
the world, passed down relationally through interactions and discourses (“birth-topresence of a form of being which pre-exists”)111 from executive to executive, president
to president, chief to chief, interlocking directorate to interlocking directorate (Barnet and
Müller 1974) to the present day. I do not cover the mechanisms of such passing down of
hegemony in my project (this is a worthy and complex pursuit in itself), but rather look at
the evidence of such interactions in the context of Niger Delta exploitation as it
prefigures petroleum exploitation by Shell.
As well, I do not pretend to present a comprehensive historical overview of the
past 600 years in Nigeria. Rather, I use historical interventions to provide a narrative
about Nigerian history with very different drivers of transformation than the neoclassical
economic stories presented above. Apter (2005, 89) focuses, with allusions to others like
Mitchell112
on the making of Nigerian national culture within the broader black and African world,
because it brings into bold relief the very logic of spectacle as a form of cultural
commodification. I approach this important notion . . . as a basic inversion of simulacrum

111
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Rose (1999, 177).
Apter (2005, 4) comments:
As Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt so elegantly reveals, the idealized Egypt of the 1889 Universal
Exhibition became more real and authentic than the Egypt visited by travelers and tourists,
corrupted as it was by empirical chaos in relation to the purified principles through which it was
perceived (Mitchell 1991[, 21-33] ).
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and original -- a kind of commodity fetish writ large -- whereby an exhibited “people”
became more real and authentic than the lands and peoples themselves.

Apter and Mitchell focus literally on exhibitions, in the case of Apter being the FESTAC
’77 cultural event underwritten by Nigerian windfall profits. I mobilize Apter’s analysis
for a related but distinct purpose, to throw into sharper relief the historical processes
through which ‘realities’ have been produced in pursuit of material gain. For me, this
spectacle of culture has served two major purposes. First, it has reframed the structures
and routines underlying control of people in Nigeria. Secondly, it has presented people in
the Nigerian colony to those people in the West who may be disposed to get involved in
some way in Nigeria.

Imperialism was, and post-imperial ‘neoliberal’ corporate

capitalism is, significantly about producing and contesting ‘reality’, similar to Scott’s
(1990,

5)

public

transcript

though

without

an

allegiance

to

dualistic

domination/resistance. Some forms of ‘reality’ are less costly than other forms, and
much of the work of exploitation lies in creating least cost ‘realities’ for exploiters.
Different ‘realities’ serve different periods of resource exploitation.
While Apter concentrates on maintenance of power through the tenuous “consent”
to spectacles of control (the regatta, the durbar, and indirect rule among others), it is
critical to note the presence of sometimes naked and brutal exercise of military and
paramilitary power in affecting control and exploitation. Watts brings violence to the
analytical fore in discussion of the ‘oil complex’ and the petro-state. Likewise, Rowell
(2005) and Okonta and Douglas (2003) provide graphic narrative detail of the role that
violence played from slavery to the present. Cultural spectacle sustains everyday control,
while spectacular violence discourages dissent.
The history of European-Nigerian interaction flows through four major periods,
each distinguished by a different kind of commodity and social forms. First, the slave
trade beginning in the 1400s was characterized by nominally independent dynastic
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kingdoms that met European traders on the coast and either exchanged slaves for goods at
that time, or took European goods upriver and came back with slaves. Jones (1963, 39;
cited in Apter 2005, 132) quotes French slave trader John Barbot regarding the African
mediators:
Several of those Blacks act therein as factors, or brokers, either for their own countrymen,
or for the Europeans who are often obliged to trust them with their goods to attend the
upper markets, and purchase slaves for them [emphasis in original].

Apter comments:
What quite literally stands out in his Description is the italicized contrast between blacks
and Europeans as partners in the trans-atlantic trade, with the emergence of mediating
“factors” or brokers and an important form of credit called “trust.” It is precisely this
class of middlemen or brokers that gave rise to the dynastic ruling houses of the riverine
trading states, accumulating fortunes and competing against each other for political
power and market share.

African merchants would seek not only the materials of Europeans but also the cultural
symbols of power (the flag, military and other European clothing). African merchant
groups would then integrate these symbols into the exchanges and value creation
activities of the Niger Delta communities. Rowell (2005, 43)113 argues that the slave
trade not only involved mobilization of cultural interaction along with trade, but created
and mobilized internecine violence, feeding it through the exchange of slaves for guns
(16 guns per slave). “By the 1750s, the Europeans were exporting between 283,000 and
399,000 guns each year into West Africa.”
These interactions of symbol, commodity, physical force and exchange relations
were both accentuated and undermined by the adventure of the Landers, European traders
captured for a time in 1830 by an African canoe house. They themselves became for a
time objects of exchange and value creation, but at the same time continued to help
develop through their interaction what became a gradual deepening of British control
through the Royal Niger Company:
113
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Their discovery of that “highway into Central Africa” which beckoned to the adventurous
with untold riches inaugurated subsequent expeditions that prepared the way for the
Royal Niger Company. And if the Landers opened this door, they also set the pattern of
expansion by establishing a set of enduring relations with local leaders and traders that
would gradually be fixed by treaties and amalgamated into a protected market (Apter
2005, 141).

These enduring relations transitioned the dynastic canoe houses into middlemen
and traders as the British traders ventured further up the river to enter into direct
‘contracts’ with the inner river groups, under the triple purposes of establishing palm oil
exploitation structures, abolishing the slave trade, and introducing the populations to
Christianity. Apter (pp. 146-147) describes graphically the contract signing ceremonies,
in which the British and local leaders had very different interpretations of one another’s
actions:
On two occasions, the Obi [an African leader who had an extended relationship with the
British] subjected the “rational” code of the treaty to the ritual obligations of fetishism.
First, as witnessed by his English guests, he made ritual preparations to secure the
success of the treaty. . . The second intrusion of fetishism occurred [during British
prayers to “Almighty God”, when the Obi became agitated and began a ritual of his own
before his “heathen ceremony” was interrupted]. . . Whatever theological dimensions of
transvaluation were here involved – and the question of whose god we trust in any
economic exchange is never fully absent – the incident represents a general confrontation
between European and African commercial understandings that would develop through
the hybrid idiom of fetishism itself.

Thus began the establishment of “rational contract” relations between British and local
populations, supplemented by missionary proselytizing and some model farms, relations
which deepened as expeditions such as William Balfour Baikie (aided by quinine to
battle malaria) met “‘on friendly terms with numerous tribes, all endowed by nature with
what I might term the “commercial faculty,” ready and anxious to trade with us’” (Baikie
1856, 385-386; quoted in Apter 2005, 148).
With the deeper penetration of the Niger Delta by traders, the Europeans
increasingly desired to get rid of the middlemen and assume direct control over
resources:
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The enormous riches to be derived from the Niger Delta and the other coastal towns
opened the eyes of the British traders and, subsequently, of the government itself, to the
possibilities of taking over the area entirely, by force if necessary. . . The Niger provided
an excellent highway for the British traders, who began to penetrate into the interior.
They saw virgin forests brimming with agricultural produce. Fired by greed, they sent
urgent dispatches to London. The Foreign Office, after ensuring that the area would not
prove a financial liability to the government, but indeed the opposite, proclaimed the
Niger Delta and its hinterland a British Protectorate in 1865, thus laying the foundations
of what turned out to be modern Nigeria (Okonta and Douglas 2003, 10).
Framed within the idiom of a humanitarian crusade against the depredations of savagery
was the assertion of a new economic order, pursued in the language of fair trade and
rational contract. The new masters of the river were the Niger Company factors with their
guns and their law (Apter 2005, 151).

Thus, because British traders saw a greater bounty of resources in the inland areas “ripe
for the taking” (because neither riverine traders nor any of the weaker local people had
adequate power to resist), they transformed the ‘reality’ in the riverine areas from
exchange relations with nominally independent trading groups (with natural “commercial
faculty”) into “civilization projects” for a host of uncivilized savages unfit to retain
sovereignty over the areas.
British colonial figures formed at least three major ‘realities’ as they sought to
create the most profitable (i.e. lowest cost, highest revenue) colonial system that they
could. For the first reality – in Britain or British business and economic circles –
theoreticians and policymakers focused on resource value and the “language of fair trade
and rational contract.” According to these discourses, actors simply exchange resources
through contracts and the competition of the market. This is no different whether one is
discussing final textiles in Britain or palm oil in Nigeria. The second reality, promoted by
theologians and many interested in social issues, was that of the “depredations of
savagery,” which the British in their compassionate manner were called to contain and
reverse through the proclamations of the Christian gospel and the controlling virtues of
civilization. Savagery, I suggest, was best presented graphically rather than through
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rational discourse, and repeated to attain a level of ‘common sense’.114 Apter (2005, 152)
looks at the particular example below, from Mockler-Ferryman (1892) as typical of this
forming of images about African ‘realities’:
“The head chief . . . was dressed in a loin-cloth and the long red coat of a Chelsea
pensioner, with a lady's tiny straw hat set coquettishly on one side of his head. The other
chiefs were equally oddly attired. Some wore black frock-coats of broadcloth of
undoubted London build, others, tunics of the Line, and one old gentleman was disguised
as a commander of the Royal Navy, though the trousers had been forgotten. Their choice
of hats was also varied. The Church, the Army, the Navy, the Picadilly "swell," and the
little girl at the seaside, all were represented here.”
In this scornful rhetoric of colonial mimicry, the African chief is reduced to a diminutive
half-wit, feminized and further compromised by his pathetic attempts at dignified
dressing. The powerful icons of Church, Army and State are seen not as signs of
European power and prestige but as articles woefully out of place on savage bodies in a
savage land.

According to Okonta and Douglas’ (2003, 1) account, a British naval force visited this
“savage land” three years after Mockler-Ferryman’s book was published, and exacted an
example of spectacular force to go along with the everyday spectacles of control. On
February 22, 1895, the British attacked the chief Ijo city of Brass, killing an estimated
2,000 people. This attack was instigated by the Royal Niger Company, after the people
of Brass resisted the company’s continuing consolidation of monopoly power over palm
oil production. Okonta and Douglas directly relate this violent incident with the violence
that Shell helped visit on the Niger Delta one hundred years later in 1995.
The final reality was the British imposition of ‘customary rule’ on the people of
Nigeria. Customary rule valorized hierarchical societies, which ironically placed the
middlemen of the riverine areas lower in the caste system than the royalty surrounding
the Sultan of Sokoto in northern Nigeria. This is a critical indication that exploitation by
the powerful would take place in whatever manner is most profitable and can be justified
according to acceptable colonial morality.

When trading was the main means of

exchange, the population was ‘naturally commercial.’ When direct exploitation (removal
114

See Deleuze (2004) Difference and repetition.
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of the middleman) was possible and profitable, these self-same commercial partners
became lower caste, less refined, less developed, savage.
The colonial rulers established direct control most effectively in areas such as the
north of Nigeria because hierarchies such as those embodied in the Sultan of Sokoto were
already established and could be hardened and adapted to colonial administration. The
existing leader (Calderisi’s “ancient lineage”) could either be bought off or replaced with
a more agreeable leader. Okonta and Douglas (2003, 15-16) describe the difference
between north and south in this manner:
[Though the North was primarily linked with North Africa and the South was primarily
Christian and traditional religious practitioners] the interests of British trade were
paramount. . . and the dictates of commerce, coupled with the financial difficulties of
administering the various nations and ethnic groups as separate entities, compelled the
colonial administrators, from Frederick Lugard onward, to treat the country as a single
unit. . . While the northern emirs who held unchallenged sway over their subjects were
allowed to administer their territories with minimal interference from the colonial
residents, Lugard discovered that this system of indirect administration could not apply in
the more egalitarian south, where the ruler’s authority was circumscribed by a large
number of checks and balances. The South was therefore ruled directly through courts
and a “warrant” system whereby certain individuals were raised to positions of authority
specifically to dispense justice and collect taxes as the emirs did in the north.

Rowell (2005, 53) refers to southern representatives as “‘Warrant Chiefs’: heads of the
communities who were chosen by the colonial power because they were supportive.” The
unchallenged sway by Northern rulers is questionable given Apter’s detailing of the
durbar and molding of the northern hierarchies through coercion and exhibition so that
they provided the kind of rule amenable to British colonial control. This “unchallenged
sway” during colonial times, Apter (2005, 169) argues, fits into what he terms Mitchell’s
(1991; 1999)
radical shift in perspective on the very processes of institutional differentiation and
objectification. In brief this refers historically to the practical and technical demarcation
of internal distinctions – “methods of organization, arrangement and representation” –
that come to be seen as the external boundaries between the state and civil society, the
state and a “free” market, or in the case of the Nigerian durbar, the state and its national
“culture.”
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The origins of the durbar were contested, with questions about whether it was an
Indian ceremony put to colonial use in Nigeria, a Muslim ceremony from North Africa,
or a pre-Muslim ceremony. However, the main item of importance for this overview is
that it represented a critical example of ". . . the constitution of authority through imperial
rituals . . ." (Apter 2005, 197-198) as the British consolidated and sought to retain
colonial control through “indirect rule”:
The colonial and imperial durbars of India did not exist in ceremonial isolation but
belonged to an elaborate cosmology and culture of rule expressed as much by the rational
techniques of governmentality – mapping populations, codifying laws, collecting taxes,
or training troops – as by political ritual and everyday routines. If the colonial rule was
visible, even spectacular, its habitus was hidden in the details and disciplines of new
forms of etiquette and knowledge. The durbar does stand out, however, in this total
ideological context as a powerful mechanism of its production, whereby indigenous
ceremonial and social orders were both underwritten and reorganized by the colonial
administration and naturalized by the colonial sciences of native races and their
evolutionary paths. I am in no position to examine this dense historiography, but I would
suggest that the colonial cosmology and administrative logic exemplified by the imperial
durbar in India were brought by Lugard to Nigeria, where they took root and developed
in similar ways (Apter 2005, 181).

The durbar “naturalized” or “hardened” or perhaps “invented” the hierarchical rule of the
north as the dominant ruling order of the country, structuring the ceremony itself in a
racial hierarchy with the northern elite at the top, the moneyed Yoruba and other groups
following on, and finally on the bottom the pagans from the hills, “Naked, black,
swarming like stinging insects. . .” (Apter 2005, 187). Okonta and Douglas (2003, 16)
relate this kind of caste system to the divide-and-rule structures found throughout the
colonial world:
The British were. . . determined to rule the country as two separate political units,
employing the infamous tactics of divide-and-rule that they had perfected in India to keep
the various indigenous groups constantly at each other’s throats.

The durbar as representation of national culture did not disappear with
independence, but rather was shorn of colonial construction and represented as a precolonial item of cultural pride:
165

What the genealogy of the Nigerian durbar really reveals is not, as FESTAC proclaimed,
a decolonization of cultural tradition based on the rejection of imperialism, but rather the
nationalization of colonial tradition by the postcolonial state. Explicitly erased, such
traditions were indigenized through the very festivals and ministries that objectified
culture for citizens and tourists (Apter 2005, 199).

Thus, colonial constructions and naturalizations of authority remain in postcolonial
construction of national, even regional, pride and power as represented by FESTAC.
More broadly, the process of gaining “independence” involved both uniting of north and
south in government and privileging of northern elite in the levers of power:
Governor Arthur Richards’s constitution [instituted in January 1947] united the northern
and southern parts of the country in one central legislature for the first time. Richards,
though, made provisions for regional councils, thus ensuring that the North enjoyed a
greater degree of autonomy and was not “contaminated” by the southern politicians,
whom the colonialists generally looked down upon as upstarts and political agitators.
The Richards constitution thus helped lay the foundation of tribalism in Nigerian politics
and proved a most effective counterfoil to the nationalistic, pan-Nigerian outlook of the
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, which Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe founded in
1944, with the aim of driving the colonialists from the country (Okonta and Douglas
2003, 16).

Contrary to the perception given by neoclassical economic literature or World Bank
research papers and policy overviews, Shell-BP was from the beginning intimately
connected with the colonial regime. Indeed, it was given concessions because British
Petroleum was a British company and the British colonial administration only allowed oil
concessions to be given to British companies and individuals:
The Colonial Mineral Ordinance, enacted by Frederick Lugard shortly after he
amalgamated Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, was the first oil-related legislation
in the country. The 1914 ordinance made oil prospecting in the new country a British
monopoly with ownership rights vested in the crown. The 1937 Colonial Mineral
Ordinance gave Shell D’Arcy (Shell’s operating name in Nigeria at the time) exclusive
exploration and prospecting rights in the country, and the Colonial Office followed this
up a year later with a grant of an Oil Exploration License to the company covering the
entire country. After Shell began oil production from its Oloibiri well in 1958, the
colonial government enacted the 1959 Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance, putting in place
a fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangement between the Nigerian government and foreign oil
companies. Instructively, this was shortly before Nigeria gained independence in
October 1960 (Okonta and Douglas 2003, 23).
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Seen in these interpretations of Nigerian history, the CCPDP can (perhaps too cynically)
be seen as a planned demolition. During project design and implementation, when
participation is a necessary justification, the “natives” become naturally entrepreneurial
though in need of “scaling up” to accommodate globalization.115 After the project is
completed, the natives and their government once again become unstable, hopeless, part
of a nearly “failed state.”

6.2

The oil complex and global petroleum production

Watts relies for his discussion of the oil complex on Rose’s work for notions of
governmentality, but his incorporation of Marxist political economy and broader
discussion of petro-state and oil complex take him in very different directions from either
what Allen (1999, 203) criticizes as Rose’s undue valorization of authority as an exercise
of power, or the “techniques” employed so well by Li (2007) to discuss the World Bank’s
turn toward social development. He begins with the physical and political economic
aspects of oil:
Oil is of course a biophysical entity (a subterranean fluid capable of being pumped and
transmitted); it is also a commodity that enters the market with a price tag and, as such, is
the bearer of particular relations of production (Watts 2003a, 17).

As with previous commodity regimes, petroleum exploitation is about particular capitalist
relationships. As neoclassical economists create a “birth-to-presence” (Rose 1999, 177)
of the entrepreneurial individual, so also they attach particular qualities to oil as a
resource. Thus as discussed in Chapter 5, neoclassical economists argue that, especially
in the absence of institutional supports, oil brings a curse upon economies.

Watts

disagrees with the driver behind this assessment: 116
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See Li’s (2007, 232-233) analysis of the World Bank and community development and bringing to form.
One could usefully compare this fetishization of petroleum with Marx’s (1976, 163ff) commodity fetish
and Coronil’s (1997) “magical state” whereby commodities and state are imbued with particular qualities
that then are presented as internal to the objects themselves.
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Much of this resource politics work is deeply problematic. It either elides the purported
effects of oil with incumbent politics,117 or as Collier’s work illustrates, presumes a
predation-proneness for what is in fact the dynamics of state and corporate enclave
politics. . . what is distinctive about oil is its enclave character and the fact that there are
certain tactical points (nodes in the commodity chain as Le Billon puts it) for holding up
supply (oil flow stations, pipelines) . . . What is striking in all of this resourcepolitics scholarship is the almost total invisibility of both transnational oil
companies (which typically work in joint ventures with the state) and the forms of
capitalism that oil or enclave extraction engenders . . . (Watts 2005a, 53)
. . . in this sort of analysis, it is not clear what causal powers these material and other
features of oil actually possess . . . if oil hinders democracy (as though copper might
liberate parliamentary democracy?), one surely needs to appreciate the centralizing effect
of oil and the state in relation to the oil-based nation-building enterprises that are
unleashed in the context of a politics that predates oil. . . Rather than see oil dependency
as a source of predation or as a source of state military power, other work explores how
oil capitalism produces particular sorts of enclave economies and particular sorts of rule,
characterized by violence and instability, that are rooted in the oil complex. . . (Watts
2005c, 387).

Watts focuses on Nigeria for substantial examples. However, he creatively combines
many conceptual frameworks that help in understanding petroleum exploitation
elsewhere including Chad:
My argument runs something like this: Modern petro-capitalism operates through a
particular “oil complex” (an institutional configuration of firms, state apparatuses, and oil
communities) that constitutes a radical—and multifaceted—challenge to customary forms
of community authority, systems of ethnic identity, and the functioning of local state
institutions. . . The oil complex generates differing sorts of governable spaces in which
identity, territory, and rule are in play. . . (Watts 2007b, 106)
Nigerian petro-capitalism contains a sort of double movement, a contradictory unity of
capitalism and modernity. On the one hand, oil has been a centralizing force that has
rendered the (oil) state more visible and globalized, underwriting a process of statebuilding and national community imagining. On the other hand, oil-led development,
driven by an unremitting political logic of ethnic claims-making and staggering
corruption by the political classes, has become a force of fragmentation and illegitimacy,
radically discrediting the state and its forms of governance. It produced a set of
conditions/communities that have compromised, indeed undermined, the very tenets of
the modern nation-state. In short, one might encapsulate this double movement as the
tension between fiscal centralism and regional/local dispersion. Fernando Coronil (1997)
refers to this conundrum as "the Faustian trade of money for modernity," which in
Venezuela brought "the illusion of development." In Nigeria, too, the double movement
brought spectacle and illusion (Apter 2005): an explosive growth of modern
infrastructure and a (brief) consumption boom for the middle classes, while 85 percent of
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See, for example, Oliveira (2007) argument discussed below that petroleum exploitation differs from
corporate support for coups in Latin America because petroleum MNCs simply benefit from incumbency.
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oil revenues went to 1 percent of the population (and $100 billion of $400 billion simply
went "missing") (2007b, 115).

Figure 1 The Oil Complex - (Watts 2005c, 379)

Because petroleum exploitation is relatively young in Chad, I go into greater detail about
Watt’s Nigeria case and only offer provisional reflections on aspects of Chad’s history
that bear further analysis in the context of the new petroleum economy. However,
petroleum production came to Nigeria under very different circumstances than for Chad.
Initial formal arrangements were simply between Shell and the late colonial and early
postcolonial governments. Petroleum having been discovered and exploitation having
begun in Nigeria over forty years before Chad, the industry had already affected two
generations of Nigerians.

As a result, Watts’ account is a useful antidote to the

neoclassical economic structure, but one must be cautious in using Nigeria’s history to
predict specific outcomes for Chad. Rather the lessons are primarily about general
approaches to exploitation and development study, and how these can effectively inform
study of petroleum exploitation in the Chad basin context.
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Watts concentrates on three sets of governable spaces intimately connected with
the Nigerian context, “[the] space of chieftainship, the space of indigeneity and the space
of the nation state.” Chieftainship (Watts’ space of “force and domination”) has been a
problematic space from the beginnings of indirect rule, as seen in the historical detail. A
“rigid political hierarchy” became selectively crystallized during colonial rule, and
control of land brought with it access to the oil royalties. Because of failure to “deliver
the goods” in the form of oil revenue, the chieftaincies came under increasing pressure
from:
a subtle process of “youth mobilisation”. In an age-graded society like the Nembe [a
center of unrest in the Niger Delta] Ijaw, youth refers to persons typically between their
teens and early forties who, despite whatever achievements they may have obtained
(university degrees, fatherhood, and so on), remain subservient to their elders. Central to
any understanding of the emergence of a militant youth in Nembe town was the catalytic
role played by a former company engineer with Elf Oil Company, Mr. Nimi B.P.
Barigha-Amage. He deployed his knowledge of the oil industry to organise the youths of
the Nembe community into a force capable of extracting concessions from the oil
companies, in essence by converting cultural organization into protection services (Watts
2003a, 19).

The space of chieftainship was not only historically dynamic and internally conflicted but
also implicated in state and corporate interactions. This was not about tightly bounded
identities (states, corporations, communities) colliding or contracting or interacting, but
rather about overlapping forces moving actors, and actors moving forces, in a relational
structure of power that, Watts argues, underpins a form of capitalism. As well, Watts
details the underside of governance. The frictions and sliding alliances in Nembe (in the
Niger Delta), whereby chiefs and youth engage in tenuous alliances/oppositions with oil
majors, not only support stability of a sort but also contribute to making areas steadily
more ungovernable:
Nembe, a town with its own long and illustrious history and politics, had become a sort of
company town in which authority had shifted from the king to warring factions of youth
who were, in varying ways, in the pay of and working in conjunction with the companies.
The council of chiefs stood in a contradictory position, seeking to maintain control over
revenues from the companies and yet intimidated and undermined by the militant youth
groups on whom they depended (Watts 2003a, 20).
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The second “governable space,” indigeneity (Watts’ space of “persuasion and
consent”), was also quite fractious and contested. The most internationally influential
group was MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People) led by Ken SaroWiwa. Saro-Wiwa eventually was hanged by Nigerian strongman Sani Abacha, which
led to international outcry and is generally accepted to have hurt the brand of Shell
Petroleum to the extent that Shell felt it necessary to join the many corporations ascribing
to Corporate Social Responsibility:
What Saro-Wiwa did was to build upon over 50 years of Ogoni organising and upon
three decades of resentment against the oil companies to provide a mass base and a
youth-driven radicalism – and, it must be said, an international visibility – capable of
challenging state power. Yet, at its core, the indigenous subject – and the indigenous
space – was contentious and problematic. . . Indigeneity has, in this sense, unleased [sic –
unleashed] the huge political energies of ethnic minorities who recapitulate in some
respects the postcolonial history of spoils politics in Nigeria. The effect of this multiethnic mobilisation was the production of political and civic organizations and new forms
of governable space, a veritable jigsaw of militant particularisms (Watts 2003a, 23-24).

As a governable space, indigeneity has been as fragmented and contested as the
frequently criticized chieftainship.

However, while contestation of chieftainship

undermines the myopic history of neoclassical economists and World Bank development
practitioners, the contestation of indigeneity also throws into question the reductionist
identity-based social movements and the return to the ‘local’. For this and other reasons,
Watts’ article on “Development and Governmentality” (2003a) is both a challenge to, and
a target of, poststructuralist development theorists including Gibson-Graham, Escobar
and others. The idea of a “post-capitalist space,” whether concentrated on indigeneity or
simply in contrast to capitalism and modernity, is rendered problematic by the challenge
of identity.

In relation specifically to the Chad case, it is important to look for

transformative possibilities not in utopian or small-scale laboratory “non-capitalist” or
“post-capitalist” spaces of the local (cf. Gibson-Graham 2003b) but in decidedly hypercapitalist or hyper-corporate spaces where sustained social interactions (can one call a
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bullet a social interaction?) sustain the kind of “development” underwritten by moreindustrialized countries and driven by multinational corporations.
The third governable space that Watts narrates is the space of nationalism (Watts’
space of “corruption and fraud”).

It is here that the double movement of the “oil

complex”, both centralization of revenue in the national government and increasing
segmentation of the federal state, is most evident:
My point is that the Nigerian national symbolic grew weaker and more attenuated as a
result of the political economy of oil. There was no sense of the national fantasy at the
local level; it was simply a big lie (or a big pocket of oil monies to be raided in the name
of indigeneity). At independence, Obafemi Awolowo, the great western Nigerian
politician, said that Nigeria was not a nation but a “mere geographical expression”; 40
years later this remained true but more so (2003a, 26).

This “geographic expression” comes with the same kind of coercive power that has
characterized exploitation from pre-colonial times.

6.3

CSR and ‘management’ of political instability

Though business and states have been intimately intertwined for generations, the notion
that business can be separate from politics is critical to both neoclassical economic
justifications and idealizations, and World Bank rationales and strategies, as the
discussion of neoclassical economics and economic development above demonstrates.
Mainstream business management literature also projects the image that business is, at
least given an economically ideal climate, separate from politics. Daniels et al (2002,
244) argue in regard to corporate involvement in politics that “. . . given the choice,
multinational enterprises would prefer to do business in ways that would make economic
rather than political sense. Nonetheless, political distortions in many countries simply do
not give an MNE a chance.” In line with this perspective, management of political
instability and CSR can be seen as two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, business
management literature argues that businesses must sometimes consider accommodating
“distorted” regimes if they are to continue making a profit.
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On the other hand,

“distorted” regimes can also damage corporate brand reputations when people connect
corporations with these regimes. Therefore, corporations must strategically adopt CSR in
order to help their images.

As Daniels (2002, 302) argues, “Companies have two

possible objectives for ethical and socially responsible behavior: to create competitive
advantages and to avoid negative consequences by being perceived as irresponsible.”
Frynas (2005, 581-582) engages business literature to question the efficacy of
CSR, and his assessment matches Daniels:
Some oil industry insiders are also highly critical of CSR. Indeed, it is significant that
some of the most scathing criticisms of CSR were expressed in conversations with the
author by former and current oil company staff and company consultants with first-hand
experience of CSR practice in the oil and gas sector, not (as the author expected) by NGO
activists. These are the views of three different industry insiders:


‘CSR is a waste of time.’



‘CSR is about managing perceptions and making people inside and
outside the company feel good about themselves.’



‘CSR is a red herring in terms of development projects.’

He argues (p. 583), in the context of local development projects, that businesses
strategically adopt CSR with the ideas of:


obtaining competitive advantage;



maintaining a stable working environment;



managing external perceptions;



keeping employees happy.

These are ‘business case’ views of CSR. Corporations such as Shell address social
welfare from the perspective of how these actions help the company. This results in very
limited initiatives that often last only as long as they contribute to particular business
strategies:
For instance, Shell’s main Nigerian affiliate Shell Petroleum Development Company
(SPDC) provides its major contract managers with a development budget, so that when a
new pipeline is built, the manager can initiate a new development project within a
community in order to enable pipeline construction to continue unhindered. When the
SPDC team finishes the construction of a particular section of the pipeline, the
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community development budget for the area is simply closed, which follows the logic of
why the firm embarked on the project in the first instance (Frynas 2005, 584-585).

Watts expands the business perspective to look at CSR in the context of the place of oil
as a central strategic economic and security resource: the “oil complex” and the petrostate detailed above. Watts (2005c, 394-395) argues that CSR became very attractive in
the late 20th century for petroleum firms, because of social movement pressure, concerns
about public image, and the threat of mandatory regulation:
The oil complex is a particular manifestation of the ways in which global companies
conduct business in conjunction with failed states, creating conditions in which egregious
human rights violations can occur and have occurred. The oil complex simultaneously
contains the potential for addressing human rights and business practice as civic
regulation through multilateral codes of conduct, and international laws have slowly
provided the ground on which business practice can be assessed. At present, the three key
arenas are environmental rights, bribery/corruption, and protection of civilian security in
relation to laws of war. CSR, however, has until now been dominated by voluntary
corporate codes of conduct in which TNC performance reporting and verification raise
profound issues of credibility (Watts 2005c, 401).

The CCPDP mentioned at the margins that multinational petroleum corporations have
been implicated in human rights abuses, and therefore the human rights and
environmental structures in the project help to allay such concerns and provide a template
for future initiatives. However, the restricted temporal and spatial nature of the project
throws these commitments into question and indeed fits more appropriately into the
“business case” argument that Frynas puts forth.
Watts’ broadening of the CSR context from firm-level (micro) business
management strategies to the larger contexts of the petroleum industry (Skjaerseth et al.
2004) sets up discussion for the return of another critical exposition by Frynas, again
relying especially on business literature (as well as political economy), of corporate
behavior in the sphere of petroleum. Frynas argues that Shell actually calculated in some
benefit from political instability in Nigeria.

Not only, therefore, are petroleum

corporations engaged in an industry with a poor human rights record among other things,
but indeed they may benefit from strategies that impede human rights. Frynas (1998,
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474) touched off a tit-for-tat with the well-referenced argument, “Elite instability in the
form of chaos in the [Nigerian] administration may serve companies by preventing the
government from formulating and executing a petroleum policy designed to control oil
companies.” He (Frynas 1998, 458) engages business literature in this examination, and
in particular the notion of political risk versus political instability:
Instability affects tangible goods such as buildings, equipment and state licences [sic]. In
other words, instability in the form of a riot or new legislation may cause serious damage
to a company’s assets. Risk is not a tangible thing but a bundle of expectations
concerning potential future instability that have a market value and determine future
earnings. In other words, risk is a subjective perception of how instability may affect the
firm and it is assessed in order to predict the likelihood of different types of instability.

Frynas argues that certain types and grades of political instability actually helped Shell to
maintain market dominance and high profits, and therefore arguably decreased political
risk. He breaks his argument into three perspectives. The international perspective is the
most influential, in that it deals with why Shell international managers concentrate on
Nigeria rather than other areas in the world including the countries of the former Soviet
Union. Shell managers, the argument goes, prefer Nigeria in part because political
instability can lead governments to cut increasingly attractive financial deals with Shell:
High profits in Nigeria may be related to high political risks for the oil companies. In
times of political instability, the government may be eager to increase the profit margin
for oil companies in order to maintain the level of the companies’ investments. Indeed,
Khan found that as a general rule the more unpredictable the domestic political situation
in Nigeria, the greater were the incentives given to the oil industry by the government
(Frynas 1998, 468-469).

In addition, Frynas argues that political instability may impede government efforts to
diversify petroleum production:
The Nigerian Government attempted in recent years to diversify foreign and domestic
private sector participation in the oil industry but with very modest success. The
Marginal Fields Degree mentioned earlier, for instance, was never properly enforced.
One could argue that, if the Nigerian government were strong and stable, it would be
capable of much better diversification efforts, which in turn would decrease Shell’s
dominance in the Nigerian economy (Frynas 1998, 470).
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Frynas also mentions in this section that political instability may have assisted Shell in
avoiding sanctions for oil spills. It could blame sabotage on unstable areas, though the
evidence pointed to lower effects of political unrest on oil spills than claimed.
Frynas’ second perspective, the structural perspective, has to do with “firstmover” and other advantages of connections with both colonial and post-colonial
government actors. Shell was able to claim a monopoly on oil exploration areas and
when the British nominally opened up the oil industry to competition, Shell kept the
choice sites that they had already explored. In addition, Shell was able to build personal
contacts with government and military figures that helped them to maintain order even in
the face of resistance. Frynas (1998, 472) mentions controversial security arrangements
such as the following:
According to one report, Shell has even had regular meetings with Major Okuntimo,
former head of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, responsible for many
massacres. Further evidence of connections between state structures and Shell, however,
can be shown by documented cases of `security cooperation’. An incident at Umuechem
in the Niger Delta in 1990 is a ghastly example of that connection. On 29 October the
SPDC’ s Eastern Division manager requested `security protection’, with a preference for
mobile police, in anticipation of an `impending attack’ on oil facilities allegedly planned
for the next day. Within the next few days, mobile police moved in with teargas and
guns, killing around 80 people. A judicial commission of inquiry set up by the state found
that there was no imminent threat of attack and that the mobile police displayed `a
reckless disregard for lives and property’. Shell showed itself to be apologetic for the
incident and tried to distance itself from Major Okuntimo. Okuntimo understandably
considered Shell rather ungrateful because he was risking his life to protect Shell oil
installations (Human Rights Watch 1995).

The final perspective is the strategic perspective. According to this perspective, Shell
found aspects of Nigerian political instability to offer specific strategic benefits vis-à-vis
other business opportunities:
It is . . . suggested here that Shell’s strategic planning may contribute to Shell’s desire to
stay in Nigeria despite political instability. Shell’s own assessment of the political
economy of oil in Nigeria may offer a few clues. An internal Shell ‘scenario-approach’
study in the early 1970s compared a number of oil producing countries according to three
factors. The first factor was ‘production motivation’, a country’s desire for high
depletion of oil reserves. The second was `take motivation’ a country’s desire for highest
take of oil revenues. The third was `absorptive capacity’, a country’s ability to absorb oil
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revenues. As far as of long-term prospects were concerned, Nigeria came top in the
categories `take motivation’ and `absorptive capacity’ and third highest in the category
`production motivation’ in the study. Thus Nigeria had the advantage for Shell because it
had ready oil reserves for unlimited depletion, the country’s rulers were willing to rely
heavily on oil and the beneficiaries of oil were able to spend revenues without limitation.
According to these criteria, corruption, mismanagement, reliance on oil or the right to
unlimited destruction of the environment may paradoxically be conducive to business
(Frynas 1998, 473).

Frynas continues that there is evidence Shell saw the Ogoni area as a sort of “option,”
when it pulled out finally after the unrest and controversy became too great. That is, the
Ogoni area was still a relatively underexploited petroleum area that Shell could re-enter
when the prices and the circumstances were more auspicious.
Frynas’ article was potentially very damaging to the images that businesses seek
to project, and Shell representatives (Detheridge and Pepple 1998) responded with an
article stating that Frynas had many facts wrong and that he had refused to talk with Shell
representatives to clear up inaccuracies before publishing the article. Frynas (2000)
replied with a short rejoinder arguing that he did indeed attempt to meet with Shell
officials but he refused to alter his article per their request, and also pointing out the
important fact that Shell representatives backed their claims up with very few references
while his claims were based on well-regarded work like that of political economist
Ahmad Khan (1994). He used their reply to further emphasize that when corporations
are attacked, a very important strategy is to undermine the character of their critic:
As I stated at the outset, it is in the self-interest of any corporation to undermine the
credibility of a researcher who would throw doubt on the benevolent image the oil
industry is trying to create. Indeed, I expect that Shell’ s PR staff will continue to attack
my writing after the publication of this rejoinder, even though the credibility of their
evidence is highly questionable (163).

As I indicate in the conclusion, one relatively low-cost “marketing department” strategy
of responding to external pressure is to undermine the credibility of those who bring the
pressure.
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Chapter 7 Conclusions: Neoclassical economics as spectacle
This project has been an examination of disjunctures among narratives about the CCPDP,
and in particular how the neoclassical economic narrative is a spectacle, making “an
exhibited ‘people’ . . . more real and authentic than the lands and people themselves”
(Apter 2005, 89). I sought to show this by looking at fissures in narratives about the
CCPDP. In brief, the social development aspects of the project failed; Chad continues to
be an authoritarian, unstable and impoverished country; and yet petroleum continues to
flow.

These fissures, I argued, fit closely with a relatively coherent interplay of

narratives (encompassing approximately 600 years) about key commodity and especially
petroleum exploitation in Chad’s neighbor Nigeria, whereby economic discourse along
with other discourses are exhibits or spectacles that have been adapted to different stages
of key commodity exploitation and control in Nigeria. At the same time that such
exhibits have made their way into British discussion of Nigeria, people directly impacted
by key commodity exploitation have been “fixed in place” through multiple spectacular
and quotidian modes of exercising power.
In this conclusion, I summarize and synthesize these narratives, showing how
they interrelate and inform one another as well as reflect and engage with broader
theoretical treatments. I follow with reflection on implications for research projects
regarding the Chad basin, more effective engagement with business in development and
social transformation in general, and multimodal exercise of power. The narratives about
the CCPDP were in essence different lenses through which events were represented and
about which prescriptions were formed. In the first narrative, presented through World
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Bank documents, the CCPDP seems a clear case in support of transaction-cost
neoinstitutional economics. The Chadian government makes moves consistent with a
country approaching the threshold of political development necessary to support effective
economic growth (cell ii of Williamson’s matrix). As a result, the World Bank allies
with multinational corporations (key containers of entrepreneurship and technology) to
take the risk on this country and provide support in helping the country to develop the
institutions necessary to avoid the resource curse and Dutch disease, and thus grow a
petroleum industry. This industry would provide the necessary revenue to improve the
social welfare of one of the poorest countries in the world, a country that otherwise has a
comparative advantage in goods (especially cotton) insufficient to provide for its welfare.
However, according to this narrative, it quickly becomes clear after implementation of
the CCPDP that the Chadian government has not reached the threshold of political
development, but rather continues to be an extremely poor country with an authoritarian
and increasingly unstable government, firmly located in cell iv of Williamson’s matrix
(below thresholds of political and economic development). On the optimistic end of
neoinstitutional economic theory, one could use North’s ideas to argue that change may
come to Chad, but it requires a long slow process of institutional change across historical
time. Most of Africa, in North’s descriptions of the Third World, is still too enmeshed in
“hunter-gatherer heritage” and “tribal societies” to quickly orient institutions toward
effective modern economic development such as that supporting petroleum production.
One could also reasonably use this narrative to argue like Gould (2007) that the
World Bank and corporations were naïve in trusting their power to influence the Chadian
government.118 Gould argues that only strong political intervention by the World Bank
118

A similar criticism to mine is made by Mary Lynn Cramer, regarding the 2008 economic crisis, in
“Stiglitz's Foolishly Flawed Morality.” http://www.counterpunch.com/cramer12152008.html. Accessed
17 December 2008. Stiglitz, Cramer writes, “chalks the whole affair up to naiveté on the part of his fellow
economists, bankers and bureaucrats. (Hey, he tried to tell them!)” See Stiglitz, Joseph. “Capitalist fools.”
http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/2009/01/stiglitz200901. Accessed 17 December 2008.
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could have prevented the government from engaging in an “obsolescing bargain” (see
Vernon 1971) whereby authoritarian elites used the sunk costs and “institutional fixity”
of the project to extract greater concessions from the World Bank. However, this clean,
technical, depoliticized narrative quickly breaks down when focus shifts away from
World Bank documents and into messy accounts from journalists, current and former
World Bank officials outside of the official documents, social movement and NGO
reports. These accounts are filled with he-said/she-said politicized contestation where
adjudication of “the truth” by non-participants all-too-often comes down to which group
one trusts more. Furthermore, multinational corporations become players rather than
simply containers of entrepreneurship and technology that appear as producer
placeholders in, or patrons of, project reports. However, as I discuss further below,
representatives of multinational corporations are not particularly engaged in this giveand-take. Rather, almost all material for public consumption from corporate actors sticks
closely to the official narrative except that the narrative is largely devoid of discussion
about instability in Chad outside of the petroleum enclaves (see, for example, the project
materials at www.esso.com).
In one of the major instances of contestation, the explosion of protests in late
1999 and 2000 had a clear effect on World Bank designs, though the WDRs and the
CCPDP reports place agency with the World Bank, and its new thinking about economics
and development, rather than any external pressure.

The EIR, however, was an

acknowledged response to pressure from Ricardo Navarro of Friends of the Earth, at a
World Bank/NGO discussion in preparation for the Prague World Bank meetings.
Whether one sides with EIR project manager and report author Elim Salim, opposition
social movements, or the World Bank, it is clear that time, space and substance all matter.
The EIR report itself was very long in preparation and, to the surprise of many who
distrusted Elim Salim and questioned the location of the project headquarters in DC
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rather than Indonesia, the report was quite critical of World Bank extractive industry
policies and quite explicit about the controversial human rights and environmental
records of multinational corporations. However, after another long period of time and to
the public consternation of Elim Salim, the World Bank management response was
essentially dismissive of the conclusions. In sum, World Bank management argued that
petroleum production was important for those (such as Chad) without other choices and
that the Bank could not allow projects to be vetoed by one interest group. Therefore
projects should include “consultation with” rather than “consent of” local populations.
The non-official CCPDP accounts reflect some of the same pressures as
surrounded the EIR. This makes sense as the project was initiated during the same time
as the EIR. However, according to Calderisi’s perspective as well as news accounts,
central World Bank officials at least were dismissive from the beginning of social
movement opposition though not necessarily social movements themselves. Calderisi’s
comment (2006, 184) defining “good” and “bad” social movements is particularly direct:
“Some international groups with limited exposure to the Bank’s work or dated
information on the project had genuine concerns that needed to be addressed. But the
Washington, DC, groups, who should have known better, simply twisted the facts. . .”
Wolfensohn’s description (Mutame 2000) of the “Berkeley mafia” being against the
“Chadians” (“‘and I for my part, am more interested in the Chadians’”) bolsters this
interpretation of World Bank attitudes toward especially those social movements who
persisted in opposition even after the World Bank reached out to them with “the facts.”
Social movements, for their part, argued that it was their pressure which led to
placement of most environmental and social welfare provisions into the CCPDP. Social
movements also maintained that they were the agents of information distribution to
Chadian people who had little information about the project and, after getting
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information, were generally opposed to it. Furthermore, World Bank claims of Chadian
government transformation as evidenced by the revenue management law hide evidence
that the government only signed the law after Bank officials threatened to pull their
support for the CCPDP.

After acceding to social movement pressure and adding

environmental and social monitoring to the project documents, the World Bank and
corporations became impatient with the time required to respond to these pressures. As a
result, they began labeling NGOs as self-interested outsiders so that they would not have
to include any additional provisions in the project documents. Social movement reports
about staged proclamations of Chadian support (including a Senegalese dance troupe
brought in because the members ostensibly supported the project) add to the cynicism
regarding the project.
These opposing accounts of the same time period serve as important indications
of the fissures that characterized the actual playing out of the CCPDP design,
development, construction, and implementation. Neoclassical economic accounts and
World Bank official reports tend to shear away the messy interactions and political
pressures, pressures which muddle the images of relatively autonomous individuals
seeking to maximize their perceived welfare in institutional structures providing
incentives for effective or ineffective economic activity. The disjuncture between IFI
policy and practice is covered well by Gould (2005) and others in Mosse and Lewis’
(2005) edited volume, in that policy is primarily about interpretation while practice has to
do with social relationships and organization.
However, though the social development goals of the CCPDP have failed and the
Chadian polity is unstable, petroleum still flows from the Doba oilfield, and ExxonMobil
among others still negotiates for greater control of petroleum production (Africa Energy
Intelligence 2009). I have suggested that this characteristic and many others of the
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CCPDP go beyond disjunctures between policy and practice and instead fit into a
counter-narrative, which parallels the history of key commodity exploitation in the
“geographical expression” that is Nigeria. First, the project plan was hyper-documented,
in that social and environmental plans comprised many volumes of text and the project
implementation was designed to be accompanied by myriad overlapping monitors from
the Bank, government, and private sector. Most of these monitors themselves produced,
and continue to produce (in the case of the IAG and ECMG for example) reports. This
hyper-documentation serves as an example of development subjects as the “birth-topresence of a form of being that pre-exists” but yet requires extended and invasive expert
intervention to bring it to fruition. As Mawdsley and Rigg (2003, 271) point out, for
example, “participation” and “empowerment” are depoliticized – “ rendered technical” in
Li’s (2007, 7-10, 234) terms – and valued “primarily for [their] contribution to the main
goal of economic growth,” which underlies why I term the World Bank’s new approach
development as governance. This hyper-documentation, whereby a population is visited
with myriad plans and sub-projects, also mirrors Craig and Roberts’ (2006, 171-172)
description of people in Uganda being overwhelmed by the planned “empowerment”
projects that they were expected to complete. When one project has deadlines, the other
projects suffer.
This hyper-documented project plan design and monitoring, I have argued,
masked a project hyper-restricted in temporal and spatial scope. In the first instance of
hyper-restricted scope, the social development portion of the project experienced
problems from the beginning, being visited by long delays in implementation, and after
being substantially weakened in 2006 by halting of the future generations fund, was
formally and quietly shut down by the World Bank in late 2008.

The monitoring

missions (particularly the IAG) were often critical of project implementation, but as
Massey (2005, 273) argues, represent “transparency over compliance,” in that the same
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problems were duly documented without significant corresponding improvements over
the course of many monitoring visits. Massey applies such preference for transparency
over compliance to the accompanying EIR as well. The winding down and ending of the
social development portions of the CCPDP almost in parallel with the completion of the
pipeline and beginning of petroleum flow, is nearly a textbook replication of Frynas’
(2005, 585) description of CSR-based social welfare projects that are limited to the
duration of oilfield development: “When the SPDC [Shell Petroleum Development
Company] team finishes the construction of a particular section of the pipeline, the
community development budget for the area is simply closed, which follows the logic of
why the firm embarked on the project in the first instance.” In the case of the CCPDP,
however, the World Bank led the general social welfare development initiatives while the
consortium has restricted itself to projects and reports directly associated with the area
around the oilfield and the pipeline.
The CCPDP was also hyper-restricted in that the project was designed and
supported with expectation of revenues coming from petroleum exploitation well beyond
the Doba oil field and deep into the Chad basin. This broader petroleum exploitation
would be outside the constraints of the CCPDP. Fah (2007) and McGregor (2008)
discuss the project developers’ regional economic aspirations, and Fah also (p. 105)
argues that increased U.S. government interventions in the region provide evidence of the
Chad basin and larger Gulf of Guinea’s strategic economic importance. This point can
also be underlined by looking at Forest and Sousa’s (2006) concentration on the Gulf of
Guinea as an important military theater for U.S. security. The rapid manner in which the
social welfare portion of the project, still being duly documented and reported, quickly
fell by the wayside adds to the sense of cynicism suggested by Keenen. For Keenan
(2005, 399), it is hard to counter the argument by cynics that a framework of corruption
and mismanagement “is in the misguided interests of all three parties – the ExxonMobil184

led oil consortium, the Chad government and the World Bank.”
As with any project in the initial stages of the process, the narrative surrounding
the CCPDP in this project has been admittedly and necessarily provisional, for three
major reasons. First, Chad has been at the margins of key commodity production since it
was colonized, and therefore does not have the long history of exploitation to draw on for
analysis.

Secondly, the CCPDP has only been active (in design, development and

implementation) for a decade, too short a time for the actors’ strategies, interactions,
plans, oppositions and contradictions to play out. Finally, too little research has been
done at this time on petroleum corporations in Chad. Corporations, as I allude to in
various parts of my project, both comprise one of the main categories of protagonists and
are all-too-often made invisible or all-too-often try to make their less-attractive
production activities invisible particularly with regard to social welfare considerations or
questions about their political role.

The anecdotes involving individual corporate

representatives rather than “corporate faces” (e.g. reports by ExxonMobil, Shell, Esso),
point largely toward management of image and signing of contracts, as seen by the final
negotiations involving Wolfensohn and ExxonMobil’s Lee Raymond as they sought final
signatures on the project, or reports of ExxonMobil making secret agreements with the
Chadian government to increase royalty payments in return for sidelining Petronas.
Given these caveats, however, the textbook “planned demolition” nature of the
social welfare portions of the CCPDP, the well-documented “management” of social
movement opposition, and the explicit link of the project to shifts in neoclassical
economic theory make the Chad and the CCPDP an excellent contemporary case whose
probable future trends can be informed by analyses of Nigeria’s much broader temporal
and spatial scale. Nigeria has been an appropriate case for comparison because it is a
geographic neighbor of Chad, has experienced a long history of exploitation across types
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of key commodities, and presently is one of the largest petroleum producers in the world.
By looking at the long history of key commodity exploitation including petroleum
production in Nigeria, I have used many of the distinct, coherent and long-lasting (across
multiple time periods and commodity types) trends that have similarities to the CCPDP.
As a result, I have been able to gain a good sense of the spectacle that is neoclassical
economics as well as the “ungovernable governmentality” that is key commodity
exploitation “on the ground” in Nigeria and now Chad. Here, to sum up, are key lessons
that I believe the Nigeria case brought to the table and that I have covered in this project.
First, Okonta and Douglas, combined with Apter, provide effective historical support for
the idea of economics (joined with religion and ‘civilization’) as spectacle in their
descriptions of events surrounding hardening of colonial control in the Niger Delta:
The enormous riches to be derived from the Niger Delta and the other coastal towns
opened the eyes of the British traders and, subsequently, of the government itself, to the
possibilities of taking over the area entirely, by force if necessary. . . (Okonta and
Douglas 2003, 10)
Framed within the idiom of a humanitarian crusade against the depredations of savagery
was the assertion of a new economic order, pursued in the language of fair trade and
rational contract. The new masters of the river were the Niger Company factors with
their guns and their law (Apter 2005).

I have argued that the coherence between this amalgam of exhibit and actual fixing in
place of the people of the Niger Delta through spectacular and quotidian violence have
striking parallels to the narrative of the rise and fall of the CCPDP and therefore the
people of Chad, which masks the fixing in place of a regional site of petroleum
production.

Chapter 6 alludes to many other parallels through the history of key

commodity production in Nigeria. These parallels of violence and corruption respect no
boundaries of commodity type, undermining the popular “resource curse” arguments
accompanying neoclassical analyses of petroleum production.
Secondly, Watts’ articulation of the “oil complex” as a site of largely
“ungovernable governmentality” serves to interrogate more directly, again primarily with
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reference to the Nigeria case, the idea that petroleum necessarily contains within itself the
seeds of corruption and authoritarianism. He argues (2005b, 53) that while petroleum
production is characterized by enclaves and “tactical points for holding up supply,”
corruption and authoritarianism cannot be understood except with reference to “a politics
that predates oil. . . oil capitalism produces particular sorts of enclave economies and
particular sorts of rule characterized by violence and instability, that are rooted in the oil
complex. . .” This oil complex characterized by violence and instability importantly does
not simply include government, “civil society,” or “traditional rule,” as is implied by so
much economic and development literature. Rather, as demonstrated by examinations of
key commodity exploitation throughout Nigerian history, corporate forms from the Royal
Niger Company through Royal Dutch Shell have been intimately involved in influencing
if possible and creating if necessary the “politics that predates oil.” Two points are
particularly important about this. First, the long historical hegemony of corporate forms
cannot and should not be reduced simply to some kind of strategic conspiracy. It is
important to recognize the dynamism and uncertainty of such exploitation, and more
critically to engage “actually existing dynamisms” as played out in particular cases
whether it is the Niger Delta or the Chad basin through the CCPDP. Watts articulates
this well through combining recognition of violence with the mobilization of Foucauldian
notions of “government” and “governmentality.” “Government [for Foucault, is] a more
or less calculated and rational set of ways of shaping conduct and of securing rule
through a multiplicity of authorities and agencies in and outside of the state and at a
variety of spatial levels” (Watts 2003a, 13).

Corporate elite are not puppeteers,

relentlessly pulling the strings of “the masses” so that the masses unthinkingly do the will
of the elite. This imputes entirely too much intelligence on corporate elite and is a
critical weakness of much literature in both traditions of Gramscian hegemony (where
domination is significantly about “controlling the boundaries of consciousness”) and
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Foucaldian governmentality (where as Allen points out domination tends too much
toward following “authority” and micro-behaviors of self-regulation). Rather success
depends on effectively engaging and when possible influencing the uncertainty,
instability and risk that is “men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those
things that are [economic resources], those other things that are customs, habits . . . and
finally . . . those still other things that might be accidents and misfortunes. . .” (Foucault
2000, 201-22). As I suggest below, this dynamism and uncertainty should be explored
further, for example by looking at how corporations respond to social movement
pressure.
The second important point about the oil complex, and one of the fundamental
innovations of resource control, is how such control manages to operate “under the
radar,” masked by all manner of ideologies and institutions. This is not a new point, but
it seems necessary to continue to make this point in different ways because attempts up to
the present have not been particularly effective at dealing with this. Marx divided “under
the radar” control into base/superstructure, while Gramsci broke it up into “relatively
autonomous spheres” (Lears 1985, 571) where the economic sphere still (in Lears
analysis) “[determines] what forms of consciousness are possible.” Allen pushes this
forward by suggesting “multiple modalities” (including seduction, manipulation,
negotiation, coercion, authority) through which resources are mobilized to exercise
power. This is a fundamental part of business literature itself, a point beyond the space of
this project, and petroleum companies are as able as any group of transnational
corporations to mobilize such resources and stay under the radar. Watts’ (2005b, 53)
comment that “[w]hat is striking in all this resource-politics [resource curse] scholarship
is the almost total invisibility of transnational oil companies. . .” is quite important here
and is also relevant in the case of my narrative about the CCPDP. Transnational oil
companies only appear in the CCPDP as report authors, fleetingly in accounts of project
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development and implementation, or occasionally as news breaks of negotiations with
government figures.
This is as corporate leaders wish, as seen in Watts’ and Frynas’ accounts in
particular about CSR, corporations and political instability.

This can be usefully

considered the new version of Apter’s (2005, 151) “idiom of a humanitarian crusade
against the depredations of savagery. . . assertion of a new economic order . . . [and]
language of fair trade and rational contract.” Furthermore, the monitoring of oilfields
only by the corporate-funded External Compliance Monitoring group (as the Chadian
inter-ministerial CTNSC was often without funds for monitoring the oilfield) fits in with
Watts’ (2005c, 401) concern that “TNC performance reporting and verification raise
profound issues of credibility.” Even more cynically, in line with Keenan’s comment
referenced above, the CCPDP seems to confirm Frynas’ (1998) thesis that effectively
managed political instability may actually be a competitive advantage for first-mover
firms like Shell Petroleum. Could it be that ExxonMobil, and perhaps also Chevron and
Petronas, actually benefit from getting a foothold in the Doba enclave and then
effectively managing Chadian civil war and instability so as to benefit from first-mover
advantages in petroleum exploitation across the entire Chad basin? I suggest three broad
areas in which this project provides material for future research. First, it shows the
importance of going beyond state-centric case analyses and looking at regional forces and
corporate interventions. Secondly, it provides case material for critically examining the
role and character of corporations and others in responding to political pressure by social
movements. Finally, it provides a view into how exercise of power can be substantively
explored as comprising multiple modalities (not only, for example, domination and
resistance).

7.1

Regional research of exploitation in the Chad basin

This project supports future research in two major areas with regard to the Chad basin
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and petroleum exploitation across the Gulf of Guinea region. First, the CCPDP must be
considered in relation to the Chad basin as a region and Chad as a “geographic
expression” in important ways. Much work has been done from a regional perspective on
petroleum exploitation in this area of Africa, including that referenced above in regard to
the Chad basin. Some work (see especially Rowell 2005) concentrates on the Niger
Delta as the most influential area in “the next Gulf” (supplanting the Persian Gulf). Other
work, such as Roitman (2001; 2004; 2005), concentrates beyond petroleum on the Chad
basin as a region where “power is not [necessarily] sovereign.” That is, state actors may
not exercise much semblance of sovereignty over the Chad basin, but the state can still
profit from “rents and the means of redistribution” (Roitman 2001, 241). Still other
work, such as Forest and Sousa’s emphasis on national security (2006) and Oliveira’s
(2007) state-based comparative politics focus, concentrate on the Gulf of Guinea as
encompassing the area from Nigeria to Angola and now including the Chad basin
interior. I argue that the regional perspective holds three interrelated lessons in particular
for research. First, it is critical to continue rich multidisciplinary work such as that found
in the case of Nigeria, and to apply such work more systematically to petroleum
exploitation in the Chad basin. Such work must include interactions like those that
Frynas presents of ‘local people’, government representatives, and corporate
representatives. Another important case study to emulate would be Sawyer’s (2004)
Crude Chronicles, which details from a view very sympathetic to corporate opposition
(as Sawyer acknowledges herself), direct engagements between social movement,
government and corporate representatives. One particularly interesting and applicable
aspect of Sawyer’s narrative (p. 6) has the petroleum industry executive (in her
Ecuadorian case, an Arco executive) instructing social movement actors on “the nature of
democracy” while the government minister sits silently by.

This would seem to

contradict the public face that corporate actors present of their wish to remain outside of
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politics and let state or World Bank actors take the lead on issues such as regime type and
the nature of political representation.
The second lesson for future regional research approaches is that experiences of
the three distinct Gulf of Guinea regions of Nigeria, Chad basin and Angola (as well as
smaller polities such as Equatorial Guinea along the coast) should be treated
comparatively as well as part of the larger global “oil complex.”

Nigeria is often

contrasted with Angola in that petroleum production in Nigeria is more onshore while
Angola concentrates on offshore oil supplies. Offshore production for Angola prevents
much of the social disruption found in Nigeria (e.g. Frynas 1998, 462), while the Chad
basin is populated by many states with even weaker sovereignty than Nigeria. How do
corporations deal with the area as a region (rather than with individual states as Oliveira
does)?

7.2

Corporate engagements and social movement pressure

Relatedly, it is important to engage in systematic research of corporate relations that
ranges deeper into such relations than the typical government-market perspectives. The
first step in such examination is to apprehend business literature.

Such an endeavor is

far beyond the scope of this project. However, this project’s examination of the CCPDP
case and more broadly the Nigerian case provide indications of the importance and
distinctiveness of business, and business literature provides important insights into
connections with economics as well as strategies for managing employees, consumers,
even governments. At the strategic management level, for example, Dunning (2006)
provides insights into a business-centered development model, what he refers to as a
“new paradigm of development,” which presents corporations as engaging in more
collaborative relations with one another than the competitive arrangements embodied in
Williamson’s make-or-buy decisions based on opportunism. It should be noted, however,
that business literature is also depoliticized, with publications arguing as a rule that
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business simply seeks to make a profit and that governments and civil society should be
responsible for taking their share of the value added to provide for the social welfare of
their people.
The Nigeria case demonstrates how corporate and state actors and institutional
forms have been intimately interacting for many generations, thus throwing into question
the ideological battles about state planning versus the private sector and the market.
First, how do government and corporate elite in less-industrialized countries interact with
one another in light of the representations of two distinctly different institutions
(government and corporations)?

Secondly, it is important to examine deeper the

relationships between executives such as Lee Raymond and James Wolfensohn, to
understand how agreements such as the CCPDP are put together and ascertain stronger
trends than anecdotes from books or newspapers. Such investigations must include
ethnographic research, interviews, and examination of applicable business literature.
This project also contributes case study material to questions about how
corporations engage oppositional pressure. Allen’s multiple modalities through which
power is exercised are quite useful here, because corporations in particular but also
organizations such as the World Bank employ varied strategies for managing image and
other risks in ways that at best increase profit and at worst provide the most effective
damage control in situations where social movement or other pressure causes real damage
to corporate operations. Based in large part on material collected for this project, I
provisionally hypothesize the following ways, organized in three sets, that contemporary
business interacts with external pressure such as from social movements. The first set
has to do with organizational transformation. First, if corporations assess that pressure
hits at their core organization, then they may employ what I call the “executive suite”
approach whereby they fundamentally change their corporate operations. Secondly, if
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corporate executives assess that pressure is quite great but not to the extent that it affects
core operations, they may adopt a “risk management” approach whereby some
organizational change is considered necessary to relieve the pressure, but not enough to
effect core corporate operations. I suggest for example that Shell had to adopt a “risk
management” approach in response to the Ogoni nine hanging and the Brent Spar.
The second set of ways that corporations engage social movement pressure has to
do with perceptual transformation. First, corporations may determine that pressure can
be addressed through managing perceptions of “key stakeholders.” This seems to be the
strategy adopted by the World Bank and petroleum corporations in regard to both the EIR
and the CCPDP. Such perceptual management may take the form of burnishing the
organization’s own reputation, as World Bank officials in particular sought to do in
regard to the CCPDP, and what Shell and others attempt to do through CSR development
projects that end immediately after the construction is complete in an area. The second
form is to attempt damage to the other party’s credibility, as was certainly the case
regarding the “Washington elite” and “Berkeley mafia” among the social movements,
and was also the case when Shell sought to damage Frynas’ credibility in regard to
political instability and petroleum production in Nigeria. The third form is to co-opt the
language of protest and actually use the language to the corporate advantage.
The third set of ways that corporations may respond, to pressure that they feel has
no traction, is the “close the front door” approach where they simply ignore the pressure
and hope that it continues to lack traction. This may be quite useful in cases where there
is clear backlash against the pressure on the corporation, but carries perhaps the most risk
of all forms. If the pressure does have traction, as in the case of Nigeria’s Ogoni nine,
then the corporation may be forced like Shell into risk management mode or perhaps
even initiatives that truly change the corporate organization.
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All of these forms are often used concurrently, as situations arise. Indeed, I
submit with evidence in particular regarding the ability of corporations to remain largely
behind the scenes regarding the CCPDP, as well as the ability of corporate actors to
sustain exploitation across generations, that it is critical to creatively assess such moves,
and note the ways in which realities are constructed, both on the ground and in minds.
There is no doubt that life in Chad and Nigeria is violent, that visions of growth through
entrepreneurship and the market do resonate in some circles, and that governmentality as
self-regulation is operable not only for those to whom the spectacle of neoclassical
economics is directed but also for those fixed in place by other means of authority (not
only indigeneity, state, corporation but also church and various forms of ‘tradition’).

7.3

Engaging multimodal power

Perhaps the fundamental lesson this project contributes to is that development cannot be
understood except with reference to power, and power cannot be understood except
through multiple spatially and temporally informed modalities through which power is
exercised:
[Power] often makes its presence felt through a variety of modes playing across one
another. The erosion of choice, the closure of possibilities, the manipulation of
outcomes, the threat of force, the assent of authority or the inviting gestures of a
seductive presence, and the combinations thereof. A simple domination/resistance
framework in this respect trivializes the feeling for what power is when it is brushed up
against (Allen 2003, 196).

In particular, this project sought to show that neoclassical economics, rather than being
the driver of business and development practice “in spite of itself,” is instead a spectacle,
an exhibit “more real and authentic than the people themselves.”

The “people”

themselves, in this case the people impacted directly by the CCPDP, are relatively fixed
in place through broad instruments of what Watts (2007b, 108) refers to as
governmentality characterized by what “looks like ungovernability.” Thus, Allen’s as
well as Rose’s notions of power as authority are extended, whereby exploitation can be
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sustained by judicious capitalization on micro-politics of instability and violence, what
can be called “ungovernable governmentality.”

The proclamation that neoclassical

economics is irrelevant in important ways to such “ungovernable governmentality”
should not, however, lead to dismissal of the power of neoclassical economics in those
sites amenable to such power. Rather, the technical, objective, depoliticized language of
neoclassical economics wields great power in justifying deep intervention into, even
violence against, other societies. For those unacquainted with realities of exploitation,
this power is particularly great.119

Thus, attempts to undermine the discourse of

neoclassical economics itself are useful, laudable and important.

The open and

ambiguous treatment of power expands analysis and engagement beyond neoclassical
economics, however, and both admits the potency of power wielded by business in
particular behind the scenes, and the ambiguity of such power that provides openings for
undermining existing regimes of exploitation and affecting core transformation of global
power.

119

Leys’ (1996, 101-102) trenchant perspective on the “New Political Economy” (NPE), of which North
forms a part, is relevant here:
Is it far-fetched to imagine that part of the appeal of the NPE lies in its very blandness and
indeterminacy, its essential lack of substance?
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Appendix 1 – HDI 1975-2005
HDI Trends 2000-2005
Chad and Sub-Saharan Africa
Nigeria
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Figure 2 Calculated on the basis of data on life expectancy from UN (United Nations), 2007e. World
Population Prospects 1950-2050: The 2006 Revision. Database. Department of Ecopnomic and Social
Affairs, Population Division, New York; data on adult literacy rate rates from UNESCO (United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2003.
Correspondence on adult and youth literacy rates. March, Montreal. and UNESCO (United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2007a. Correspondence on
adult and youth literacy rates. May, Montreal.; data on combined gross enrolment ratios from
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics.
1999. Statistical yearbook. Montreal. and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 2007c. Correspondence on education data and
indicators. April, Montreal; and data on GDP per capita (2000 PPP US$) and GDP per capita (PPP
US$) from World Bank. 2007b. World Development Indicators 2007. Washington D.C.

The aggregate trends of Human Development Indicators provide interesting quantitative
information.

First and foremost, Chad showed consistent improvement in the HDI

indicators from 1975-2000 but fell precipitously during the time of the CCPDP.
Secondly, during the same time, low-HDI countries on average improved consistently.
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This on its face would seem to support the idea of a resource curse. However, Nigeria,
also an assumed victim of the resource curse, improved throughout the period of
petroleum boom and bust into the 2000s. In the final analysis, HDI indicators simply
point to lack of improvement though they do not support any conclusive explanation
answering why Chad did not improve.
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Appendix 2 – Abbreviations
CCPDP .............................................................. Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Project
CCSRP ............. Collège de Contrôle et de Surveillance des Ressources Pétrolières
CDF ........................................................ Comprehensive Development Framework
CLS ...................................................................................... Core Labour Standards
CRS .....................................................................................Catholic Relief Services
ECMG ............................................. Environmental Compliance Monitoring Group
EIR .............................................................................. Extractive Industries Review
FESTAC ..........................................Festival of Black and African Arts and Culture
IAG ............................................................................ International Advisory Group
IDA .............................................................International Development Association
IFIs ..................................................................... International Financial Institutions
MNE................................................................................... Multinational Enterprise
NPE ..................................................................................... New Political Economy
PRS ............................................................................. Poverty Reduction Strategies
PRSP ..................................................................Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
WBG ...........................................................................................World Bank Group
WDR ............................................................................. World Development Report
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